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Résumé
Cette thèse s’inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui vise à réintégrer les institu-
tions et l’identité sociales en économie et ce pour trois raisons. Premièrement, de
nombreuses expériences comportementales ont mis à mal le modèle conventionnel
de l’agent égoïste maximisateur en raison notamment du rôle joué par les normes
sociales. Deuxièmement, les groupes sociaux, et l’identité qui en découle, peuvent
déprécier les attentes des individus les plus démunis et limiter leurs "capabilités"
selon le terme de A. Sen. Dernièrement, ces institutions peuvent contrecarrer l’al-
location efficiente des ressources. Dans cette thèse, nous présentons un modèle qui
décrit la ségrégation comme un des équilibres provenant d’une distribution inégale
du pouvoir. L’intérêt de ce modèle réside, premièrement, dans la reconnaissance que
les sociétés ségréguées sont aussi celles où le pouvoir est très inégalement réparti,
deuxièmement, dans le fait que la ségrégation peut apparaitre en l’absence de préju-
gés, troisièmement dans les définitions données du pouvoir et de la ségrégation qui
sont suffisamment amples pour recouvrir un grand nombre de situations, et enfin,
dans le processus qui mène d’une situation neutre à la ségrégation. Dans le second
chapitre nous montrons que la caste détermine considérablement le statut social
perçu des intouchables et des tribus. Néanmoins, d’autres facteurs comme le revenu,
la profession et dans une moindre mesure l’éducation ont aussi une importance. De
plus la caste a un effet à la fois direct et indirect, ce dernier s’exprimant par une
influence réduite du revenu sur le statut social perçu. Nous interprétons ces résul-
tats comme l’internalisation de la discrimination subie depuis des siècles, qui abaisse
l’image de soi et diminue les attentes. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous mettons en
évidence la persistance des pratiques d’intouchabilité. Nous montrons que le nombre
de crimes contre les intouchables est positivement relié à une distribution commu-
nautaire de l’eau. Les règles de castes prohibent le contact des intouchables avec
les sources d’eau des castes supérieures. Bien que ces règles soient anticonstitution-
nelles, elles sont encore largement appliquées et de manière violente. A priori, ces
règles ne concernent pas uniquement l’eau mais aussi une grande partie des biens
publics, ce qui laisse à penser que ces derniers sont en réalité des biens de club ou de
caste. Ce dernier point est étudié dans le chapitre 4. Nous montrons que si l’indice
de fractionalisation a un effet sur la présence dans les villages de biens publics, cet
effet est essentiellement positif. En revanche les indices de polarisation ne semblent
pas avoir d’impact. Nous interprétons ce résultat, contraire à bon nombre de ceux
obtenus auparavant, comme le fait qu’il existe du patronage de castes. Cette hypo-
thèse est testée à la fin du chapitre. Les résultats semblent indiquer que les castes
s’approprient l’usage des biens fournis publiquement. En conclusion, nous proposons
des pistes de recherche, visant, essentiellement, à améliorer la compréhension de la
formation des identités sociales et les raisons de leurs mises en exergue.
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Abstract
This dissertation relates to the literature on the implications of social institu-
tions and identities in economics, through a focus on the institution of castes. Three
reasons motivate the analysis of castes in economics.
The Under-socialized Homo Economicus
One of the motives for the analysis of caste lies in the shortcomings of the stan-
dard conceptual framework used in economics. The Homo economicus is conventio-
nally viewed as a self interested maximizing agent, whose preferences are exogenous.
He was not much considered in his environment. As Becker and Murphy (2003) writes
"modern economics [...] typically assumes that individual behavior is not directly
influenced by the actions of others". However, all the assumed characteristics of the
Homo economicus have come under scrutiny impelled by (a) criticisms addressed by
other social sciences, (b) the regain of interest for earlier theories that either contes-
ted one or more of these characteristics (Bowles and Gintis, 2000) or insisted on the
roles of institutions and (c) the "accumulation of abundant anomalies" (Ostrom and
Ahn, 2003). First, new institutional economics challenged the assumption of cost-
less information and modified the instrumental rationality assumption to account
for cultural differences. However, this set of theories maintained the assumption of
a consequentialist behavior, while economic anthropology tended to refute it on the
basis that choice may not be driven by a scarcity of means but rather by a social
context. However, this last discussion was, oddly, confined to anthropology. The
important point is that the accounting of institutions led to a modification of the
instrumental rationality hypothesis and the accounting of cultural variations.
In the 1990’s the impressive development of the literature on social capital (Os-
trom and Ahn, 2003) was a strongest attempt at recasting the economic agent into
his social environment. Yet, this posed the question of freedom of choice. If social
capital has such a large impact on agents’ behaviors, then the only space left for free
choices was who to associate with, i.e. the level of social capital (Becker and Murphy,
2003). However, many arguments, including the analysis of stratified societies such
as that of castes, could be invoked to show that agents rarely choose their levels of
social capital (Bowles, 1973). This points shows how ill at ease economists are when
dealing with social interactions.
Another attempt at reintegrating social relationships came with the modifica-
tion of the assumption that agents are not concerned with the direct effect of their
actions on others. Indeed, they may include in their decision process the fact that
viii
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other individuals may respond to their actions. They are not concerned with the
consequences of their actions out of altruism, but rather out of self interest and
because others may backfire. Thus, social relationships were viewed in terms of
strategic interactions (Akerlof, 1976). However, pure self interest is not sufficient
to explain why individuals do incorporate the effect of their behaviors on others
(Basu, 1997). Basu (1986) argues that virtually any economic behavior and markets
depend on adherence to some basic social norms. "Self interest and policing cannot
always explain why individuals do not run away without paying after a haircut"
(Basu, 1986). Thus norms ought to be taken into account as they are an important
component of behaviors. Many behavioral experiments make that point (Hoffman
et al., 1996; Henrich et al., 2001) when their results conclude that Nash outcomes
are rarely observed : behaviors are also driven by a genuine concern for fairness or
cultural norms of reciprocity. The centrality of the social norm leads to the following
question : "what is a social norm ?" The eclecticism of the answers given probably
emphasize the intricacy of the question. We do not attempt to settle the debate,
however the first chapter of this dissertation clearly fits into the debate.
Nevertheless, behavioral experiments clearly show that individuals have "other-
regarding" preferences, that may be context dependent. For instance, the experiment
led by Hoffman et al. (1996) suggests that norms of reciprocity decrease with social
distance. Thus, it may be hypothesized that the balance between self and other re-
garding preferences actually depends on social identification.
Some fairly recent behavioral experiments stress the role of social identity in
behaviors (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Shih et al., 1999; Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Chen
and Li, 2009). This influence may stem from a utility derived from identity and
one derived from complying to the norm or ideal set by the group one identifies
with. Psychological experiments have already emphasized the anxiety experienced
by individuals whose behaviors contradict their believes. This anxiety is referred to
as "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger et al., 1956) and most of them will endeavor
to reduce this anxiety through the adaptation of their believes, i.e. through an a
posteriori rationalization. Thus not acting in conformity with a group’s norms may
induce cognitive dissonance and this may explain why social identity has such a
strong influence on behaviors. In the second chapter of this dissertation, we will in-
vestigate the influence of caste on perceived social status. Arguably caste has been
a strong determinant of social identity in India. The system ascribed a status to
some groups, such as the former untouchables, the Scheduled Castes ("SCs"). When
privately asked to rank themselves on a social scale, SCs would pick a rather low
position because of their castes. This is an example of how a norm has been inter-
nalized by individuals. This last point had already been addressed by A. Sen when
he criticized the utilitarian framework. This is reviewed in the next paragraphs.
Sen’s capability approach
First, let’s recall the ambition of what was once called political economy, that
is, to make it short, the promotion of social welfare. Because utilitarianism asserted
itself as the predominant conceptual framework, social welfare was seen as arising
ix
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from the maximization of individual utilities. Yet, Sen (1992, 1999a) criticized the
use of utility as a metric on two grounds. First, "a thoroughly deprived person,
leading a very reduced life, might not appear to be badly off in terms of the mental
metric of desire and its fulfilment, if the hardship is accepted with non grumbling
resignation". (Sen, 1992). Because individuals may adapt their preferences to what
seems attainable, they may not be dissatisfied with strikingly unfair situations. Thus
the use of utility as a yardstick may lead to an improper assessment of inequality.
A. Sen also criticized the focus on income as the main argument of the utility func-
tion, for there is a great heterogeneity in individuals’ capacity to convert income
into well-being. Such a variance may stem from both individual and groups’ cha-
racteristics. Experiments concur on this view by showing that utility derived from
income largely depends on the group the individual compares to. Sen (1992, 1999a)
proposed to substitute utility for the concept of capabilities, that can be summari-
zed as the freedom to lead one type of life or another. Inequality is better assessed
through the distribution of capabilities. Sen (1999a) identified five freedoms that
are instrumental to advancing capabilities and that are : economic facilities or the
freedom to use resources for consumption and production, social opportunities such
as access to health and education, political rights, transparency and security.
This is all fine but what about castes ? First, I would argue, based on recent
research and experiments, that the institution of castes and the related identity do
alter expectations and ambitions. An interesting experiment in that respect is the
one conducted by Hoff and Pandey (2006). Children from Northern India were as-
ked to solve mazes. When caste identity was made public, either the performance
from the lower castes children dropped or they withdrew from the game. The authors
argue that once identity is made salient, lower castes children either tend to conform
to stereotypes or expect discrimination to occur and conform to it. This is one of
the many behavioral experiments that evidenced stereotype threat and self discri-
mination. Caste identity does modulate individuals expectations. Second, if utility
derived from income is expected to depend upon the comparison group, the rele-
vance of social identity in well being is rather obvious. Third, it makes little doubt
that caste rules restrict the set of "functionings", as per Sen’s words, especially for
the lower castes. Untouchability practices prevent lower castes from entering public
facilities such as schools, hospitals or even village centers. This was acknowledged by
the Constitution of India that stated in its 15th article of the Fundamental Rights
that "no citizen shall, on grounds of [...] caste [...] be subject to any disability, liabi-
lity, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants,
hotels and places of public entertainment ; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing
ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State
funds or dedicated to the use of the general public [...]". If we acknowledge that
lower castes are excluded from public places and resources, they do not have access
to economic facilities and social opportunities defined by A. Sen. It becomes rather
clear that untouchability do limit capabilities.
The second and third issues are addressed in this dissertation. Chapter 2 inves-
tigates the determinants of Hindus’ perceived social status and more particularly
the impact of being from a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. Chapters 3 and 4 addresses
x
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the issue of exclusion from public goods usage on caste grounds. They show that
untouchability practices are still common and violently enforced despite them being
outlawed. In this case, four of the five instrumental freedoms defined by Sen (1999a)
are violated. First, some individuals may be excluded from economic facilities and
social opportunities by being banned from using public goods. Second, transparency
and security are all but guaranteed if caste based rules are violently enforced regard-
less of the law.
Castes Distort Resources Allocation
The last argument for looking into the implications of the institution of castes,
is that it interferes with an efficient allocation of resources. This point was first
addressed by Akerlof (1976, 1980). Employment discrimination against lower castes
is an example of the distortions introduced by the institution in the labor market
and of its interference with an efficient resource allocation. Another example, is
the supposedly negative impact of social fragmentation on the provision of public
goods, discussed in chapters 3 and 4. This is a more practical motive for the study
of castes as it has serious consequences on policy design. For instance, public goods
availability is a central issue for economic development and a key concern of many
developing societies. Results from a voters survey conducted in 1996 in India show
that the second most popular concern was related to public goods1. Nevertheless, if
caste rules prevent some groups from accessing public goods, development programs
and policies, that are often oriented towards an increased coverage of public goods,
may miss their targets.
Chapter 1 : Power and Endogenous Segregation
At the beginning of Chapter 1 we question whether segregation may occur even
without the intervention of discriminatory norms or preferences. This assumption is
somewhat at variance with a large part of the literature on segregation and discri-
mination. Indeed, whether Becker (1957) or Arrow (1971), or even Schelling (1969)
all posited the existence of prejudice, even in the slightest form, to model discrimi-
nation. The model presented in Chapter 1 strives to depart from this assumption.
This chapter models an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random mat-
ching. A group is assumed to have a power of influence over others. Power is defined
as the capacity to give someone else access to opportunities that would be un-
reachable otherwise, which in political science, is often referred to as a "power of
influence" or "reward power" (Raven and French, 1958). Thus the concept accounts
for a broad array of powers including political, religious or economic. As a result
of this power, the powerless will perceive an additional benefit in cooperating with
the mighty. They will increase their propensity to cooperate and the mighty will
respond by increasing theirs as well, which prompts a new increase in cooperation
from the powerless, up to a point when they will cooperate for sure with the power-
ful. At this point, the mighty’s best response will be to reject any cooperation with
the powerless, who will respond by systematic defection. This systematic refusal to
1In Banerjee and Somanathan (2007)
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cooperate is how we define segregation. Hence segregation can be an equilibrium
resulting from unequal power distribution.
The mechanism brought forward in this chapter is supported by a couple of
historical examples and serves as an explanation of the strong segregation between
castes. First, some theorists have seen the origin of the caste system in the do-
minated Aryans’ willingness to stay away from the conquered. The power capture
by the Aryans is likely to have been contemporaneous to the design of segregation
rules that would separate the conquerors from the conquered. Although this theory
is disputed on many grounds (Klass, 2004), it remains one of the most commonly
accepted about the origins of caste. Second, in Vedic times, fire sacrifice was central
as this was the main way to gain the deities’ favors that would ensure worldly suc-
cess. Yet the priests had a monopoly over sacrifices and rituals. As such, they had a
power of influence that placed them above the crowd. In the vedic texts who codified
the vedic religion, many clues can be found indicating that there was already some
form of segregation, at least between the priests and the rest of the population. The
reversal of vedic values that occurred between the Vth and the IId centuries B.C.
could have jeopardized the priests supremacy. Doniger and Smith (1991) argue that
the ethos developed by the priests at that time that ensured proper segregation was
coming from the priests efforts to maintain, or even firmed, their superior positions.
It is also striking that the top varnas described in the texts are the one endowed
with some sort of power. The Brahmans had had a monopoly over spiritual affairs
and the Kshatriyas over political affairs. On a different note, historical recounts of
the colonization process admit that early European settlers tended to mingle with
local societies. Yet, when foreign power was more firmly established, condescending
ideologies about the "natives" started appearing.
This model has several compelling features. First, it recognizes that segregated
societies are often the ones that exhibit a highly unequal power distribution, which
is a point that has been little addressed. Second, the definition given to segregation
as a systematic refusal from two groups to cooperate, is large enough to encompass
various situations from marriage to geographical segregation. Indeed, segregation if
often thought of as being the geographical separation of two groups. This probably
is only the tip of the iceberg as segregation manifests itself in many aspects of every
day life, such as manners, conversations or jokes, for instance. Similarly, the way
power is defined is large enough to account for various types of segregation such as
the separation between the clergy, the aristocracy and the commoners. Third, the
process described by the model has an interest in itself and more particularly that
rejection is a result of the powerless striving to cooperate. Many examples drawn
from day to day life could illustrate this point. Think of a child that desperately
wants to make friend with another one. If the desire is too obvious or intense, he
will likely be turned down.
The model also has a couple of drawbacks and section 6 presents ways for im-
provement. First it can not be reasonably claimed that the segregation equilibrium
is unique. Second, in an attempt to bring forward the process of segregation forma-
tion, the model is not written in a canonical way. Adopting an evolutionary version
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of the model might help at tackling both issues. Another envisaged improvement
would be to design the creation of a third group arising from cooperation between
the mighty and the powerless and who would be endowed with a fraction of power.
Besides, in the model presented,power is left constant, while it could be thought to
be negatively correlated with the number of powerful individuals. Lastly customs
could be introduced as a signal or a device aiming at enforcing cooperation within a
group. Indeed, it is striking that constraints imposed by customs on lifestyles, such
as for instance vegetarianism, are much harsher on higher castes than on the lower
ones. All these potential improvements are left for future research.
Chapter 2 : Social Identity in India : Caste and Beyond ?
This chapter inquires into the determinants of perceived social class among Hin-
dus. More precisely it addresses the following questions : is caste the only determi-
nant of perceived social status or are they other relevant factors that could even-
tually mitigate its effect ? If there are other determinants, do they have a similar
effect across all groups ? For instance, education may be efficient at improving social
status, but only so among high castes. The analysis is based on data collected in the
1995 and 2001 rounds of the World Values Survey. We are particularly interested in
one of the question asked during the survey : "to which of the five social classes do
you think you belong to ?". Data cover 8,543 households although caste is informed
only for the 3,403 Hindu ones. Therefore, results obtained in this chapter can not
be generalized to other religious denominations.
The analysis yields three main results. First, and this is no surprise, being either
from a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is a major determinant of perceived
social class, but is not the only one. Both income and occupation, whether super-
visory, or involving either human or physical capital do have a significant impact.
Education is also relevant although to a lesser extent and the divide lies between
primary and secondary or higher education.
Second, the impact of caste on perceived social status is somewhat smaller among
the Scheduled Castes than among the Scheduled Tribes, although their ritual status
is, arguably, quite close. Large, yet plausible shifts in income or occupation could
make up for the caste effect, as far as Scheduled Castes are concerned. For instance,
the acquisition of land or skills can annul the caste effect. On the other hand, only
very unlikely improvements could hardly compensate for the tribe effect. However,
this result may be driven by a potential sampling bias. The same analysis ran over
a sub-sample conclude that the impact of being from a Scheduled Caste was un-
derestimated and that of being from a Scheduled Tribe overestimated. However,
concurrent with previous results, the analysis shows that being from a scheduled
group has a strong effect on perceived social status and that plausible, albeit large,
shifts in either occupation or income can compensaye the scheduled group effect.
Third, being from a scheduled group is found to have both a direct and an in-
direct effect on perceived social status, the latter being that an increase in income
may have a reduced effect on perceived social status among Scheduled Castes. The
xiii
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group’s effect is actually mainly indirect for the SCs. Once the effect of income is
allowed to vary across groups, the direct effect of belonging to a Scheduled Caste
disappears. On the other hand, the tribe effect is essentially direct. The indirect
caste effect may be interpreted as a remainder of long lasting discrimination. SCs do
not rank according to their wealth probably because they are untouchables. This is
not without echoing the stereotype threat and self discrimination phenomena evoked
above. Group membership may thus lower ambitions and expectations.
It is noted at the end of this chapter that the actual group’s effect may be unde-
restimated given that data were collected during face to face interviews. It is likely
that if the social class had been declared publicly, the group’s effect may have been
larger. Potential discrepancies between the privately and publicly declared social
class, if they exist, would be worth investigating as it would highlight the pressure
put on social identity directly by the immediate environment. It would not measure
an internalized social identity as in our analysis, but rather the one imposed by
others. We even could hypothesize that discrimination has three facets : (a) a dimi-
nished self image, even when not confronted to the opinions others have about ego,
(b) the modification of this percieved self-image when confronted to others’ views
and (c) how others perceive the individual. Disentangling the three would shed new
light on discrimination. It is left for future research. Moreover, local social composi-
tion may be thought of having an effect on the group’s effect. It is plausible that SCs
would better rank if they live in predominately SCs villages. Although best efforts
were made to control for the local social composition, the analysis comes up against
a lack of data. These challenges are left for future research.
Chapter 3 : Is Blood Thicker Than Water : Untouchability and Public Infrastruc-
ture
This chapter addresses the issue of caste based violence. Caste strongly defines
the use of common resources mainly through the prohibition put on the sharing of
these resources between castes, particularly with outcasts. For instance, Shah et al.
(2006) surveyed 565 villages and found that in nearly half of them, untouchables were
denied access to water facilities. In 28% of them they were denied entry into police
stations, and in 18% access to the road or primary health centers. This prohibition
is what is referred to as untouchability and is most salient in the case of water. Un-
touchability is grounded on the belief that outcasts are impure and that any form
of contact with them is tainting. Food and water are the paramount conveyor of
ritual pollution. Water is considered tainted if an untouchable or his vessel touch
it. Despite a large heterogeneity in the compliance to the caste code, outcasts are,
more often than not, banned from using higher castes wells. Indian local newspa-
pers abound with stories of untouchables being beaten up for having used higher
castes wells. This phenomenon is quantitatively investigated in this chapter, where
the number of acts of violence against untouchables is shown to be associated with
the way water is distributed. The more common and shared the source, the larger
the number of acts of violence against untouchables.
The analysis is based on data on the number of acts of violence against SCs
xiv
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and STs, collected by the National Crimes Record Bureau of the Indian Minsitry of
Home Affairs (based on the complaints filed by the local bureaux). The data cover
581 districts for the year 2001. They are then linked to Census data on the per-
centage of the population that access water through wells, tanks, tubewells or taps.
A principal component is constructed for these four water sources. The component
decreases with the individualization of the water source. For instance the component
is minimized if the entire district’s population access water through taps. On the
other hand, it is maximized if they all access water through wells. Please note that
what is meant by individualized source is one that is less sensitive to ritual pollution.
For instance, tap does not entail physical contact with the source and as such it is
less prone to ritual pollution. It is sad to be individualized. Although, I must admit
that the choice individualized as opposed to common is not very fortunate, I carry
on with it for the sake of conciseness.
Results show that there is a positive relationship between the commonality of the
water source and the number of acts of violence against untouchables. This relation-
ship is robust to many controls, including caste and religious polarizations, states
measures of wealth, human development, fixed effects and measures of other public
infrastructure. It is noteworthy that the percentage of villages that are connected by
road as well as the number of primary school per district’s inhabitants do seem to
significantly reduce the number of acts of violence against untouchables, although
this result is note definite as the lack of roads may proxy remoteness. Finally, quan-
tile regressions show that the effect of the water distribution mode on the number
of acts of violence, is most strongly felt when the level of violence against outcasts
is already relatively high.
The results presented in this chapter show that, despite untouchability practices
being outlawed, they are still common and violently enforced. Moreover, based on the
evidenced relationship, it is argued that water development programs, who primary
aim at improving health, exhibit a nice side effect of reducing caste based violence.
It is not claimed that extending tap water will uproot caste conflicts. Rather, it is
argued that it would remove a serious bone of contention between castes and provide
some relief to the "weaker segments of society" on top of enhanced sanitation, while
more definite measures must be considered to eradicate castes. This chapter, as well
as other empirical studies such as that of Shah et al. (2006) question whether public
goods are truly public in India. Indeed, if some individuals are prevented from ac-
cessing water sources for instance, one may wonder if these resources do not better
compare to club goods rather than public goods. This hypothesis is what chapter 4
challenges.
Chapter 4 : Social Fragmentation and Public Goods : Polarization and Patronage
in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar
Theoretical and empirical results have concluded that there is a negative rela-
tionship between social fragmentation and the provision of public goods through
limited collective action. I argue that this literature exhibit four drawbacks. First,
empirical results are mixed, at best, and the relationship has not been firmly establi-
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shed. Second, it rests on the implicit assumption that social fragmentation induces
groups antagonisms. Third, this last relationship has never been firmly established
and even if it actually existed, polarization indices would be more appropriate than
the fractionalization index traditionally used to prove that social fragmentation lo-
wers public goods provision. Fourth, the intervention of ethnic patronage has little
been considered. As Alesina and Ferrara (2005) pointed out "while pure public
goods may be lower in more fragmented communities, the amount of publicly pro-
vided "private" goods - especially those that can be targeted to specific groups -
may be larger. We can then have a positive correlation between fragmentation and
ethnically based patronage".
These four points are addressed in this chapter and more specifically the patro-
nage assumption. The analysis uses the data collected by the World Bank during
the Survey of Living Conditions in the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar in 1997 and 1998. The likelihood for a village to have six public goods present
is assessed depending on the village’s characteristics. These goods are connections
to the electric, road and bus networks as well as the presence of a waste disposal
system, a primary health center and primary public school. The fractionalization in-
dex exhibits a positive and significant impact on the presence of four of these goods,
and a negative significant one on the presence of primary public school. This result
is robust to the inclusion of indicators of caste dominance and state fixed effect.
However the significance of the positive coefficients is weakened by the introduction
of inequality measures. This positive impact is somewhat at odds with the results
obtained by previous empirical analysis who largely displayed a negative impact.
The fractionalization index is then replaced by polarization indices in order to bet-
ter stick to theoretical assumptions and conclusions. Results show that polarization
in almost never found to have an impact on the presence of the goods.
Why would the fractionalization index be relevant when the polarization index
is not ? Let’s recall that the former is closely and positively linked to the number
of groups in the society, while the latter is decreasing in the number of groups and
is maximized when the population is clustered into two equally sized groups. Then
the number of groups seems to positively influence public goods provision while
potential group antagonisms play little role. A possible explanation might be pa-
tronage. Indeed, if every group endeavors to have a "caste good", the larger the
number of groups, the larger the likelihood to have the good present in the village.
I therefore try to evaluate whether the probability for a household to have access
to a specific good, provided it is available in the village, depends on its membership
to the village’s dominant caste. The latter is defined as the caste that collectively
owns the largest value of land. For instance, does the likelihood for a household to
send their children to school, provided schools are present in the village, depend on
belonging to the dominant backward agricultural caste ("BAC") ? Although results
do not clearly and firmly answer the question, they do provide some support to
this assumption. It is found that belonging to a backward agricultural caste does
significantly reduce the likelihood to have toilets facilities or to attend anganwadi
centers, except when the village is dominated by this caste. Similarly, the coefficient
for having electricity at a BAC home when the village is dominated by the BACs is
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positive and close to significance.
This study is rather exploratory and data scarcity is somewhat of a problem
given that they only cover 120 villages. Nevertheless, it casts some doubts on the
fact that social fragmentation may have a negative effect on public goods provision.
The idea lurking at the back of the latter assumed relationship is that social frag-
mentation induces antagonisms and confrontations. However, this relationship is not
firmly established. As Esteban and Ray (2008) noted "by and large, it is fair to say
that most of the literature fails to find any significant evidence of ethnic fractio-
nalization as a determinant of conflict". Moreover, what this assumption sidesteps
is the existence of intergroup norms that govern the relationships between groups,
such as patronage or exclusivity. What may prompt violence is the challenge of this
norm as seen in the previous chapter, not fragmentation itself.
These results coupled with the ones found in chapter 3 do strongly suggest that
caste rules and norms impede universal access to public goods. Publicly provided
goods may be seen as "caste goods". This is quite worrying and even more so if
we bear in mind that universal public goods availability often is a priority of many
development programs and a key concern.
Conclusions and Agenda for Future Research
Several examples of how the institution of castes limits capabilities were provi-
ded. First, long-standing discrimination has influenced the way low caste and tribes
perceive their social status in both direct and more insidious ways. Second caste
based rules and untouchability practices are still enforced regardless of the law and
somewhat prevent lower castes from accessing public goods. Thus, the institution of
caste thwarts many freedoms that are instrumental to development such as econo-
mic facilities, social opportunities and the need for security. Moreover the conflict
between legal and caste based rules hampers transparency. From a more practical
point of view the influence of castes on public goods access may divert the objectives
of development programs to spread public goods access.
Yet, all is not doom and gloom. The scheduled group effect on perceived social
status may be canceled by shifts in occupations or income. Moreover, the results
displayed in Chapter 1, suggest that the redistribution of power might weaken the
segregation that still seems to prevail. Access to primary education was shown to be
exempt from patronage and seems effective at reducing caste based violence.
This work has raised many issues that are worth addressing and are left for fu-
ture research. First, perceived social status may differ when it is privately expressed,
as it is the case in the database used in Chapter 2 and when it has to be publicly
declared. As a consequence, the caste effect may differ as well. The study of such
a potential discrepancy may prove valuable to assess the amount of discrimination
anticipated from others and that would come on top of an internalized diminished
self-image. I would hypothesize that discrimination is the meeting of a diminished
self image and of the opinions others have.
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Second, I propose to investigate the influence of the local social composition on
the constraint put by caste on identity. For instance, would the feeling of alienation
due to group membership experienced by an outcast depend on the outcast popu-
lation of the area where he lives ?
Third, there still is work to be done on the conceptualization of a polarization
index. The one promoted by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002), which appears to
be the most widely used, displays two related inconveniences. It holds intergroup
distance constant and neglects the issue of income distribution. I would argue that
intergroup distance, even if group is defined along ethnic lines, largely depends on
those groups relative and collective wealth. Suppose that there are three groups,
A, B and C and that C is extremely poor while A and B enjoy a similar collective
wealth. The social distance perceived between C and A is probably different from the
one experienced between A and B. This should be reflected in the index. Moreover,
wealth distribution within the ethnic group may alter the sense of identification to
the group. A poor individual in a rich group, may put more stress on his identity
as a poor than on his ethnic denomination. Finally, a society that is said to be
polarized because of the structure of the population distribution, is even more so if
the pattern of the income distribution follows that of the groups and this should be
reflected in the index.
Finally, a more general question permeated the dissertation. Why do agents pick
a trait among many and define themselves according to it ? For instance, in India,
there are many factors that may define social identity such as religion, caste, lan-
guage, eventually ethnicity, gender just to mention the most obvious ones. Then
the question is : under what circumstances will individuals stress one identity ra-
ther than another ? What factors make the religious denomination more relevant
than caste ? These questions are fraught with consequences. If identities change de-
pending on the circumstances, how can we properly assess social fragmentation or
polarization ? This would suggest that strong identity factors such as ethnicity for
instance are not exogenous but constructed. Moreover, how come that an identity
factor that was merely conscious, all of a sudden becomes so marked that it may
prompt violence and conflicts ?
These propositions for future research are by and large not exhaustive. They
may seem ambitious, although they probably are incommensurate with the ques-
tions posed by social institutions and identity. Recent economic literature has drawn
attention to them and there is little doubt that it will be a promising area for future
research.
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3
INTRODUCTION
I’d like to start this dissertation with a question frequently asked by my friends
and family when they inquired about the topic of my thesis : "what do castes have
to do with economics ?". The question was usually accompanied by a frown and
the impression that they may not have understood correctly either the title or the
specialty. After all, this is a good question. Why would economists be concerned
with social relations and identities ?
There are many ways to answer this question and this is the objective of this
introduction. To make it short and broad, a relatively recent economic literature
has put the emphasis on the fact that the classical utilitarian framework and its
self-interest maximizing agent left social relations and identities as a background
noise. The homo economicus is rather lonely. The hitch is that this background
noise is becoming louder up to the point that some authors argue that the welfarism
framework ought to be recast (Sen, 1992, 1973, 1999b,c). More conservatively, other
authors believe sufficient to include social capital as yet another argument in the uti-
lity function (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Becker and Murphy, 2003). Whatever the
option chosen, incorporating social identity, of which caste in India is an example,
into the economic analysis appears a necessity.
A point needs clarification. One could think, given that this work revolves around
castes, that the analysis and the conclusions are limited to India. This view may be
challenged on two grounds. First, many features of the institution of caste such as
segregation, deprivation and community self management may be found in various
degrees elsewhere. What surely makes this institution original is the ideology that
supports it as well as its amazing resilience. It is no coincidence that authors who
have insisted on its particularity mainly focussed on the ideology (Dumont, 1970).
Second, by showing that this social organization has a pervasive influence in the
economic arena, a case is made for transforming the under-socialized homo econo-
micus into an agent whose preferences, motives or behavior are influenced by his
social environment.
Before delving in more details into arguments justifying the economic interest
of castes, which will be done in section 2 of this introduction, I shall provide a
brief of castes in section 1. Experts may find it short, novices long but it hopefully
contains all the elements necessary to understand what follows. The last section of
this introduction discusses how my approach is related to the literature and outlines
the plan of the dissertation.
1 Background on Castes
"Caste is an institution of great complexity". "The term caste itself requires
some discussion. It has been used to mean different things by different people in
a variety of situations. Indeed it is doubtful whether much will be gained in clarity
by giving to the word a single rigorous meaning at the outset." So start the two
chapters dedicated to castes in Beteille (1974) and written by two of the most
prominent castes sociologists : A. Beteille and M.N. Srinivas respectively. Given the
great intricacy of this social institution, the scope of this chapter is to modestly
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provide some elements necessary to the understanding of the dissertation. It would
be presumptuous to say that this is an extensive description of the institution. An
attempt will be made in a first step to define some concepts that underlie part of the
functioning of the system. In a second step, competing theories about the origins
of the institution will be outlined. These will prove quite helpful in the discussion
carried out in Chapter 1 about the potential origins of segregation. Yet, this approach
may set the pitfall of believing that caste is an inflexible institution that has not
changed for the last two millennia and that is deeply rooted in religious believes.
Such an impression would be highly incorrect given that, if castes have managed
to survive to deep political and economic changes, as well as to the introduction
of various religions in the sub-continent, it is thanks to their great flexibility, its
social and economic rather that purely religious roots as well as their role played
in the local economic and political organizations. A brief account of the recent
transformations undergone by castes will finally be given. One caveat is necessary.
Although I endeavor to give the most accurate portrait of both theories and facts, I
from time to time will have no choice but to resort to stylized facts and simplifications
to preserve the clarity of the arguments.
1.1 Caste, dharma, karma and purity
1.1.1 The attributes of Castes
Although there is some debate between scholars, most agree on five attributes
of a caste summarized by Dutt (1931)2 : "without attempting to make a compre-
hensive definition it may be stated that the most apparent features of the present
day caste system are that the members of different castes can not have matrimonial
connections with any but persons of their own caste ; that there are restrictions,
though not so rigid as in the matter of marriage, about a member of the caste ea-
ting and drinking with that of a different caste ; that in many cases there are fixed
occupations for different castes ; that there is some hierarchical gradation among the
castes, the most recognized position being that of the Brahmins at the top ; that
birth alone decides a man’s connection with his caste for life, unless expelled for
violation of his caste rules, and that transition from one caste to another, high or
low, is not possible". The five attributes are therefore (a) endogamy, (b) hereditary
membership (c) occupational specialization (d) hierarchy, (e) commensality.
The most central attribute that probably underlies the whole system is endo-
gamy and hereditary membership that go hand in hand. The other features deserve
some discussion that may enlighten the role played by the concepts of ritual purity,
dharma and karma. Caste names often describe castes’ traditional occupation. For
instance, Bhandari means barber in oryia, Paraiyars means drums players (usually
during funerals) in tamil, Bhangi mean garbage men in hindi and Kallar thief in
tamil3. However, this occupational specialization of a caste is not so much linked to
the actual occupation of its members than it is a founding principle, a determinant
of its nature. While the congruence between the caste’s traditional occupation and
the actual professions of its members might have been strong in ancient times, it
2cited by Klass (2004)
3This last occupation being considered as a profession requiring specific skills
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may have not been the case in recent periods. For instance, the 1911 Census su-
perintendent, Edward Blunt, noted that less than 50% of the Dhobis were actually
laundry workers. 10% of the Brahmins were actually priests and 5% of the Charmars
still worked as tanners4. One may ask why occupational specialization still is a pro-
minent feature of caste, given that its correlation with the actual professions is quite
weak. Some authors would answer by saying that the traditional occupation pro-
vides an indication of the degree of purity of the caste and hence a gross information
about its status. For instance, having contact with death is considered a source of
ritual impurity. Castes whose traditional occupation entails such a contact, such as
tanners, or funeral drum players (Pariyars) are ritually impure. This does not mean
that their occupations make them impure, but rather because they are impure, they
have a monopoly over these sorts of activity and should dedicate to them. Now the
question of why they are impure will be touched on in the next section. Note that
the very idea that some castes are more pure than others implies a hierarchy. Yet,
ranking does not only derives from a supposed ritual purity as we shall see later
(section 1.1.4). Rules governing commensality, although not as stringent as those
governing marriage, also stem from a differentiated level of ritual purity between
castes. These points all direct attention to the concept of purity which should be
described and explained.
1.1.2 Purity
In order to properly assess the centrality of the concept of purity and the implied
hierarchy, we need to go back in time. About 2,000 years ago a population probably
coming from the Iranian plateau or Caucasia, known as the Aryans, began settling
down in the sub-continent. They brought along a large corpus of religious texts, the
Vedas. This religion, called vedic laid many foundations for Hinduism and exerted a
great influence on Indian thought. The Vedas put great emphasis on the role of fire
sacrifices, and highly complex rituals for this purpose was monopolized by priests5.
As Doniger and Smith (1991) mentioned in their introduction to a translation of the
Laws of Manu, "the importance attributed in the Veda to the fire ritual can hardly
be overestimated. It was from cosmic and primordial sacrifice that the universe was
created, and it was because of the repeated sacrifices offered by humans that the
universe continues. The ritual, done correctly and at the proper time was the work-
shop for manipulating the cosmic order itself. [...] Personal ends, as well as cosmic
ones, were the fruit of sacrificial practices". Given the prominent role of sacrifice,
individuals who had a monopoly over it could claim superiority. This was reinforced,
Doniger and Smith (1991) argue, by a vision of the social world as a food chain,
modeled after the "natural" one. "The Vedas depicts a life where I gain only at
your loss, my prosperity entails your ruin, my continued existence depends on your
death, my eating requires that you become food [...] and in those texts, the priests
repeatedly declared themselves the highest class, the ultimate ’eaters’". And priests
4cited in Deliège (2004)
5It is interesting to note, as some authors have done, that there are many similarities bet-
ween the Vedic religion and Mazdaism that later developed in Zoroastrianism. This similarities
include a large focus on sacrifice especially through fire, the latter being envisaged as both a deity
and a privileged way to communicate with gods, the preeminence of the sacerdotal class and the
consumption of soma a beverage that enhanced contacts with gods.
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claimed that superiority on the basis that they controlled over sacrifice. Ritual was
thus the source of social and political power. However, such a superiority might have
been frail given that it could have been easily overturned by actual physical violence.
Sometimes between the Vth and IId centuries B.C., a complete reversal of the
Vedic values took place. The sort of Hobbesian view of the world was replaced by
a great emphasis on amhisa or non violence, grace, humility, love and renunciation.
The new virtuous were vegetarian, devotional, and non-violent. Texts like the Bha-
gavad Gita of bhakti or devotionalism, composed around that time, do insist on
these new ideals. Texts composed around the same period, the dharma sutras extol
the virtues of renunciation that should be set up as principles of life (dharma). As
Doniger and Smith (1991) highlight by quoting Zimmermann (1987) "A new type
of opposition between men was introduced. It was no longer a matter of courage
and fear, domination and servitude ; it was instead an opposition between the pure
and the impure and a hierarchy of castes". Doniger and Smith (1991) add "Vegeta-
rianism and non-violence became the principal signifiers of this ’purity’ that jostled
power, the new yardsticks for social ranking in the priestly and ’orthodox’ reforma-
tion of Vedism documented in the dharma texts". With the introduction of purity,
predominance of the sacerdotal class was firmed, "the ranking order of the social
classes did not change. But the rationale for the ranking did6".
An important text endeavored to reconcile the Vedic traditions and the new
school of thought, the the Manu Smrti or Laws of Manu. This text is of particular
importance to us as a large part of it is dedicated to castes. It builds on an hymn
found in the Rig Veda that describes the origin of the universe through the sacrifice
by divinities of a "cosmic being" who gave birth to four groups or varnas : Brahmins
originate from his mouth, Kshatriyas from his shoulders and arms, Vaishyas from
his thighs and Shudras from his feet7. Because Brahmins originate from the noblest
part of the supreme creator, the mouth, they are placed at the top of the hierarchy
and are sole authorized to study and teach the Vedas and to perform sacrifices and
rites. Khsatriyas, who originate from the arms, is the second best placed group and
is dedicated to war and ruling. The Vaishyas main purpose is trade, while Shudras
are made to serve the other varnas. The Laws of Manu also build on the concept of
dharma. "Beginning in Manu, non violence is usually listed among other qualities
that comprise universal dharma, applicable to all regardless of class or caste. Those
castes who follow occupation entailing relatively little violence towards other beings
and who practice vegetarianism were, generally and theoretically speaking, ranked
higher than those who do not8". The Laws of Manu praise a svadharma or a class
nuanced duty9. The fact that the svadharma of the priests is the general dharam
6Doniger and Smith (1991)
7The varnas are often interpreted as being the castes, yet, as we shall see later, strictly speaking
they are not the groups Indians would refer to as their castes. Indeed, smaller groups called jatis
are the "actual" castes
8Doniger and Smith (1991)
9Weber (1958) believed that untouchables almost never rebeled because they interiorized the
religious concepts that legitimized their low position. More specifically, untouchables interiorized
that it was right and moral to follow the duty of their castes, their svadharma, even if this entails
deprtivation and subjection
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ensues a hierarchical order10.
One may question the pertinence of presenting the world-views at the beginning
of this era to understand the actual working of castes today. The answer is that
such a view introduced notions that were to have enormous ramifications for the
history of religion in India and a large influence over Indian thought. Concepts such
as non-violence, vegetarianism, the relative purity of a life style and most impor-
tantly dharma are all still very operative in modern days India. As Srinivas (1974)
noted, "certain Hindu theological notions like karma and dharma have contributed
very greatly to the strengthening of the idea of hierarchy, which is inherent in the
caste system". Birth is the only way to acquire membership to a caste, yet birth
is not an accident according to Hinduism. It results from accumulated actions in
previous lives. If these actions were virtuous, a man is to be reincarnated in a high
caste, while misconduct is sanctioned by a low caste reincarnation. "Thus the caste
hierarchy comes to be an index of the state of an individual’s soul. It also repre-
sents certain milestones on the soul’s journey to God" (Srinivas, 1974). This point
underlines the centrality of the concept of purity that was seen as so fundamental
that one of the most prominent theorists of castes L. Dumont (1970), put it at the
very center of the system and thought that anything in the social organization is to
interpreted by this yardstick, wealth or power playing very little role. This last point
will be nuanced by section 1.1.4. Caste prescriptions are reinforced by the important
concept of dharma which has many meanings, one of which is "that which is right
or moral" or "the universal law" to be followed. As Srinivas (1974) tells "a man who
accepts the caste system and the rules of his particular sub-castes is living according
to dharma, while a man who questions them is violating dharma. Living according
to dharma is rewarded, while violation of dharma is punished both here and after. If
he observes the rules of dharma, he will be born in his next reincarnation in a high
caste, rich, whole and well endowed. If he does not observe them he will be born in
a low caste, poor, deformed and ill endowed. Worldly position and success indicate
the kind of life a man led in his previous incarnation".
1.1.3 Untouchability
Counterpart to purity is ritual pollution. As seen before, some castes are more
pure than others by nature and due to their functions11. Assertions made above may
be summarized by saying that the more violent the functions, the less pure the caste.
Yet, I have so far resorted to the word violence, although it would be more accurate
to say that contact with ritually polluting elements is the appropriate reference.
The more involved with ritually impure elements, the lower the caste. For instance,
anything that directly has to do with death is polluting. Thus, a caste whose tradi-
tional occupation is to prepare the dead or play music at funerals (Pariyars) are too
much involved with death to be pure. Yet, it is not clear whether death is a violent
10One may be surprised that Khsatriyas, who are dedicated to war and ruling and thus violent
ends, are ranked second. This probably is a concession made by theory to reality as power could only
be ranked at the top. The point of emphasizing non violence is probably to secure the supremacy
of the priests over the rulers.
11the two being closely tied if not equivalent
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concept. Another example is the barber. Hopefully this occupation is not so much
violent. Nevertheless, it is seen as impure, as it deals with human waste. Arguably
violence and impure occupations are symbolically related, however to get a better
sense of the gross hierarchy between castes, reference to the assumed pollution lin-
ked to occupations is more relevant. Ritual impurity is derived from the nature of
the caste but also from ritually polluting elements. Pollution may then be passed
on through contact with impure elements, including individuals from impure castes.
A strong vector of ritual pollution is physical contact but also food and water. This
explains why commensality is a feature of the caste system. Food and water may
not be shared between castes that are too far away in the hierarchy, as this would
result in the higher of the two being polluted. Caste prescriptions mainly rest on
the absolute avoidance of contact, which prompts segregation. This last concept, in
the case of caste has a broad acceptation, since it means the prohibition of any sort
of relationships. Touching is prohibited. Inter-caste marriage is hardly conceivable.
Higher castes must not accept food or drink from lower castes. Anthropologists do
assess hierarchical distance between castes by the willingness to accept food and wa-
ter by members of another castes. Breaking of these rules would thwart dharma and
the violator would have to go through purificatory rites for minor infringements to
excommunication for more serious ones. The disgrace would also affect his relatives.
Let’s pause for a moment to add one caveat to this description. What has been
said so far is rather "theoretical" should be understood as principles. In practice
there is a large heterogeneity in their applications. Yet, I am tempted to say that
such an heterogeneity depends on the actual social distance between castes. For
instance, it may be more frequent for Brahmins to accept food or water from a rela-
tively close, yet inferior caste, than it will be from the lowest caste. Social scientists
who conducted field works and were most concerned with the actual practices rather
than the theoretical ones, emphasized the strong divide that exist between a group of
castes, collectively known as untouchables in reference to the fact that their contact
is polluting to anyone. While distance between various castes may not be plain clear
and inter-castes rules not stringently respected, distance between untouchables and
the prohibition of their contacts by other castes is rather marked. Beteille (1965) in
his study of a Tanjore village asserted the village’s population could be grouped in
three : Brahmins, untouchables and the rest. He argued that such a classification
made sociologically the more sense. The point is that, even if castes rules are not
strongly enforced, contact prohibition not so frequent, the "untouchability" barrier
clearly stands.
However untouchability does not come down to ritual impurity. As Deliège (1994)
mentions untouchability arises from "cumulative domination"12. "Socio-economic
dependance, material poverty, social deprivation and a lack of political power com-
bine to ritual pollution to make untouchables a special social category13". Economic
dependance arises, among other factors, from the traditional system of production
within villages. Untouchables’ vocation was to serve other caste by providing ser-
12The term is borrowed from T. Oommen in "Sources of Deprivation and Styles of Protest : the
Case of the Dalits in India", Contributions to Indian Sociology, 18, 1984,45-61.
13in Deliège (1994). Translation is mine
1. BACKGROUND ON CASTES 9
INTRODUCTION
vices in relationship with wastes, blood, dirt and death to other castes, who were
prevented from carrying out such activities in fear of being ritually polluted, or to
contribute as agricultural laborers to the grain production. In exchange for these
services, they had a claim on a share of the harvest. The amounts of services and
the quantity of grains to be exchanged were fixed by tradition. This economic sys-
tem is known under the term jajmani. The spreading use of money, among other
things, progressively suppressed the jajmani system, and it has almost disappeared
by now. However, the system left traces of it in the distribution of land ownership
and in villages composition. Indeed untouchables are rarely dominant in villages.
As Deliège (1994) recounts14 "in the plains of Northern India, for instance, Cha-
mars are together with other rural jatis, one of the most numerous caste. Yet in
a sample of 167 villages, they are in a majority in only 16 villages, that may be
fairly recent". Such an economic oppression was often accompanied with the nega-
tion of a political power. As for social deprivation, it arises from untouchables low
ritual status that prevented them from entering public space, unless they had good
reasons such as work, for this. Deliège (1994) provides a couple of examples. For
instance, there was no well or other water sources in untouchables neighborhoods.
Moreover untouchables were not allowed to draw water from higher castes wells as,
either their direct contact, or that of their vessels would have polluted the well.
Thus they had to wait for a higher caste to draw water and to pour it into their
jars. Access to roads were also restricted. In Uttar Pradesh, higher castes shouted to
warn that Banghis were coming. In Kerala, Pulaya had to shout every four or five
steps while walking on a trail to warn that they were coming and when someone
shouted back, they had to step aside. In Poona, untouchables were let inside the
city walls between 9a.m. and 3p.m., when their shadows were short enough not to
pollute those walking by. All these recounts are fairly old and common sense tells us
that things must have changed and they have. First, the newly independent India
enshrined in the Constitution the prohibition of caste based discrimination and of
untouchability15 and assigned to the State the duty to promote the educational and
economic interest of the outcasts16. Positive discrimination policies were envisaged
in the Constitution and put in place. Seats were reserved to the former outcasts,
in the Administration, Assemblies as well as in Universities. The castes who were
to benefit from these reservation policies were said to be "scheduled". Thus untou-
chables are administratively referred to as the "Scheduled Castes" ("SC"). Some
Tribes were also scheduled for this reservation policy, given that they have suffered
from long standing discrimination and deprivation in very much the same way as the
SCs. We shall come back to the situation of tribes in a few moments. Whether this
legislation is responsible for the emancipation of untouchables is not discussed here.
However, it is hardly disputable that untouchables gained political visibility. For
instance, the current Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh is from an untouchable caste.
Moreover, many untouchables have benefited from increased social opportunity and
managed to substantially improve their economic position. Untouchables economic
14Translation is mine
15Article 15 and 17 of Fundamental Rights
16"The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation". Article 46, Directive
Principles of State Policy, Constitution of India
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status are now more diversified. However, these successes should not be the details
that distract us from the bigger picture. As Deshpande (2000a, 2001) pointed out,
being an untouchable is still a strong predictor of economic deprivation and as it
will be shown in Chapter 2 it is still a strong determinant of perceived social class.
As far as untouchability practices are concerned, Chapter 3 will show that they still
take place, despite the passing of many laws and acts. "Cumulative domination"
underline the existence of potentially close relationships between power, wealth and
caste. Before turning our attention to this point, which will be done in the next
section, we need to, in order to close this discussion on untouchability, say a few
words about the status of tribes.
Tribes in India constitute a fairly distinct group. They usually live in remote
areas and have not mingled much with the rest of the population. They are in a ma-
jority in North Eastern states although they are found throughout the country. To
start, tribes share some features with castes, such as endogamy, hierarchy precluding
inter-dining and, in some cases, occupational specialization. However, it should be
noted that this is a generalization, given that tribes are very diverse. Nevertheless,
it is worth noticing that Bailey (1957) considered castes and tribes as continuum.
Yet, are tribes part of a system as castes are ? Two cases may be identified. Either
the tribe converted to Hinduism and, in such a case, it very much resembles a caste.
A tribe’s position position in the caste hierarchy depends on a large number of fac-
tors including the tribe’s history. It may even be the case that members of a tribe
allocated differently between castes ? Therefore a hierarchy may be found among
members of a same tribe. In a second scenario the tribe kept apart from Hinduism
and thus may not be called a caste, given that they lie outside the system. Yet, as
mentioned in Carrin (2006) from an Hindu standpoint, the fact that the tribe is not
part of the caste system, makes it "untouchable", in the sense that their contact may
be polluting to a higher caste. Thus in the first case, it is difficult to anticipate the
position of a tribe on a social scale, while in the latter, the tribe is very likely to be
located at the bottom and to suffer from untouchability. Given that the tribes we are
concerned with are the scheduled ones, they were recognized as "weaker segments
of society" which means that they are likely to be at the bottom of the social scale,
either because of their material or social deprivation. Although strictly speaking, we
can not say that tribes are untouchables, it is likely that Scheduled Tribes will also
suffer from the stigma as well.
1.1.4 Caste, Power and Wealth : a Tango Dance
The jajmani system emphasizes the strong relationship between castes and the
economic arena, at least as far as agricultural production is concerned. Local politi-
cal life was also organized by castes. Caste courts composed of the elders of a caste
belonging to different villages were setting the norms to be obeyed within a caste
and in inter-caste relationships as well as settling any issue arising in the community.
Therefore, caste specialization as well as its influence over the local political life is
(a) a tendency for each sub caste "to live in a separate social world" (Srinivas, 1974),
although inter-caste and intra-caste solidarities should not be overlooked (Srinivas,
1955) and (2) to see a high correlation between castes and wealth. This prompts the
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following question : are wealth and power distributed according to caste status ?
Sociology brought diverging views on this question. Louis Dumont (1970), insis-
ted on the primacy of the ideology in the caste system. He argued, in a structuralist
perspective, that caste was most prominently the materialization of an ideology ba-
sed on ritual purity and, as such, status is assumed to be relatively independent
from political or economic power. He insisted on the fact that while wealth and po-
wer have been the dominant forces shaping western societies, in India, religion has
prevailed. His point of view has since been seriously challenged as (a) caste trans-
cend religions, (b) religious allusions are rarely made in debates about inter-caste
relationships and (c) as Baechler (1988) argued, Pariyars would be equally despised
even in the absence if a religious ideology of purity.
Alleging that caste is independent from the distribution of power or wealth
had Dumont stressed the concept of dominant caste that he borrows from Srini-
vas (1955) : "A caste may be said dominant when it preponderates numerically
over the other castes, and when it also wields preponderant economic and politi-
cal". Given the agrarian nature of villages in India, economic power often comes
down to land ownership. Yet, Srinivas (1955) feels necessary to add : "a large and
powerful caste group can be more easily dominant if its position in the local caste
hierarchy is not too low". Thus, even if the distribution of power and wealth may
be assumed to not directly depend on caste status, it must be reckoned that both
are highly correlated. Bailey (1957) found "a high degree of coincidence between
politico-economic rank and the ritual ranking of caste". For this author caste is a
system of ranks which is "validated not only by ritual and social usage, but also
by differential control over the productive resources". He adds "but the correlation
[between economic and ritual status] is not perfect. For castes groups in between
the two extremes, their ritual rank tend to follow their economic rank in the village
community". This correlation between castes and the productive organization has
led many authors to argue that caste was a form of class in the Marxist sense. Ne-
vertheless, this interpretation is much disputed on many grounds and one of them
is the imperfect correlation between status and wealth. In his study of a Tanjore
village, Beteille (1974) also observed this imperfect yet quite strong correlation. Up-
per castes own the majority of land and even found ways to escape acts passed
that aimed at redistributing land. Nevertheless, he argued that as modernization of
the economy progressed, upper castes found opportunities in the new sectors being
developed and thanks to a relatively high level of education moved to urban areas.
Thus local economic power in rural areas was somehow transferred to middle castes.
This is the reason why, middle castes may be found to be more dominant than upper
ones at the local level.
The process of Sanskritization also stresses the flexibility of the system and the
relative importance of wealth in the caste structure. Srinivas (1952) who coined the
term writes "the caste system is far from a rigid system in which the position of
each component caste is fixed for all time. Movement has always been possible, and
especially in the middle regions of the hierarchy. A caste was able, in a generation
or two, to rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting vegetarianism and
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teetotalism, and by Sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon. In short, it took over, as
far as possible, the customs, rites, and beliefs of the Brahmins, and adoption of the
Brahminic way of life by a low caste seems to have been frequent, though theo-
retically forbidden. This process has been called Sanskritization". Many observers
have added that such a Sanskritization process was concurrent with an increase in
the group or sub-group wealth. Thus, a group becomes wealthier, it endeavors and
sometimes succeed in raising its status. This, again, suggest that status power or
wealth are not independent.
To sum up, there are three features that make a caste dominant : population,
control over land, and ritual status (as well as education although to a lesser extent).
A perfect match between the three is seldom observed, and their distributions may
change over time. These probably are the reasons why a clear answer to the ques-
tion asked at the outset of this section can not be given. Nevertheless, please bear
in mind that, although not perfect, the correlation between these three features is
relatively high.
The aim of this section was to, if not define, at least characterize castes through
five main features and to get a better understanding of their backgrounds. This led
us through a historical detour whose main purpose was to present some notions that
underlie the caste ideology and whose effects are still largely felt today, as well as to
highlight the centrality of ritual purity. Building on the latter we were able to better
trace the form of untouchability. This will prove quite useful in Chapter 2 where it
is shown that, despite the diversification of untouchables’ economic situations, caste
remains a strong predictor of perceived social class. The counterpart of purity that
is ritual pollution is also fundamental to sense why some castes and most notably
untouchables are prevented from accessing public goods, which is the point made in
both Chapters 3 and 4. All the elements necessary to the understanding of Chapters
2, 3 and 4 are thus gathered. All that remains is a synopsis of the various theories
about the origins of castes, given that we rely on some of them to develop a model
of social distance in Chapter 1.
1.2 Theories About The Origins of Castes
There is no consensus about the origins of caste, largely due to the scarcity of
historical records. However, theories may be grouped in two families. The first one
looks into history, as little documented as the concerned period is, while the second
builds on the documented characteristics of the institution to infer the potential
functions of caste in the political or economic arenas. Not surprisingly, the first
family insists on the ideology that underlies castes while the second emphasizes its
functioning. Both families will be reviewed alternatively17.
17This section follows quite closely the presentation and the arguments made in Klass (2004)
for this author provides a very comprehensive view of all competing theories. Yet, from time to
time I allow myself to comment on some of the points he makes
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1.2.1 The "Purity of Descent" Theory
"Attempts have been made [...] to derive the caste system from the presumed
social system of invading ’Aryans’. For Hindus, that system had a divine origin and
sanction. Some scholars [...] have concluded that the system developed in the period
just after the ’Aryan invasion’, as a response to circumstances of that invasion and
the resulting confrontation of ’races’"(Klass, 2004). This is the theory that will be
investigated below.
As already mentioned, there is strong evidence that a population called Aryans
settled in the sub-continent around the first millennium B.C. They brought along
the Vedic religion based on sacred texts the Vedas. One of the latter, the Rig-Veda
distinguishes between Arya Varna and Dasa Varna. In Sanskrit, dasa used to have
the primary meaning of enemy and later acquired the connotation of servant or
slave. In the Rig Veda the word dasa occurs sometimes in conjunction with the
term black. Varna meaning color in Sanskrit, some specialists consider that this
distinction between Arya Varna and Dasa Varna was made to separate the fair
skin invaders form the darker skin natives. Deliège (2004) outlined the view of the
renowned Indian sociologist Ghurye who believed that Aryans had already ascribed
a degree of ritual purity and exclusivity rules to these groups. Moreover, the laws of
Manu that describe the four varnas, also mention the the Chandalas, the lowest of
the low men, whose moral degradation is complete and who are to be humiliated.
Because, Chandalas are rarely mentioned in sacred texts they are usually not consi-
dered part of the system of castes. Although the Laws of Manu describe them as
individuals who broke the code (for instance the offsprings of forbidden marriages),
some authors think of the Chandalas as being the natives, the non Aryans18. Because
their religion was not Vedism or its later form, Brahminism, they were considered
being outside the system of castes and therefore looked down upon.
The distinctions made in sacred texts combined with the centrality of the concept
of purity, led many scientists to believe that earlier versions of castes and the atta-
ched endogamous rules came out of a concern from the conquerors to maintain the
purity of blood. This theory found an echo in the common belief in India that ha-
ving a fair complexion is a sign of distinction and that Brahmins in general do have
fair complexions.19. As Klass (2004) summarizes "let us note at the outset that it is
surely one of the most commonly held explanations in India, as well as in Europe
and the United States. In sum, the position is taken that the original varnas were
racial categories, set up to maintain ’purity of blood’ with many, if not all, of the
present castes deriving, in their common rule of marital exclusivity as well as in their
particular positions in the hierarchy, from attitudes towards ’racial’ intermarriage in
the Vedic period". He later adds "this explanation of caste origin, surely the most
widely accepted and most influential of all explanations".
18Many tribes call themselves "adivasis" which can be translated as "original habitants of the
land" in reference to the theory that sees them as the descendants of the Chandalas. It is dubious
that one may trace back tribes’ origins up to two millennia ago and it should be stressed that this
label is fraught with political claims
19this is a remark made by Beteille (1965) in his study of a Tanjore village. Please note that it
is the perception people have, albeit it may not be actual
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Although the most common theory, Klass (2004) argues that it has major in-
consistencies. First, the theory assumes that color refers to skin color whereas it
could be symbolic. For instance, the color of the Khsatriyas or warriors is the red
according to ancient texts, much in the same manner that red was the color of the
Emperor in ancient Rome as it symbolizes martial virtues. Second, we lack histori-
cal evidence about the physical traits of the two populations and more importantly
about the fact that there may have been strong differences between the two. Klass
(2004) is probably right in saying that we have no evidence of this, yet it is likely
that the physical traits of Caucasian Aryans and of South East Asian may have been
different. Third, "the mere fact of conquest [...] is no proof in itself that conquerors
will hold aloof from intermarriage with the conquered20". This would be convincing
if we did not have a set of arguments, although disputable, coming from the Vedas
and later texts themselves, that suggests the contrary, as explained earlier. Fourth,
the Aryan conquest has been envisaged by the advocates of the "purity of descent"
explanation as a civilizing process led by the Aryan "gentleman" of the barbarians
natives. Yet, whether this was a conquest is still debated. It might have been pro-
gressive relatively pacific settlements. Second, it is quite likely that the populations
the Aryan met during their "invasion" were from the Indus civilization, and were
anything but anarchic "uncivilized" hordes of barbarians.
Fair enough, but whatever the hypothesis about the level of achievement of the
two civilizations, the settlement of the Aryans in the sub-continent nevertheless oc-
curred. Whether they brutally conquered the land or pacifically settled down does
not necessarily entail that they might not have wanted to rule out intermarriages
with the "natives". One may argue that given the success of the Aryan conceptual
framework and religion, the debate about whether they conquered or settled down
is useless, given that, at the end, the Aryan civilization dominated and given this
domination they did not want to mix with the locals and thus set up the an initial
form of castes. This makes sense, unless we question the supposed "continuity [...]
between the religion of the people of the Vedas and the belief system of the contem-
porary Hindus of India. For some, particularly for many Hindus, it is in fact the
same religion - modified perhaps, evolved, or even degenerated, but not different.
The suggestion, therefore, that Hinduism derives to an important extent not only
from the Vedic peoples but also from the earlier, indigenous inhabitants might come
as a shock to some - but not, of course, to Indologists21".
In summary, the Aryan invasion theory is the most common held view about
the origin of castes, although it still has some dark sides and can be challenged on
various grounds. Nevertheless it acquainted us with the Aryan invasion and the fact
that segregation might have resulted from such a conquest, a story to which we shall
come back in Chapter 1.
20Klass (2004)
21Klass (2004)
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1.2.2 Castes as Religious Guilds
Some theorists attempted to extricate the origins of castes out of the "Aryan-
Dasyu" confrontations. While the latter mainly focused on endogamy, the former
stress the occupational specialization of castes. The theories hypothesize that castes
derive from occupational associations comparable to "guilds", which for various rea-
sons became transformed into endogamous groups. Furthermore, in short, it states
that India, probably like any place in the world, was populated by tribes whose
raison d’etre was common ancestry. Then, at a later stage of development groups
became specialized and tribes collapsed. Yet, membership to these groups was not
hereditary at this time but later became so for various reasons including one invoked
by some theorists that at some point, Brahmins restricted access to priesthood to
their own children "in an effort to preserve for all their descendants the perquisites
and privileges of their occupation22". Given that Brahmins set the example, other
occupational groups followed the same path and the resulting society was a collection
of hereditary occupational groups, i.e. castes. According to this view, castes stem
from the particular power of influence of the Brahmins. This view is summarized by
Maine (1887) "caste is merely a name for trade or occupation, and the sole tangible
effect of the Brahminical theory is that it creates a religious sanction for what is
really a primitive and natural distribution of classes"23. Klass (2004) argued that
this occupational interpretation of castes does not hold against factual evidence.
First, occupation is not, in his view the most salient feature of the system and he is
probably right given that, as we have seen, traditional and actual occupations are
nowadays uncorrelated, while caste still remains a reality. Second, he argues that
the "entry of the members into new occupations is rarely the occasion for expulsion
from the marriage group24. Some men might be expelled because the occupation
being followed was repulsive to the rest of the group, and others might separate
themselves [..] perhaps because because they believed their new occupation placed
them above their fellows". Klass’ argument however is somewhat disconcerting for
he compares relatively recent accounts of caste fission to what might have happened
centuries ago, thereby giving the impression that caste has not changed over time.
However, the lack of convergence between actual and traditional occupations, parti-
cularly centuries ago when agricultural production was the main activity probably
proves him right in his saying that occupational specialization should not be taken
as the foremost feature of caste.
A last theory worth mentioning in that vein is that of Sénart (1978). Sénart
builds both on the "guild" arguments and on the racial antipathy theory. It pro-
bably is best summarized in the following excerpt "Nowhere in antiquity have the
Indo-Europeans shown any great taste for manual professions. The Greeks and the
Romans left them to slaves or intermediate classes, freedmen and members of the
household. The Aryans, settled in villages and at first completely pastoral in occu-
pation, had even less need to follow them in India than elsewhere. Manual labor
was destined in general to remain the lot of either the aborigines or of the peoples
whose hybrid or doubtful origins related them to the same level. Both these groups,
22Klass (2004)
23cited by Klass (2004)
24Klass (2004) prefers marriage-group to the term caste
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in becoming artisans, brought with them their tradition and the desire to be assimi-
lated to the analogous organization of the superior race". In brief he builds on both
theories by saying that invading Aryans already endeavored to separate themselves
from indigenes and people with "doubtful origins". Given their reluctance towards
manual work, they relegated it to non-Aryans. The set of occupations for Aryans
was therefore non manual and within that set, the priests emerged as the dominant
social and occupational group and restricted access to their group to their own chil-
dren. They now constitute a caste that other groups would eventually copy. One
could say that the same counterargument as the one used against tenants of the oc-
cupational explanation could be applied to Sénart (1978). My sentiment is that by
subordinating the occupational specialization to the power gained by the Brahmins
and to endogamy, his theory may have overcome elements that appeared dubious in
the "guild" theories.
1.2.3 Castes Functions as Their Origins
The above mentioned theories have three drawbacks according to Klass (2004).
First, Brahmins and their power are central to these explanations. Yet it is unlikely,
Klass (2004) argues that such a pervasive institution has been imposed by one group
on the others. Second, the absence of historical records confine these explanations to
the rank of hypothesis, not to say speculations. Third, it places too much emphasis
on the religious aspects of castes, when the system may be viewed as a political
or economic organization, whose sanction was religious. Therefore another valuable
approach would be to investigate what caste is and how the system works to infer
its function and look into its origins.
These theories fall within the functionalist views on institutions. They rest on
the hypothesis that no social organism may last in time if one of its constituting
institution is massively dysfunctional, thus institutions, such as the caste system
must have or had a function. The theory developed by Baechler (1988) may be
placed in this category. Briefly said, this author asserts that kingdoms or empires
in India did not manage to provide society with coherence and cohesion. It seems
that Indian polities lacked consistency, were instable, short-lived as testified by the
absence of dynastic continuity. Indian rulers failed to implement a local political
organization, contrary for instance to the Chinese state, whose bureaucracy extended
to the very local level. In Baechler’s word, the political arena was discredited. This
posed a threat to the Indian social body that replied by forming jatis as a way to
organize villages’ lives. This theory, unfortunately too briefly summarized, finds an
echo in the way caste used to, and in some instances still do, rule communities’ lives,
through caste assemblies.
While Baechler’s theory emphasized the political origin of castes, others have
insisted on their economic functions. These set of theories builds on Polanyi’s sub-
stantivist approach, in the sense that they insist on the influence over economic
behaviors and organizations exerted by the relationships with individuals’ natural
environments and patterns of interactions. The latter are of three types "Empirically,
we find the main patterns to be reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. Reciprocity
denotes movements between correlative points of symmetrical groupings ; redistri-
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bution designates appropriational movements towards a center and out of it again ;
exchange refers here to vice-versa movements taking place as between ’hands’ un-
der a market system. Reciprocity, then, assumes for a background symmetrically
arranged groupings ; redistribution is dependent upon the presence of some mea-
sure of centricity in the group ; exchange in order to produce integration requires
a system of price-making markets. It is apparent that the different patterns of in-
tegration assume definite institutional supports" (Polanyi, 1957). Now where does
the caste system fit in this classification ? The jajmani system was briefly descri-
bed as an exchange of labor, services or goods between relatively specialized castes
for a share of the harvest. Yet the amount of the "exchange" was fixed by tradi-
tion and obligations to provide the services were inherited. Money would not be
exchanged. In short this was not a marketplace which prevents from fitting caste
relationships in the exchange category as defined by Polanyi (1957). Second, in the
jajmani system certain castes, such as that of priests among others, often excluded
from the exchange low-ranked castes. Thus relationships can not be called recipro-
cal. We are then left with redistribution. Gough (1955)25 provides an account of the
set up of a village in Tanjore named Kumbapettai. According to the author, the
Maratha Raja, willing to set up a village, offered land to four families belonging to
a Brahmin sub-caste. Apparently, the land was divided into four equivalent parts
that were rotated every three years. They did not, strictly speaking own the land,
given that they had no rights to dispose of it to outsiders, but they and their des-
cendants enjoyed the usufruct as long as the Raja received a major share of the
harvest. The remaining part of the harvest was the propriety of the four Brahmin
families. The Brahmins soon "acquired" families to perform the agricultural work
that themselves were forbidden to do. They provided them with construction ma-
terials, a garden and the right to fish in village’s bathing pool as well as gifts at
marriages, festivals and death. Men performed various tasks from planting, growing
and harvesting the crop, to attending to the Brahmin’s cattle, while women would
clean the houses’ of their husbands masters. In exchange for these services, men were
given by their masters a fixed quantity of paddy each month while women and boys
received a smaller amount. The bottom line is that Brahmins directed and supervi-
sed the agricultural production, administered the affairs of the village and were also
granted by government the supervision of public goods production and of justice.
They were the center for redistribution. In this instance, they were the Brahmins,
but they may have come from other castes. The important point is "the work of
all of these castes was performed primarily on behalf, and under the authority, of
the landlords whose villages they served" (Gough, 1955). This story of Kumbapettai
stresses the importance of land ownership that is a major factor in the definition
of a dominant caste given by Srinivas (1955). This is where this theory rejoins that
of Baechler (1988). The institution of caste was a redistributive exchange system
where the dominant caste controls both agricultural production and the allocation
of services, under the relatively weak authority of the government. The absence of
political authority was compensated through an economic system that transformed
the dominant caste into a political center.
25quoted by Klass (2004)
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1.2.4 Summary and Relationship to Power
At this point I somewhat feel compelled to ask for the reader’s forgiveness for
such a long account of the origins of castes. Yet, I have insisted on presenting all
these views for three reasons. First, these theories clearly stress that caste is a multi-
faceted and complex phenomenon. Caste is both a religious, economic and political
phenomenon and is not exempt from the influence of historical events. Second, some
of the anthropological debates on the origins of social institutions and norms finds
an echo in the way economics has progressively integrated these social elements.
This point will be developed in section 2.1.6. Finally, as I have already mentioned,
some of these theories served as a starting point for the elaboration of a model of
segregation that will be developed in Chapter 1.
Indeed, in this chapter, segregation is envisaged as resulting from the fact that
one group has the capacity to offer benefits to others that would otherwise be unat-
tainable. This is how power is defined in Chapter 1, although I must admit that this
concept is rather ambiguous and multi-faceted. What I call power some may name it
influence. Political scientists usually hold to the word power and distinguish between
"power of injunction" and "power of influence". The table below is an excerpt from
a political science textbook (Braud, 1985) that summarizes the difference between
the two26 :
Kinds of Ways of exercise Potential sanctions Effectiveness warranties
power
Injunction
"Legal" norm Negative sanctions Material
(punishment) coercion
Moral Inflict a a material or Psychic coercion
prescription symbolic penalty that will (whether real or perceived)
alter the subject’s
initial situation
Influence
Persuasion Positive sanctions (rewards) No coercion
Manipulation Access to information
Authority Material or symbolic reward
Thus the definition of power given in Chapter 1 relates to a power of influence.
Moreover, Raven and French (1958) define five basis for social power27 : "reward
power, based on the perception by the individual, P, that the agent, O, can mediate
rewards for him ; coercive power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to
mediate punishments for him ; legitimate power, based on the perception by P that
O has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for him ; referent power, based on
P’s identification with O ; and expert power, based on P’s perception that O has
some special knowledge or expertise". The definition given to power in Chapter 1 is
precisely what Raven and French (1958) call "reward power".
26Translation may be approximate as it is mine
27Social power is already a sort of sub-category of the notion of power. It should be understood
as the ability to influence others by changing their real or perceived incentives. Thus it is quite
close to the power of influence described in the table.
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Why can it be argued that, in the case of castes, one group had "reward power"
over others ? Please recall that in the Vedic period the priests monopolized sacri-
fices, whose importance was crucial in worldly success. They were the only ones who
had access to the deities and divine protections could only be acquired through the
intercession of the sacrificers. In this sense, the Brahmins were controlling access to
spiritual and the resulting material benefits.
In the same vein, the Aryan domination, is likely to have entailed a power grab,
and whether this was political through military supremacy, or land control or spiri-
tual is not discussed here. And it may have very well resulted, the "purity of descent"
story tells us, in attempts to separate from the dominated natives. Sénart (1978)
precisely makes this point when he says that the caste system arose from a reluctance
by one group to perform manual tasks. And if this group was able to confine those
tasks to a different one, it is because they, in a way or another, dominated the other
one. Although, as previously said, the "purity of descent" theory may be challenged
on different grounds, it remains the most widespread and influential explanation of
the theory of caste. Even if one does not subscribe to this theory, sacred texts on
castes, clearly stress the influence one group, the priests, had over others.
Let’s assume that the explanation of castes in religious or historical terms is not
satisfactory and that we may prefer to turn to the functional role of castes. The
description of castes as an economic redistributive center highlight that other castes
did actually depend for their livelihood on the land owning caste, who, more often
than not, were Brahmins. Such a system placed the landowning caste as both the
economic center but also the political one. This description stresses the "reward
power" the landowning caste had. It could be objected that such a power may have
been a consequence of the caste system and as such it resulted from an already
operative segregation. Thus, the views expressed in Chapter 1 that segregation may
originate from a power capture should be reversed. Yet, I would argue that since
we lack evidence on what preceded what, both points of views are conceivable.
However, the Kumbapettai account and the zamindari28 system under British rule,
let us believe that the powers granted to the landowning castes have resulted in
deeper castes cleavages.
1.3 Caste Flexibility and Recent Transformations
This search for the origins of castes as well as the presentation of the sacred
texts should not lead us to believe that caste has not changed over time and that
it is anything but flexible. I have already mentioned that caste is not independent
from wealth and power. There has been many castes fissions, generally due to an
increasingly heterogenous economic status within a group. There has been fusions
as well, prompted by various factors ranging from wealth levels to political interests
and so on. Caste is far from being the rigid institution people usually have in mind
and given this flexibility it must have largely changed over time. Some authors such
28In Kumbapettai, the Raja turned over land to few families to collect more efficiently taxes.
The British resorted to a similar system, when they ascribed to the existing zamindars a tax
collection duty. This system if often viewed as having deepened castes cleavages.
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as Bayly (2001) argues that the British Raj reinforced its rigidity. She argues that
what is now viewed as the traditional institution and ideology underlying castes,
only took shape at the beginning of the XVIIIth century "that is, the period of ra-
pid regional state-building which accompanied the collapse of Mughal rule and the
expansion of Western power in the subcontinent". Other authors such as Dehejia
and Dehejia (1993) argue that the caste system in India was quite flexible until the
Medieval Times when land or crop granting replaced cash salaries. The caste system
has undergone deep transformations. For instance, the jajmani system has nearly
disappeared. The increasing access to primary education as well as the development
of new economic sectors besides agricultural ones might have lowered the correlation
between caste and wealth. Yet, many authors such as Banerjee and Knight (1985)
or Borooah (2005) have evidenced and measured caste-based discrimination, the-
reby showing that it is still a reality and not only in rural settings. In Chapter 3
we also present some evidence that untouchability practices have not disappeared.
Thus even if the caste system has been largely altered, some of its aspects remain.
Among the recent transformations that are worth mentioning, one should be loo-
ked into more details, as it may have had repercussion both on the functions of castes
and on the data available and those used in this dissertation29. The Constitution of
India both outlawed caste based discrimination and set up reservations policies for
both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Yet, the Constitution also envisaged
extending these policies to "other backward classes" ("OBCs"), that, roughly spea-
king, were low non untouchable castes. In 1953 a commission was set up to identify
this group. It proposed to extend reservations to about 2,000 castes identified as
OBCs. The government rejected the proposal on the ground that the list rested too
much on caste as criteria for social backwardness, at a time when it championed a
universalist conception of the Indian citizen. In the meantime, the identified OBCs
became conscious of the value of being on the list and of benefiting from reserva-
tions. Under their pressure another commission was set up named after its president
B.P. Mandal. The commission identified 52% of the population as OBCs and re-
commended reserving 27% of the administrative positions to them. Higher castes
reacted violently and recommendations were not applied nationwide. In reaction
OBCs mobilized politically and caste, in a broader sense than that of jati, emerged
as a political identity. Thus, according to Jaffrelot (2002), caste in India has become
a political rally.
This classification as SCs, STs, or OBCs has very a very practical consequence.
All the statistical information gathered has been adapted to this new classification.
Given that OBCs is not an officially recognized group and that there is a debate
about who is in and who is out as well as the size of the group, only few data sets
would classify households as OBCs. Most information on caste would come under the
categories of SCs, STs and non scheduled. Arguably, this is an over-simplification as
each group encompasses very heterogenous castes. For instance, as the debate over
OBCs has shown, situations may be very heterogenous within the non-scheduled
group ranging from very low castes to Brahmins. Nevertheless, authors of empirical
work have little choice but to follow the way data are informed.
29The account that follows is based on Jaffrelot (2002)
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Now that foundations have been laid for the comprehension of the nature and
potential origins of caste that will prove necessary in the following chapters, we may
turn back to the initial question : "what do castes have to do with economics ?".
2 How is The Study of Castes Relevant to
Economics
There are three families of arguments to answer this question. The first one deals
with the conceptual framework used in economics. As Becker and Murphy (2003)
write "modern economics, whether in textbooks or in the most advanced journal
articles, typically assumes that individual behavior is not directly influenced by the
actions of others. Of course, it is understood that every individual is greatly af-
fected indirectly [...] Presumably for this reason, anthropologists and sociologists
have repeatedly told economists about the importance of culture, norms and social
structure. Economists have not listened, however, mainly because these other fields
have not developed powerful techniques for analyzing social influences on behavior".
The rational self-interested maximizing agent, the Homo Economicus was not much
considered in his environment. Yet, experiments have shown that norms, culture and
values play a great role in decisions or preferences. Thus Ostrom and Ahn (2003)
write "abundant anomalies accumulated that called for careful examination of the
factors that were left out of earlier theories. Some of the puzzles [...] could not be
answered satisfactorily without seriously studying the omitted factors : trust and
norms of reciprocity, networks and forms of civic engagement, and both formal and
informal institutions". This set of arguments will be detailed in section 2.1.
The second family refers to the purpose of what was once called political eco-
nomy, which can be described, with a bit of simplification as the maximization of
welfare in a society. Failing to account for the limitations imposed by the individuals
social condition on their ambitions or functionings, as per A. Sen’s words, would put
the analyst in the grip of the criticism addressed by this author to welfarism. This
will be discussed in section 2.2.
Finally the last set or arguments relates to the economic instruments that are
chiefly markets. Because social structures may create large transaction costs or al-
ter preferences, they impede the efficient allocation of resources. Suppose, for the
sake of the argument, that perfect and fluid markets are a prerequisite of growth
and economic development. Then employment discrimination should be studied not
only because it reduces individuals capabilities and is unethical (such a study would
be related to the purpose of political economy) but also because it prevents efficient
allocation of labor (the instrument of political economy). The same goes with social
norms or institutions in general and castes in particular. They ought to be studied
because they influence the attainment of policy objectives but also the means of
achieving such objectives. Examples of how castes do interfere with the economic
instruments will be evoked in section 2.3.
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Before delving into this matter, let me give here a couple of definitions of concep-
tually very close terms that will be extensively used, namely social institution, social
identity and social norm. Social institution should be understood in a sociological
sense that is a system of social relationships that is relatively stable in time. It
implies groupings that, once formed, immediately prompt the formation of social
identity, at least this is what the results from behavioral experiments suggest. Social
identity can be defined as a "person’s sense of self"30 as a member of a group. Social
institution can be said to be a determinant of social identity. Moreover, both social
relationships and social groupings imply the creation of norms. Presumably, as soon
as groups are formed, codes are be set up to secure both social identity, coopera-
tion within the group and to structure relationships with other groups. These three
concepts are very close and their alternative use in what follows should not come as
a surprise.
2.1 The Under-socialized Homo Economuicus
As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the conventional economic agent
is isolated from his social environment. This is one of the strongest criticism ad-
dressed by other social sciences, chiefly sociology, to economics. While the Homo
Economicus is mainly pulled by instrumental rationality, the Homo Sociologicus
is mainly pushed by social norms and institutions as well as social pressure. For
instance, Durkheim and its followers insisted on viewing economic behavior as a
"social fact" i.e. a way of "acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual,
which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over
him"(Durkheim, 1895). Sociology stresses the primacy of social relationships. This
can hardly be more opposite to the conventional view held in economics of behaviors
driven by self-interest based on exogenous preferences and that through unlimited
information and instrumental rationality, maximize utility under the constraint of
scarce of means. The Homo Economicus is a self-regarding consequentialist rather
than a "political animal" as per Aristotle’s words. However, all these characteristics
have come under scrutiny impelled by (a) the criticisms addressed by other social
sciences, (b) the regain of interest for earlier theories that either contested one or
more of the characteristics attributed to Homo Economicus such as A. Marshall
(Bowles and Gintis, 2000) or insisted on the role of institutions such as J. Schumpe-
ter and T. Veblen and (c) the accumulation of "abundant anomalies" as per Ostrom
and Ahn (2003) words. Among such anomalies, two are worth mentioning, collec-
tive action and discrimination, since they will serve as a thread for the arguments
developed in the chapters. Indeed early theories of collective action (Olson, 1965)
concluded that agents left by themselves in a situation where free riding is an option,
can not achieve cooperation unless incentives are modified by an external authority.
Similarly, how come that individuals who are identical in all their characteristics but
skin color do not earn the same wage ? As mentioned by Ostrom and Ahn (2003)
these analysis clearly point at the role of social interactions and norms.
30Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
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Naturally the last point leads us to the work undertook by Becker (1976) and to
whom we must pay a tribute for reintroducing social relationships in economic beha-
viors. Yet, his analysis probably did not go far enough as the behaviors he described
are dependent upon set roles that are exogenously ascribed. As Granovetter (1985)
argued "Actors’ behavior results from their named role positions and role sets ; thus
we have arguments of how workers and supervisors, husbands and wives or criminals
and law enforcers will interact with one another, but these relations are not assumed
to have individualized context beyond that given by their named roles". Becker’s
explanation of discrimination in the labor market through an exogenous "taste for
discrimination" immediately prompts the question of the origin of such a taste and
points towards the necessity to bring social norms and institutions in the picture.
2.1.1 Instrumental Rationality
This is where new institutional economics came in by refuting the assumption
of costless information and insisting on asymmetrical information and transaction
costs. As North (1995) writes "in fact, information is incomplete and there is limited
mental capacity by which to process information. Human beings, in consequence,
impose constraints on human interaction in order to structure exchange. There is no
implication that the consequent institutions are efficient. In such a world ideas and
ideologies play a major role in choices and transaction costs result in imperfect mar-
kets. The place to begin a theory of institutions, therefore, is with a modification
of the instrumental rationality assumption". Instrumental rationality assumption
was modified indeed, rather than swept away for, in this framework, agents still
resort to an optimization of the ends under the constraints of scarce means, given
information available to them. Thus out of the characteristics attributed to the neo-
classical agent that are self interest, exogenous preferences, instrumental rationality
with complete information, only the last one was contested, yet without refuting the
consequentialist behaviors of agents. Therefore, institutional economics may come
under the grip of three kinds of criticism. First, are the retained hypothesis about
agents behaviors acceptable ? Second, if ideologies and norms are the tools agents
resort to in case of information scarcity, where do they come from? Going back to
the discrimination example cited above, the theory moved from Becker’s taste for
discrimination to Arrow (1971) statistical discrimination. Agents resorts to discri-
mination to compensate for the lack of information about their future employees
productivity. Thus the norm is a palliative to a lack of information. I argue in Chap-
ter 1 that this prompts a similar question to that raised by Becker (1957) theory :
where does the inference about someone’s productivity from physical or social traits
come from? In other words, where do prejudice come from?
Let’s turn first to the first question, that is the validity of the characteristics
ascribed to agents. Are they consequentialists in the sense that they optimize their
utility given a scarcity of means ? Two types of answers have been brought forward
mostly based on the distinction made by Polanyi (1957) between the "formal" and
"substantive" meanings of economics : "the substantive meaning of economic de-
rives from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to
the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in
supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction. The formal meaning
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of economic derives from the logical character of the means-ends relationship, as
apparent in such words as "economical" or "economizing". It refers to a definite
situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced by
an insufficiency of those means. If we call the rules governing choice of means the
logic of rational action, then we may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised
term, as formal economics. The two root meaning of "economic", the substantive
and the formal, have nothing in common. The latter derives from logic, the former
from fact. The formal meaning implies a set of rules referring to choice between
the alternative uses of insufficient means. The substantive meaning implies neither
choice nor insufficiency of means : man’s livelihood may or may not involve the ne-
cessity of choice and, if choice there be, it need not be induced by the limiting effect
of scarcity of means...". The reason for quoting Polanyi (1957) at such length is
that the distinction he made had enormous implications in social sciences and most
prominently in economic anthropology. Surprisingly, the cleavage created between
"formalists" and "substantivists" was confined to anthropology. This may be due
to the fact that susbstantivists challenge the hypothesis that all actions derive from
deliberate choice, which is central to most economic models.
2.1.2 Freedom of Choice
However, when economists start introducing social interactions to explain the
puzzles Ostrom and Ahn (2003) were referring to, choice appears much more limi-
ted than what conventional models assume and this seems to be troubling Becker and
Murphy (2003) when they write "strong complementarities between social capital
and individual behavior appear to leave little room for individual choice. Although
at one level there is much validity to these claims, at a more fundamental level social
capital changes the focus rather than reduces the importance of individual choice. If
peer pressure and other forms of social capital have enormous power over choices, it
becomes much more important to make wise decisions in selecting peers and other
determinants of such capital". In the model derived by Becker and Murphy (2003)
the only space for rational choice is the decision to associate with others."Even when
social structure and social capital have enormous power over behavior, people still
greatly influence their behavior by, in effect, choosing their social capital [...] We
believe that utility maximization and other parts of rational choice theory provide
insight into how people are divided into different categories when some categories
are in greater demand because they have more attractive members. That is, we hope
to demonstrate that rational choice theory is not inconsistent with the importance
of social structure, but rather is crucial in understanding how this structure gets
determined". Yet, many instances prove that the freedom to choose social capital is
rather limited. In highly stratified or ethnically fragmented societies, social capital
is probably imposed on individuals by birth or physical traits. Given what has been
said before about the system of castes, it would take a lot of energy to show that
individuals are entirely free to choose their social capital within this context. Ar-
guably, even in socially mobile societies the extent of social capital that one is able
to acquire may often be thought as given, owing to the fact that habits are taken in
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the community, norms are inculcated early in the childhood, etc31.
2.1.3 Embeddedness and Social Interactions
What is clear from this abstract is that economists are ill at ease when too much
emphasis is put on social relationships, norms and institutions. However, since the
argument made by Granovetter (1985) that "most behavior is closely embedded in
networks of interpersonal relations and that such an argument avoids the extremes
of under- and over-socialized views of human action" a middle path seems to have
emerged. Rather than positing the absence of relationships between desired out-
comes and scarce means, or the absence of interferences by social relationships in
behaviors, recognizing that behaviors are embedded into social relationships leads
to considering strategic interactions. This is a point made in Akerlof (1976) about
castes, when the author asks why virtually no one would break the caste code, when
the disappearance of castes would make everyone better off. He answers that the
expectation of being out-casted if the individual was to break the code, would make
him much worse off than obeying the code. Thus everyone obeys the caste code,
even though everybody would be better off without it. Similarly Basu (1986) recalls
what Vaclav Havel wrote about "dictatorships in which no one or no group plays
the role of dictator. Each citizen, from fear of being labeled disloyal and being ha-
rassed, conforms to the rule of the system. Even those who harass do so because
they are worried that if they do not harass the disloyal, they themselves may be
labeled disloyal. So each individual through his own little rational acts help sustain
a regime which he might not actually want"(Basu, 1986).
Behaviors are thus considered in terms of strategic relationships. Yet this is not
sufficient to explain "Why do we not try to walk off without paying after a taxi
ride ?" (Basu, 1997). This author argues that it cannot be explained by pure sel-
fishness but rather by obedience to norms of fairness. Walking away is not in the
agent’s set of actions, because norms exclude certain behaviors32 As Basu (1997)
writes "It is obvious, at least to most of us, that much of human behavior is shaped
by morals, customs, and social norms. What is less obvious is that an individual’s
adherence to certain social norms may be a necessary element in many economic
models". Behavioral experiments concur on the fact that norms restrict the set of
possible actions. Dictator’s games rarely yield the outcome that would be expected
under the assumption of selfishness and utility maximization. For instance, Hoffman
31Please refer to Bowles (1973) and Bowles et al. (2009)
32I need to clarify the relationship between norms and preferences. Basu (1986) argues that
norms restrict the set of feasible actions. Thus preferences are likely to lie within the the feasible
set. Given that a behavior that would go against the norm is hardly conceivable, or all in all very
costly, an individual would only weigh his options, i.e. express his preferences within the set of
feasible actions. Let’s take a rather crude example. A social norm may state that being more than
15 minutes late is extremely rude. Yet, I may choose to be five minutes earlier, if I like to come
to an appointment first or only five minutes late. I still have expressed my preference within the
boundaries of a socially acceptable set. Turning to the example of caste. The norm stipulates that
one should marry within my group. Suppose an individual obeys a norm, he still can express his
preferences in terms of partners within a group. This is discussed in more details in section 2.1.6
below
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et al. (1996) conclude from dictator’s game experiments that if subjects offer higher
payments than predicted by the Nash equilibrium, even in one shot games, this is
due to the habit of reciprocity, a social norm imported into the laboratory. Moreover,
offers decrease with social distance during the experiment, suggesting that as the
distance increases norm compliance loses strength. Henrich et al. (2001) studied the
behaviors in ultimatum, public good and dictator games in 15 small scale societies.
One of their conclusions is that predictions based on the self interested maximizing
agent is not found in any of the society under study, while "the large variations
across the different cultural groups suggest that preferences or expectations are af-
fected by group-specific conditions, such as social institutions or cultural fairness
norms"33.
2.1.4 Other Regarding Preferences
Eckel and Gintis (2010) conclude "Experimental economics has found several
very important cases in which the predictions of the self-regarding actor game theo-
retic model are incorrect, and the failures are due precisely to the violation of the
assumption of self-regarding behavior". Another kick at the conventional Homo Eco-
nomicus : preferences are not exogenous but rather situationally specific as Bowles
and Gintis (2000) write "The primary contribution of the behavioral approach to
economics is to understanding the diversity and context dependent nature of human
preferences, how elements of this repertoire of preferences become salient in parti-
cular strategic interactions, how they have evolved over the long run, and how indi-
viduals form the beliefs that along with their preferences explain what they do. The
behavioral approach is not a critique of optimizing subject to constraints. It takes
for granted that people are purposeful and have reasons for what they do - although
it recognizes that individuals may have internal conflicts and time-inconsistent pre-
ferences". An example of this, may be the analysis undertook by Voors et al. (n.d.)
where the authors show that communities who experienced war in Burundi exhibit
more altruistic and less patient behaviors.
Let’s pause for a short time to briefly summarize what has been said so far.
First, the instrumental rationality of the Homo Economicus has been challenged.
Yet, limited or asymmetric information came to its rescue by saying that individuals
do optimize subject to constraints, given the limited information available to them.
Then the introduction of social institutions came as a reinforcement by stating that
social norms do restrict the set of actions available and thus agents do optimize
within that set, or by assuming that agents do make expectations about the reper-
cussions of their actions on other who may backfire. The last two set of arguments
build on the idea that behaviors are embedded into social relationships, but still
maintain the selfishness of the agents. Yet, this last point has been challenged by
behavioral experiments as observed outcomes rarely match the predicted Nash equi-
libria, due to the presence of concerns for fairness or the habit of reciprocity. It
seems that agents are genuinely concerned with the effect of their actions on others.
They have social preferences and may be less self-regarding than conventional mo-
33For a review of the outcomes in various experimental games, please refer to Bowles (2004)
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dels would assume. Moreover, the impacts of such concerns are dependent upon
perceived social distance (Hoffman et al., 1996). So preferences are likely not to be
exogenous and rather context dependent. This last point seems to be confirmed by
experiments on the formation of social identity.
2.1.5 The Impact of Social Identity
A number of experiments have shown that social identity influences behaviors
(Steele and Aronson, 1995; Shih et al., 1999; Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Chen and Li,
2009). How is that so ? "Social identity is commonly defined as a person’s sense
of self derived from perceived membership in social groups"(Chen and Li, 2009).
Moreover, the social identification process is often tied to the adherence to group’s
specific norms34. We may argue that any behavior that contradicts this sense of
membership, or the group’s code, jeopardizes part of the individual’s identity and
generates a feeling of discomfort, that is often referred to as "cognitive dissonance",
a term coined by Festinger et al. (1956). Psychological experiments have shown that
individuals experience anxiety while acting in a way that contradicts self perception
and believes and that they endeavor to reduce this feeling of discomfort by either
rationalizing their decisions or adapting their behaviors. Therefore, given that so-
cial identification is tied to stereotype formation (Tajfel et al., 1971), not acting in
conformity to the stereotyped behavior contradicts social identity and thus creates
anxiety. Let’s consider the following examples to be more specific. Steele and Aron-
son (1995) conducted an experiment where they gave African-American and white
students a test. The pool of subjects was separated into two random groups. One
group was told that the test evaluated intellectual performance while the second
group did not receive such a message. Performance of African-American in the first
group was significantly worse. This under performance was due, the authors argued,
to the conforming of race related stereotypes, what they called "stereotype threat".
Another striking example is the experiment conducted by Shih et al. (1999). Asian
American female undergraduates were grouped in three and given a math test. In
one group, the Asian identity was emphasized. In a second the gender was stressed
and in the control group no identity was particularly made salient. Results show that
the first group outperformed and the second group under-performed compared to
the control group. Thus women performance was altered by the stressed stereotype.
There are a couple of other experiments of this sort and most evidence that indivi-
duals act in conformity with what others expect of them35. The one conducted by
Hoff and Pandey (2006) is of particular interest. Children from Northern India were
asked to solve mazes. When caste identity was not made salient, the performance
34One of the examples Akerlof and Kranton (2010) give is the enrollment of cadets at West
Point. The aim of the training is to promote a military identity by stressing the differentiation
between insiders (military) and outsiders (civilians). The adherence to a code of honor is supposed
to reinforce the identification process. The authors write "In the formal language of social sciences,
people divide themselves and others into social categories. And social categories and norms are
automatically tied together : people in different social categories should behave differently. The
norms also specify how people of different types - different social categories, in our new vocabulary-
should treat each other."
35For an extensive review of these experiments please refer to either Akerlof and Kranton (2010)
or Chen and Li (2009)
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of both high castes and lower castes children were not very different. Yet, the lower
castes performance dropped dramatically when caste membership was publicly an-
nounced. Thus long standing discrimination has shaped self perception and thereby
reduced the most vulnerable group’s set of expectations. This is what Bertrand et al.
(2005) call "implicit discrimination". As individuals internalize norms and adhere to
them, their social identity strongly influences their behaviors. Hence the necessity
to introduce a utility derived from a compliance to the group’s norms as done by
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005, 2010). They introduced as an argument in the
individual utility function, a utility derived from identity and a gain or a loss in
utility derived from complying to the norm or ideal set for or by the group the
individual belongs to. The model thus captures the fact that behaviors depend on
social category and on norms.
However, the impact of social identity may go beyond groups’ norms and codes
obedience as some authors argue that it modifies preferences. Experiments led by
Tajfel et al. (1971); Tajfel and John (1979) show that even when groups are for-
med arbitrarily, subjects tend to identify with their group and such an identification
begets intergroup rivalry and discriminatory practices. Chen and Li (2009) conclu-
ded that social identification modifies preferences in the sense that experiments
participants exhibit more altruistic dispositions towards in-group members. Thus
accounting for social identity stresses that preferences are context dependent and
probably neither fixed nor exogenous. However, what is not clear in this literature
is whether social identity modifies behaviors because it alters preferences or because
it implies adherence to a code that restrict the set of possible actions. To be more
specific, will individuals be more indulgent or generous towards their fellows because
they feel a preference for them, or because to be part of the group, they have to
adhere to an in group altruistic norm that makes selfish behaviors not an option.
2.1.6 What is a Social Norm?
This is quite a difficult question and I will not attempt to settle it as this would
largely be beyond the scope of the dissertation and rather presumptuous. Howe-
ver, it is surprising that that every set of theories mentioned so far, seem to have
a different idea about the nature of norms. For instance, New Institutional Econo-
mics defines an institution as "rules of the game [..] humanly devised constraints
that shape human interactions" (North, 1990). This definition is broad enough to
include norms as informal rules of the game. They are viewed as a "humanly devised
constraints" which suggests that they have a function and arise out of collective opti-
mization36. A good example of this may be the prohibition of incest. However, Elster
(1989) and Basu (1986) challenge this view on three grounds : first not all norms
are Pareto-improvements. The study of castes by Akerlof (1976) clearly makes this
point. Other authors such as Young (2007) describe norms as way to "coordinate
people’s expectations in interactions that possess multiple equilibria", a conception
that is related to the former, although it departs from the idea that the equilibrium
is necessary Pareto optimal. However, most of these views insist on norms being
36For a discussion on this particular point please refer to Elster (1989) or Anderson (2000)
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imposed and sanctioned, while experiments on social identity showed that sanctions
are not necessary for norms to be complied with. As Akerlof and Kranton (2010)
put it "they [individuals] internalize the norms and adhere to them. This conception
does not correspond to economists’ usual view. To date, economists have mostly
seen norms as sustained by external forces : people follow a norm because if they
do not, they could be punished in some way". This last point insists on the fact
that norms are not obeyed out of a fear of punishment, but rather because norms
ought to be obeyed. They include a moral injunction. As in the example of the taxi
ride given in Basu (1997), a taxi’s passenger will pay for the ride not out of fear
of getting into trouble with the taxi driver, but rather because he has to. This is
what Basu (1986) calls "contract-adherence norms". Thus, according to this author,
norms serve at restricting agents’ action space. He writes "before asserting that an
individual maximises utility, it is necessary to state clearly the domain over which
the utility function is defined and the domain is not well-defined by uttering the ma-
gic word "everywhere". [...] The reason why in a formal general equilibrium model,
an agent does not steal another agent’s initial endowment is simply because such an
act is not in his feasible set. [...]. This is where social norms become crucial. It is a
method of policing individual activities without having to maintain a police force".
A last definition of norms that is worth mentioning is related to social identity. It
may be hypothesized that norms serve at reinforcing social identity, as the Cadet’s
code of honor reinforces a sense of membership to the Army. They may also serve
at conveying information about the interacting partner.
The eclecticism of the answers presented so far is probably commensurate with
the difficulty of answering the question about the origins of norms. This reminds of
the debate about the origins of castes. It is much easier to identify how a system
works and what its attributes are rather than how it came about. Moreover, it is very
tempting to see in the attributes the origins, albeit nothing proves that because some
features are relatively efficient they must be the cause of the system. Let’s try to ap-
ply the above points of view to castes based norms. As Akerlof (1976) showed, castes
can not be said to stem out of a collective optimization process. It may also be far
fetched to see in such a very complex institution a mere coordination problem. How
can we say that untouchability is a way to coordinate expectations ? Now turning
to Basu’s argument, caste based norms restrict the set of feasible action to police
activities. This is not very far from the point made by Baechler (1988) presented in
section 1.2.3. Yet, such an interpretation obliterates many aspects of castes. Thus
the more suitable explanation is the one related to social identity, yet it is neither
entirely satisfactory. If we assume that untouchability practices for instance aim at
reinforcing social identity, which it probably does, this says nothing about why are
low castes untouchables ? The point is that very few of the theories invoked so far
leave room for ideologies, which is disturbing in the case of castes. We may thus
have to turn to political science for an explanation and, as I will do in Chapter 1, to
Weber (1978) concept of legitimacy, as the acceptance of an authority. The concept
of legitimacy implies that people sees in this authority an accepted "rules of the
game" as per D. North’s words. Thus norms, may result from an already established
situation. This is the assumption that supports the model developed in Chapter 1.
Segregation may occur due to a specific political organization and segregation norms
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are only a dress up for making the situation "legitimate" in the sense Weber gave to
this word. Going back to the concept of cognitive dissonance, the social body may
need an a posteriori rationalization of an already existing segregationist situation.
Let’s leave the debate about the nature of norms aside for the time being. The
points is that norms may have a large effect on behaviors and the necessity to ac-
count for them stands out clearly when practical issues are addressed. This is the
point we make in Chapters 3 and 4 when we show that caste based norms, such as
untouchability, have consequences on the way public goods are delivered and used.
Unfortunately local norms or customs are seldom considered in economics, probably
due to the universalist ambition of the discipline. This echoes the methodological
criticism addressed by the followers of Durkheim to conventional economic models
that were seen as deriving a set of actions from disputable behavioral assumptions,
whereas facts should be the analysis starting point, as well as the distinction made
by Polanyi (1957) between the substantive and formal meanings of economics. Hope-
fully the analysis conducted in the last two Chapters of the thesis make a convincing
case for including local social institutions and norms within the ambit of economic
analysis.
The consideration of social norms by the economic literature allowed to recast
the Homo economicus as a political animal as per Aristotle’s words and to challenge
conventional assumptions to bring them closer to reality. "As economics evolved in
the twentieth century, the models grew more sophisticated, but Homo economicus
lagged behind.[...] Fairly recently, behavioral economics has introduced cognitive
bias and other psychological findings. Identity economics37, in its turn, brings in
social context - with a new economic man and woman who resemble real people
in real situations". Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered such as that
related to the emergence of norms or the identification process and assertion. The
study of social organizations and norms, of which caste is hopefully an instructive
example, allowed for this improvements, yet there still is much to be done. We may
now turn to the second reason for studying the system of castes in economics that
mainly rests on the arguments brought forward by A. Sen.
37Identity Economics is the title of the book by Akerlof and Kranton (2010)
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2.2 A. Sen’s Capabilities Approach
What was called in the XVIIIth century political economy and later became eco-
nomics, was a normative theory of social arrangements. Utilitarianism imposed on
political economy its framework and set as a criterion for a desirable social arrange-
ment social welfare by the maximization of the individual utilities. A. Sen criticized
the use of utility as a yardstick on many grounds, two of which are of particular
interest to us : adaptative preferences and the focus on income as the argument for
the utility function. He writes "a thoroughly deprived person, leading a very reduced
life, might not appear to be badly off in terms of the mental metric of desire and its
fulfilment, if the hardship is accepted with non grumbling resignation. In situations
of long-standing deprivation, the victims do not go on grieving and lamenting all the
time, and very often make great efforts to take pleasure in small mercies and to cut
down personal desires to modest - "realistic" - proportions. Indeed in situations of
adversity which the victims cannot individually change, prudential reasoning would
suggest that the victims should concentrate their desires on those limited things that
they can possibly achieve, rather than fruitlessly pining for what is unattainable.
The extent of a person’s deprivation, then, may not at all show up in the metric of
desire fulfilment, even though he or she may be quite unable to be adequately nou-
rished, decently clothed, minimally educated, and properly sheltered" (Sen, 1992).
Because of the malleability of individuals expectations and mental states, even stri-
kingly unfair states of facts may not result in dissatisfaction and as such would not
be counted as unequal. Welfarism can thus result in highly unequal situations. Let’s
caricature by saying that if the utterly deprived are not dissatisfied, then all is for
the best.
Moreover, the focus on income as the main argument of the utility function is
also probably not appropriate given that there may be large variations in indivi-
duals capacities to transform income into well-being. As Sen (1992) puts it "even
if the parameters of the conversion rates are respectively given , an equal distribu-
tion of income may yield very unequal well-being levels - with differences related
to group specific parameters (such as gender, age, environments) and individual
parameters (such as genetic characteristics)". Indeed many theoretical as well as
empirical works38 have shown that the relative income level matters almost as much
as the absolute one in shaping well-being. Carlsson et al. (2009) showed in a study
conducted in India that more than half of the marginal utility derived from income
comes from some kind of relative income effects (what Sen called the group speci-
fic parameters). Moreover, the concern for relative income is positively related to
low caste membership and a low level of family income. These authors also show
that "an increase in the mean income of the caste to which the individual belong,
everything else held constant, reduces utility for the individual". These studies put
the emphasis on the fact that conversion rates of income into well-being is clearly
dependent upon who the individual compares to, or, in short, his social identity.
The differences in the relationship between income and well-being plead for the in-
tegration of social identity into the economic analysis, if we are to perceive social
welfare as a function of individual well-being.
38By Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Carlsson et al. (2007), Clark et al. (2008); Luttmer
(2005), among others.
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After having charged at the concept of utility, what kind of metric are we left
with to assess well-being ? Sen proposes that of capability. Capability "represents
the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can
achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s
freedom to lead one type of life or another. Just as the so-called ’budget set’ in
the commodity space represents a person’s freedom to buy commodity bundles, the
’capability set’ in the functioning space reflects the person’s freedom to choose from
possible livings" (Sen, 1992). If we retain the distribution of capabilities as the most
relevant measure of inequality, we still need a lens through which the capabilities
distribution is to be analyzed. Should we study the lack of freedom depending on
age, gender, social class, geographical zones, individuals ? According to Sen (1992)
inequality is probably best assessed in terms of groups and more particularly on
those who experienced stable differentiation such as "class, gender, caste or com-
munity"(Sen, 1992). Besides Sen’s suggestion, how do we know that caste is the
appropriate dimension to study inequality ? Deshpande (2001) argues "poverty and
inequality in India have been extensively researched, but the focus in economic re-
search has been on identifying and defining the contours of poverty and redistributive
policies that target the poor as a group. While this is undoubtedly essential, this
has excluded the study of other ingredients of stratification, most notably caste, and
precludes any inferences about intergroup disparity based upon caste". Sociological
accounts presented in the previous sections of this introduction set us thinking that
caste indeed is an important factor in the distribution of capabilities. Studies that
empirically evidence the importance of castes in the analysis of inequality are few
(Borooah, 2005; Deshpande, 2000b,a, 2001), yet they strikingly make a point for the
integration of this institution. As Deshpande (2001) puts it caste should be seen as
"an essential ingredient in the study of stratification patterns in India’s population"
and that "inter caste disparity continues to underlie overall disparity" (Deshpande,
2000a).
Now, how would social institutions such as that of caste have any effect on capa-
bility and functionings ? I would argue that there are two ways through which social
groups may limit capabilities. The first one is related to the rules and behaviors
imposed on other group members (prohibition to share water in the case of castes
for instance). The second one works through social identity and the either collective
or individual internalization of stereotypes and norms (as an outcast I should not
envisage pursuing prestigious careers because (a) I will not be allowed to and (b) it
is at odds with the way I picture myself). As far as the first point is concerned Shah
et al. (2006) showed that even 50 years after the Constitution outlawed untoucha-
bility outcasts are often denied access to publicly provided goods and services such
as entry into police stations, primary health centers, or access to public roads or
water facilities. This particular point will be reviewed in more details in Chapters
3 and 4. Caste-based discrimination in the labor market is quite common and has
been assessed, for instance, by Banerjee and Knight (1985) and Ito (2009). Caste
based discrimination is pervasive and determines many aspects of economic oppor-
tunities from access to education, through wage or employment or even geographical
settings. The list of channels through which castes reduce capabilities is probably
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endless and these examples coupled with what has been said about caste rules and
the prohibition of contacts should be convincing. For those who are accustomed to
reading Indian local newspapers that abound with stories of inter caste clashes, often
prompted by a willingness to enforce caste rules, saying that this social institution
reduces capabilities and freedoms will probably appear a truism39.
It could be argued that the limiting impact of castes on capabilities works also
through a more subtle way than the imposition and the enforcement of rules by
others. Social identity itself may limit the set of expectations and this more indirect
route has often been underestimated. Given what has been said in section 2.1.5 on
stereotype threats, it would not be very bold to say that caste limits functionings
through a diminished self-image. This is the point made in Chapter 2.
2.3 Castes Distort Resources Allocation
Finally, there is a more conventional reason to be concerned with social ins-
titution in general and caste in particular : they may interfere with the efficient
allocation of resources. For instance, discrimination may impede an efficient allo-
cation of labor. This point is addressed by Akerlof (1976). Akerlof challenges the
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of perfect competition by refuting the as-
sumption of complete and costless information. Rather, in the absence of complete
information, agents resort to indicators, from which they infer the missing informa-
tion. This is close to Arrow’s statistical discrimination whereby potential employees
abilities, that are unobservable, are inferred from stereotypes. The use of such indi-
cators leads to equilibria that are not Pareto optimal. Akerlof concludes that "the
use of indicators makes equilibrium income distribution and resources allocation
dependent on these [social] divisions". Another example of how social institutions
may distort resource allocation can be found in the literature on social fractionaliza-
tion and the provision of public goods. As far as castes are concerned, Banerjee and
Somanathan (2001); Banerjee et al. (2005); Banerjee and Somanathan (2007); Ba-
nerjee et al. (2008) and Bardhan (2000) showed that caste fragmented areas exhibit
a lower level of public goods40. Accounting for social institution, does not only have
a theoretical relevance as explained in the above sections, but also has consequences
on policy designs and implementations. For instance, if the provision or use of public
goods, which is core to many development policies, is hobbled by social fragmenta-
tion, the programs may not reach their targets unless they take social divisions into
consideration. Similarly, if social customs command that some population catego-
ries do not need education, how will a nation build a human capital ? If high castes
own water irrigation systems and are unwilling to sell them to lower castes, thereby
reducing the yield of their land41, how can agricultural production be maximized ?
Thus social institutions ought to be taken into consideration if development policies
are to be well targeted and designed.
39On caste atrocities, please refer to the account given by Cabalion (2010), for instance. See also
stories about the Ranvir Sena private militia in Bihar known for its exactions against untouchables.
40This literature is challenged in more details in Chapter 4
41Such a situation is described in Anderson (2007)
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3 Outline of The Dissertation
The four Chapters contained in this dissertation borrow from the three ap-
proaches presented so far. Chapter 1 raises the question of the emergence of a
segregation norm even in the absence of prejudice against a particular group. It
is striking to see that a large part of the literature on discrimination and segrega-
tion cannot depart from positing that agents do have exogenous preferences about
who they interact with. I try to build a model where preferences do not have to be
specified. Building on arguments developed by Weber (1978) and on historical facts,
I envisage ideology as an a posteriori justification of an already existing situation. If
this is true, then segregation can appear without the help of predefined preferences.
Its origin seen in an unequal power distribution. As mentioned in section 2.1.6 the
egression of social norms is still to be inquired and there is a debate about whether
they originate from. Some of the features and conclusions drawn from the model are
compelling such as the account for power, and the fact that it is a strive for associa-
tion with the mighty that results in being rejected. Various examples are provided
that support the conclusions. Yet, ways for improvements are provided at the end
of the Chapter and the most promising is probably to adopt an evolutionary version
of the model.
In Chapter 2, I investigate how binding being from a Scheduled Caste or Tribe is
on perceived social status and question whether other characteristics such as educa-
tion, occupation or income could partly or entirely counterbalance the caste effect.
Results show that the group’s effect is quite large and may differ between Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This analysis is motivated by the fact that, as men-
tioned in section 2.2 of this introduction, self perception plays an active role in the
forming of expectations and ambitions.
Finally, Chapter 3 and 4 develop the relationship between caste based fragmen-
tation and public goods provision and usage and are therefore more policy oriented.
Chapter 3 shows that the number of acts of violence against outcasts is positively
related to the way water is distributed. The more common and shared the water
source, the higher the number of violent acts. Two consequences may be inferred
from this result. First, untouchability practices are still vigorous 50 years after the
Constitution provided for its demise and caste norms are violently enforced. Se-
cond, publicly provided goods are not that public and individuals may be prevented
from using them on caste grounds. This is an illustration of fundamental rights and
functionings being denied. Chapter 4 pushes the investigation a notch further by
studying whether caste fractionalization or polarization has an effect on the local
presence of six publicly provided goods. Results show that if it has an effect it is
likely to be a positive one, which is at variance with theoretical conclusions and
with some of the previous empirical works, that exhibited a negative impact. On the
other hand, polarization is found irrelevant, which casts doubt on the assumption,
implicit in the literature that social fractionalization results in groups antagonisms.
The positive relationship between social fractionalization and public goods presence
is envisaged as a sign of potential caste based patronage. This hypothesis is inves-
tigated and some evidence is found that belonging to the dominant caste raises the
likelihood for a household to access some of the goods. This tends to confirm that
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caste appropriate publicly provided goods and may turn them into club goods. The
last Chapter concludes the dissertation and puts forth an agenda for future research.
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CHAPTER 1. POWER AND ENDOGENOUS SEGREGATION
Every genuine form of domination implies a minimum
of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest
(based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance)
in obedience.
Max Weber in Economy and Society (1909)
1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to model the emergence of a segregation norm without
the interference of a priori prejudice but based solely on the power seize by one group.
The idea stems from two sources : first segregated societies are often ones in which
power is unequally distributed and second, prejudice and discriminatory norms may
be thought of as a justification for an already existing social cleavages, in the spirit
of the theory developed by Weber about the sources of political legitimacy1. This
is also what Doniger and Smith (1991) strongly suggest in their introduction to
the Laws of Manu, where caste’s ideology happened to serve the already prominent
priests either through a monopoly over sacrifice or the idea of ritual purity2. As
far as castes are concerned, please remind that the religious text founding castes,
Manu’s code, mentioned in introduction to the dissertation, was probably written at
a time where the Vedic society had already established segregation norms. Thus it
may be an a posteriori justification of an already existing social organization. There
is still a raging debate about whether social identity such as ethnicity is constructed
as a response to institutional or economic incentives, or whether it is exogenous. By
assuming and trying to show that social norms such as segregation may arise even
in the absence of a priori preferences, makes way for the argument that such prefe-
rences are a posteriori construction to reinforce segregation or legitime this state.
This last point goes much further than what is modestly shown in this chapter
and should be taken as a question raised by this piece of work. Yet, a quick review
of the theories of discrimination show that it is difficult to address the issue of the
very origin of discrimination. Although the work by Becker (1957) was seminal to
structure and understand the process and consequences of discrimination, it unsa-
tisfactorily address the origin of discrimination by referring to a vague "taste for
discrimination". To his credit, finding the origin of discrimination was not his main
concern. More informative is Arrow (1971) and the theory of statistical discrimi-
nation where prejudice makes up for a lack of information regarding individuals’
capacities. Yet, one might wonder why certain criteria such as skin color are used
rather than others ? Moreover, how come that such criteria are common knowledge ?
Although these theories were very helpful at breaking down the discriminatory pro-
cess, they probably provide too few elements about the root of prejudice, to whom
discrimination is probably only the right-hand man.
Where do prejudice originate from is a question that has rarely been delved into
by economists, who have given it up to other social scientists such as anthropolo-
1Please refer to section 2.1.6 of the introduction
2Please refer to section 1.1.2 of the introduction
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gists and sociologists. Prejudice is taken here in its sociological acceptance that is
the fact of inferring an individual’s subjective characteristics, especially moral ones,
from observable attributes such as sex or ethnic groups, etc. Intuition tells us that
prejudice is indivisible from inequalities. Therefore it may be hypothesized that in-
equalities generate such a cleavage within a society that antagonism and rejection
among groups and as a result prejudice appears, discrimination being a corollary. I
wish to show in this article how one group’s power of influence gives rise to segrega-
tion. My assumption is that prejudice and discrimination are the logic outcome of
identity phenomena, that stems from a deep cleavage in society whose utmost form
is segregation. Therefore, through the study of the creation of segregation, we may
be able to understand the source of prejudice and push the discrimination analysis
a notch further.
My work aims at showing that segregation may pre-exist prejudice. Works in the
wake of Schelling (1969, 1978) theory have shown that a segregationist equilibrium
may appear even in the absence of discriminatory dispositions. Such an equilibrium
is the product of individuals’ strategic decisions, who do not perceive the general
effect of the sum of their micro-decisions. This impact may often widely differ from
their individual motives. Although I fully concur on Schelling’s view that segrega-
tion is the product of individual rational decisions that have nothing to do with
discrimination, my work differs from Schelling’s in one important way. In Schelling’s
model, individuals do bother even a little about the ethnic composition of their close
neighborhood. Although preferences are weak, they nevertheless have to be specified
in the model. Saying that segregation arises because white do prefer to live next to
at least y% of their likes, more or less amounts to saying that segregation is not in-
dependent from discrimination and prejudice. In the model developed in this paper,
preferences are endogenized. Therefore, I may be able to show that segregation may
appear even in the total absence of prejudice.
I need to make clear what is understood here by segregation. This term has of-
ten been reduced to its spatial definition in economic works. Authors have mainly
focussed on the fact for example that blacks and whites do not live in the same
neighborhood, do not attend the same schools, etc. However, it can be argued that
this term should be taken here in a broader sense. I define segregation as a refusal
by members of different groups or communities to interact. Such a refusal may ma-
nifest itself through marriage decisions or by choosing a neighborhood or friends’
company. Spatial segregation is only a specific case of this refusal to interact with
members of another social or ethnic group.
Given my stand that (a) segregation is a systematic refusal to cooperate and (b)
it is an equilibrium that stems from individual strategic decisions, game theory mo-
dels seem appropriate tools to analyze the conditions under which this equilibrium
appears. The model used in this paper is based on repeated prisoner’s dilemma with
random matching models that are common in the cooperation literature. Although,
the model presented here is technically close to the one used in Eeckhout (2006) it
differs in two major ways. First, Eeckhout (2006) main objective was not to study
the emergence of a segregation equilibrium but to assess its efficiency. Second, this
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author gave agents’ segregationist strategies choices as exogenous. My objective is
totally different given that I want to explain the emergence of a segregation equili-
brium. Consequently agents strategies choices are entirely endogenous in my model.
Indeed, segregation may not be explained if agents segregationist strategies are given
as exogenous.
One of the main intuitions is that segregation can be explained by one group’s po-
wer of influence on another. Power here is understood as the ability to give someone
else opportunities that are otherwise unreachable, be these opportunities economic,
social, spiritual, etc3. The basic mechanism is as follow. Considering a society with
two costlessly identifiable groups, whenever one group has a power of influence on
another, members of the second group will perceive additional benefits in building
long-term relationships with the mighty. Their propensity to cooperate when mat-
ched with powerful individuals will increase until it reaches one. At this point, the
powerless will surely cooperate when matched to powerful individuals. The mighty
best response to this situation will be to systematically reject the relationship. The
powerless will in turn refuse to cooperate. One of the final equilibria will be segre-
gation. Therefore segregation’s origin may be found in power capture by one group.
One caveat is necessary. Although I fail to show that the segregation equilibrium
is unique, the model highlights the process that may lead to segregation. Such a
process may have an interest of its own.
The originality of this paper lies in (a) the broad definition given to segregation
that allows various forms of segregation, even immaterial ones, to be encompassed
in the analysis (b) evidencing that segregation does not come from the mighty’s will
to put the deprived group at its mercy but rather is inherent to specific economic
or social conditions (c) showing that segregation may be totally independent from
preconceptions (d) breaking down the process through which segregation equili-
brium is put in place and analyzing its stability (e) accounting for selected historical
examples.
This work is related to the literature on cooperation in game theory and to works
on segregation. Section 2 provides a short review of these two literature trends.
Section 3 gives an account of the model’s main features and depicts equilibrium
conditions assuming that social group membership has influence neither on strate-
gies nor on pay-offs. Section 4 describes the mechanism through which segregation
may germinate from power capture by one group. It also looks into the stability of
the segregation equilibrium obtained. Section 5 discusses the findings and provides
selected historical examples while section 6 deals with the limitations of the model
and lay out potential ways for improvement whose investigation are left for future
research. Section 7 concludes.
3For a discussion about the many facets of the term power and how I use it here, please refer
to section 1.2.4 of the Introduction
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2 Related Literature
It is striking that authors who investigated segregation phenomena mainly ad-
dressed three kinds of issues : (i) how is segregation perpetuated and why doesn’t it
collapse ? (ii) How could segregation be measured, and what point has it reached ?
How has it evolved over time especially in the United States ? (iii) What are the
properties of segregation equilibria ? Works on segregation may be grouped in three
kinds along these three types of questions. Studies that intend to explain why do
agents choose strategies that allow them to avoid contacts with members of another
communities are few.
As far as the first issue is concerned, a couple of economists have tried to show
how a society could move from a segregation equilibria to a more mixed one and
vice versa. Akerlof (1976, 1980) identified some of the factors that prevent the caste
system from collapsing but did not look into the forming of the caste institution.
Scoville (1996, 2003) followed the same path. Lundberg and Startz (2007) presented
a model that aim at explaining how segregation reinforces itself through prejudice.
Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) showed how neighborhood effects perpetuate segrega-
tion, while Loury (2000) emphasized the concept of social capital. Most of these
works do raise the question of the persistence of segregation but not of its origin.
Sethi and Somanathan (2004) did approach this issue. They found that segregation
"can be stable when racial income disparities are either very great or very small,
but instable in some intermediate range. And small income disparities can give rise
to multiple equilibria, with segregation and integration both being stable". Even
though these authors pointed out factors that make a society move from a segrega-
tion equilibrium to integration, their works exhibit one major drawback : they only
depict movements of an already segregated society. The model fails to explain how
segregation is produced ex nihilo, but shows how a society may return to its original
situation. These types of analysis focus on societies that have segregation condi-
tions already embedded in them and provide little help in explaining the occurrence
of these conditions. However, these studies are helpful at establishing relationships
between levels of segregation and other variables such as income distribution within
and across groups.
The second kind of issue regards segregation measurement and calls for empirical
studies. These works have mainly focused on either spatial segregation or labor
market discriminations since these are the most tangible forms of segregation and
almost the only viable source of data. Such pieces of work are legion. They provide
interesting case studies but fall short of segregation emergence explanations.
The third group of studies does not address in my view the issue of the se-
gregation origin but rather look into the efficiency of segregation equilibria. The
study undertook by Cutler et al. (1999, 2008) is a good example. The work un-
dertook by Eeckhout (2006) on which my model is based, does push the analysis
quite far but finally fails to explain why do agents adopt segregationist strategies.
In his article segregationist strategies are exogenous. The author is most concerned
with the stability and Pareto efficiency features of a segregation equilibrium. The
model constructed by Darity et al. (2006) is actually quite close to achieving my
purpose as it investigates the formation of racial identity as a result of both intra
and inter-group interactions. Yet, given that the authors postulate in their model
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that agents can follow racialist strategies, which amounts to saying that they already
have preferences, it is not entirely satisfactory.
Schelling (1978) works are an interesting exception to the three groups men-
tioned above. Schelling brilliantly managed to show how a segregation equilibrium
may be produced by the junction of decisions made by individuals who do have
only very mild preferences regarding whom they interact with. Nevertheless, such
preferences need to be specified in his model. The question as to why do individuals
prefer a certain proportion of their likes in their neighborhood is left open. So is
also the question of the selection of a criteria that will define "them" as opposed
to "we". Again there seems to be a missing link in the search for the very origin
of segregation. I firmly share Schelling’s view that segregation is generated by in-
dividual strategic decisions that did not intend to be discriminatory. Nevertheless,
since agents do have preferences about whom they interact with in Schelling’s model,
it is not possible to conclude that segregation is entirely independent from prejudice.
The model used in this paper relates to the literature on random matching and
repeated games. In this research field, the main question is how do individuals create
and maintain long term relationships that are at odds with selfish individual motives.
This problem is center to the study of segregation, as the latter may be viewed as
a systematic rejection of any form of cooperation among two social groups. One so-
lution to this problem provided by repeated game theory is that cooperation arises
from a punishment threat such as reputation loss or social norms (see Rosenthal
and Landau (1979)). Yet, how these norms appear and along which line is still not
very clear. Answering this last question probably is what needs to be done if one
is to explain the emerging of segregation. The present paper aims at showing that
norms such as ostracism are the consequences and not the origins of a particu-
lar equilibrium, contrary to Lundberg and Startz (2007) position. Ellison (1994),
Kranton (1996), Ghosh and Ray (1996) provide solutions to the cooperation emer-
gence puzzle. Their models show that cooperative equilibrium may arise despite the
absence of information flows among individuals and provided that players are suf-
ficiently uncertain about their partners’ valuation of future transactions, and that
cooperation pay-offs increase over time. As already mentioned, the model presented
here is technically close to Eeckhout (2006). Indeed Eeckhout (2006) resorted to
repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random matching as I do to analyze segregation
equilibrium. However the objective of this article is totally different as my point is
to evidence the process of segregation formation and his is to value the efficiency of
a segregation equilibrium. Secondly, although the base model is identical to Eeck-
hout’s it is then significantly altered in section (4) by the introduction of asymmetric
pay-offs due to power capture by one group.
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3 The Model
3.1 Basic Assumptions
Consider a society with a continuum of infinitely lived agents. In each period
a mass one of the agents is born. Time is discrete. At the beginning of each t
period, agents are either single or matched in pairs. Two social groups are present
in society : Ls and Hs and no individual can possibly hide his membership to one
group that is costlessly observable. The proportion of Hs in the society is denoted
pi. The model is symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. In this section I suppose that social
group membership has no impact on the game pay-offs. Individuals are randomly
matched in pairs. Each individual while being in a relationship with another can
choose between the action C which implies cooperation, or D, non-cooperation.
When making the decision of action, each individual is unaware of his partner’s
simultaneous action decision. The action couple {C;C} means that both partners
cooperate, while {C;D}, means that the non cooperative individual who played
D free rides his cooperative partner. The {D;D} action couple means that both
partners refuse to cooperate.
Hence the prisoner’s dilemma action space is A = {C;D}×{C;D}. The stage game
pay-off function γ → < is as follows :
C D
C 1; 1 −l; (1 + g)
D (1 + g) ;−l 0 ;0
where g > 0, l > 0. It is assumed that g − l ≤ 1.
The action couple {D;D} with pay-offs (0, 0) is the only Nash and dominant
strategy equilibrium. In this section, given that social group membership does not
have any impact on pay-offs, it will be assumed that individuals will not condition
their action decisions on their partners’ social group, name or type. This situation
will be investigated in section (4).
3.2 Game Lay-out
The game has numerous stages. The first phase could be identified as the "mee-
ting period" where both individuals make their action decision without knowing the
partner’s decision. The outcome is observed by both individuals at the end of each
stage of the game. Depending on the outcome, they individually decide whether they
terminate the relationship. If at least one partner decides to terminate the match,
the partnership is dissolved and a new match is formed in the second period. It is
assumed that if one partner has played D, the match is terminated by the other
partner. Hence a match could only go on if both partners have played C at each
stage of the game. A player’s strategy is defined as the rule that tells him which
action to choose at each stage of the game, given his information set. In my model, a
strategy would be to chose between cooperation and non cooperation at each stage
of the game, given the information a player has, i.e. the past actions in the current
match. Any strategy s over the repeated game has a pay-off that is the expected
utility a player receives as the function of the strategies chosen by himself and the
other players. Such a pay-off is denoted by υ(s) and players discount the future at
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a common factor δ < 1. The objective of the player is to maximize the normalized
sum
υ(s) = E(1− δ)∑ δtγ(s)
The normalization allows us to compare the repeated game pay-off directly with the
stage game pay-off.
3.3 Equilibrium Conditions
I assume that individuals are not allowed to condition their actions on their
historical actions in past partnerships and have no information about their partners
actions in previous matches. Therefore, should a partner deviate and play D, the
match is dissolved and the deviator can not be punished for its deviation beyond
the termination of the match. Individuals will therefore be tempted to adopt a
systematically non-cooperative strategy (systematically play D) and no cooperation
can occur. In order to reach a certain level of cooperation a no-deviation constraint
must be placed on strategies that is to say, the pay-off from deviating should be
inferior to the cooperation pay-off.
3.4 No Deviation Constraint Definition
Given an infinite horizon, pay-off from cooperation is 1. pay-off from deviation
(υD) can be written as :
υD = (1 + g)(1− δ) + δυ(s),
In a first period the deviator free rides his partner and receives (1 + g) discounted
by the factor (1− δ) and has to start a partnership anew whose pay-off will be υ(s)
discounted back by the factor δ. The no deviation constraint requires the pay-off
from deviation (υD) to be lower than the pay-off from eternal cooperation that is to
say 1. The non deviation constraint can be written thus :
υD ≤ 1 ,or υ(s) ≤ 1− g1− δ
δ
(1.1)
In other words, a s strategy may be considered as an equilibrium strategy provi-
ded its pay-off υ(s) is lower than 1 − g 1−δ
δ
= V i.e. provided that the no-deviation
constraint is respected. Should a strategy pay-off be greater than V , then any player
would systematically deviate from the equilibrium strategy that is play C until a de-
viation occurs. A player who adopts a strategy s such as υ(s) > V will systematically
play D and no equilibrium can occur.
3.5 Equilibrium Strategies Definitions
Suppose players i and j enter into a relationship. Let’s note for player i the
pay-off from playing C by Fi(s) at one stage of the game and the the pay-off from
playing D by Gi(s), where :
Fi(s) = σj + (1− σj)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυi(s)] (1.2)
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As Fi(s) is considered, player i plays C with certainty. His partner j plays C with
a probability σj. In this case, the outcome of the stage game would be {C,C} and
player i will receive a pay-off of 1. Hence the first term on the right side of the
equation (σj). Should partner j choose to play D with a probability (1 − σj), the
outcome of the stage game would be {C,D} and player i would be free ridden by his
partner j (j is not cooperative while i is). Player i would receive in a first stage −l
discounted at a factor (1 − δ). Given that D had been played, a new match would
be formed in the future whose pay-off will be υ(s) discounted at the rate δ.
Gi(s) = σj[(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυi(s)] + (1− σj)δυi(s) (1.3)
Similarly, player i is now assumed to playD. His partner j plays C with a probability
σj, in which case, i would free ride j and receive (1 + g) in a first stage discounted
at a factor (1 − δ) and a new partnership would have to be formed given that the
outcome is {C,D}. If partner j decides on playing D (probability 1 − σj), then
the outcome would be {D,D}, and player i would receive 0 in a first stage and a
new partnership would have to be formed in the future which pay-off will be υ(s)
discounted at the δ rate.
Then the expected pay-off for a newly matched individual i at the beginning of
the game is
υ(s) = σiF (s) + (1− σi)G(s) (1.4)
where σi is the probability that individual i will choose to play C. Equilibrium is
defined as a strategy combination that consist of a best strategy for each of the n
players in the game. Best equilibrium strategies s∗ are the strategies players pick in
trying to maximize their individual pay-offs. They are found by solving the following
problem
s∗ ∈ arg max υ(s),
s.t. υ(s) ≤ V
and in addition, supposing indifference between the pay-off of playing C and D if
σj ∈ (0, 1). Note that if the partner j plays C with certainty, i would no longer be
indifferent between playing C and D and will choose D with certainty.
I suppose that when at equilibrium, social group membership does not make
a difference in the choice of strategies. This equilibrium will be named a "mixed
equilibrium". Specifically, the probability for a player to play C or D does not
depend on the social origin of the partner.
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4 Formation of a Segregation Equilibrium
4.1 Introduction of an Attractive Feature of Group H
So far, social group has had no incidence on partnership formation. Let’s assume
from now on that one group, the Hs, monopolizes all the economic resources. For
example, the Hs may invade the Ls’ country and seize most of the land or political
power. Entering into a relationship such as marriage with an H may bring additional
opportunities to an L. Ls will perceive additional value in a long-term relationship
with Hs. In the context of India for example, a low caste father may be eager to
have his daughter married to a higher caste man as such an alliance may give his
own family, or if not his direct family his lineage, access to better opportunities.
This may be true beyond the context of marriage. International trade literature
has shown that less developed countries are more eager to trade with developed
countries as these relationships give them access to products of different quality.
This additional value perceived is symbolized by parameter z in the pay-off matrix.
It is worth noticing that this additional parameter only appears on the L side in a
H-L relationship. Intragroup pay-offs and Hs pay-offs are unchanged. Pay-offs for a
H-L match are represented in the matrix below :
C D
C 1; 1 + z −l; (1 + g)
D (1 + g) ;−l 0 ;0
4.2 Impact of The Parameter z on Relationships Pay-offs
Let’s note FH/L the pay-off from playing C to a member of the H group when
matched to a partner drawn from the L group. Similarly GL/H is the pay-off from
playing D to a member of the L group when matched to a partner from the H group.
Please note that the introduction of the parameter z only modifies the pay-off from
playing C to an L who meets an H i.e. FL/H . All other pay-offs remain identical as
in section 3.5. For the sake of clarity the four possible cases are laid out below.
4.2.1 Pay-off to an H Individual in a H-L Relationship
FH/L = σL/H + (1− σL/H)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυH(s)] (1.5)
Where FH/L is the pay-off from playing C to an H who meets an L. σL/H is the
probability that the L partner plays C given the fact that he is matched to an H.
Should this case occur it means that both partners would have played C, pay-off
to the H would be 1 and the partnership is never dissolved. Should the L partner
choose to play D (probability 1− σL/H ), the H would be free ridden by the L, earn
−l in the first period (hence the (1 − δ) discount factor), the relationship would
be terminated and a new match formed whose pay-off to the H would be υH(s)
discounted at a factor δ.
Symmetrically, pay-off from playing D to an H who meets an L is
GH/L(s) = σL/H [(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυH(s)] + (1− σL/H)δυH(s) (1.6)
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σL/H the probability that the L plays C when matched to an H. In this event, H
would have playedD and L, C. H would earn (1+g) in the first period and the match
would break up. If the L individual chooses to play D (probability (1− σL/H)), the
action couple {D,D} would appear. In this case no one would receive any payment
in the first period, the relationship would be terminated and the H would start a
new match whose discounted pay-off is δυH(s).
The expected pay-off for an H that is newly matched to an L is therefore
υH/L(s) = σH/LFH/L(s) + (1− σH/L)GH/L(s) (1.7)
where σH/L is the probability that the H chooses to play C given the fact that the
other player is drawn from the L group.
4.2.2 Pay-off from Intragroup Relationships
Intragroup relationship pay-offs are derived in the same way as above. For an H
meeting an H
FH/H(s) = σH/H + (1− σH/H)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυH(s)]
GH/H(s) = σH/H [(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυH(s)] + (1− σH/H)δυH(s)
υH/H(s) = σH/HFH/H(s) + (1− σH/H)GH/H(s)
For an L meeting an L
FL/L(s) = σL/L + (1− σL/L)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυL(s)]
GL/L(s) = σL/L[(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυL(s)] + (1− σL/L)δυL(s)
υL/L(s) = σL/LFL/L(s) + (1− σL/L)GL/L(s)
4.2.3 Pay-off to L Individual in an H-L Relationship
Pay-off from playing C to an L member matched to an H is somewhat different
due to the introduction of the parameter z.
FL/H = σH/L(1 + z) + (1− σH/L)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυL(s)] (1.8)
If the L partner chooses to play C and the H partner is also cooperative (probability
σH/L) then a long-term relationship may be set up and the L individual will gain 1
from the partnership plus all the additional opportunities such a partnership may
provide him with. The value of these additional opportunities is estimated by the
parameter z. Note that this parameter plays a role only if the action couple {C;C}
is the outcome. Pay-off from playing D to an L matched to an H is similar to those
occurring in intragroup matches.
GL/H(s) = σH/L[(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυL(s)] + (1− σH/L)δυL(s) (1.9)
The expected pay-off for an L who is newly matched to an H is therefore
υL/H(s) = σL/HFL/H(s) + (1− σL/H)GL/H(s) (1.10)
I mentioned in section (3) that at the mixed equilibrium, i.e. prior to the intro-
duction of the parameter z, players do not condition their strategies on the social
origin of their partner. Therefore σL/H = σL/L. Now that z has been introduced in
the pay-off matrix, it can be argued that L players will modify their probability to
play C when matched to an H. It is in their interest to do so.
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4.3 Systematic Cooperation from the Ls Leads to a Segrega-
tion Equilibrium
It is quite obvious that the introduction of the z parameter increases Ls’ potential
pay-offs. In the event of a match with an H they do not only benefit from the value
of the match itself but also from additional social opportunities such a relationship
may bring them. The intuition is as follows : Ls individuals have a strong interest
in building long-term relationships with H members. They are enticed to cooperate
when matched to an H in order to maximize the chance of having a long term
relationship. The probability to play C for an L meeting an H increases up to 1 as
a consequence of the introduction of the parameter z. Now that the H individual
knows for certain that the L partner will cooperate, he has no incentive anymore
to cooperate. He would be better off by systematically free riding his cooperative
partner. In this case, an equilibrium strategy will be for the H to systematically
reject any cooperation with an L. One of the final equilibria is a situation where
a guaranteed cooperation from one group leads the other group to systematically
reject any relationship with this group. Perfect segregation has emerged and in
the aftermath prejudice that reinforces segregation. It is rather counter intuitive to
think that segregation germinates from the yearning by one group to cooperate with
another.
Proposition 4.1 The introduction of the parameter z increases the probability for
an L to play C when matched to an H up to 1 that is σL/H = 1
Proof I mentioned that an equilibrium condition must be the indifference between
the pay-off of playing C or D that is F (s) = G(s). If this condition was not satisfied,
a player would modify his probability to play C. For example, if the pay-off from
playing C increases comparatively to the pay-off from playing D, (F (s) > G(s)) a
player would adjust upward his propensity σ to play C, until the equality condition
between F (s) and G(s) is restored. Let’s note Φ = F (s) − G(s). I assume that
∂σ
∂Φ
> 0. The introduction of the parameter z alters the pay-off from playing C for
an L who is matched to an H. The L individual will therefore alter his probability
to play C (σL/H) consequently. Let’s note ΦL/H = FL/H(s)−GL/H(s)
then ∂σL/H
∂ΦL/H
> 0
The following equation can be written :
∂σL/H
∂z
=
∂σL/H
∂ΦL/H
∂ΦL/H
∂z
where we know that the first term on the right hand side of the equation is positive.
The second term of the equation is also positive since the inclusion of the para-
meter z has unilaterally increased FL/H(s) without altering GL/H(s). Introducing
the parameter z increases σL/H i.e. the probability for an L who meets an H to
cooperate.
An increase in σL/H will alter the pay-off for the H matched to an L to play C
comparatively to playing D. Indeed, if the H individual learns that his L partner
cooperates more frequently, playing C will be more valuable to him. ΦH/L will be
modified and σH/L will therefore be adjusted. A movement in σH/L will modify in
turn σL/H , and so on. So the total effect on σL/H due to the introduction of the
parameter z can be written :
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∂σt
L/H
∂z
=
∂σi
L/H
∂z
+
∂σi
L/H
∂z
n∑
j=1
(
∂σH/L
∂σL/H
∂σL/H
∂σH/L
)j =
∂σi
L/H
∂z
(1 + n)
Where
∂σi
L/H
∂z
is the initial impact of z on σL/H and
∂σt
L/H
∂z
is the total effect of the
introduction of z. The introduction of z has two impacts :
- one with the direct increase of σL/H via the increase of ΦL/H
- one with the cumulative effect of a positive shock on σL/H . n is the number
of periods in the game needed for players to adapt their action strategies. It is
argued that there exists n∗, so that σL/H will move from its mixed equilibrium level
(σL/H = σL/L) to a new equilibrium level σL/H = 1. n∗ is defined by the following
equation :
∂σi
L/H
∂z
(1 + n∗)dz = 1− σL/L
Proposition 4.2 Whenever σL/H = 1 the only possible equilibrium for an H-L
partnership is given by σH/L = 0
Proof Recall that in order for a strategy s to be an equilibrium strategy, the no
deviation constraint must be respected that is to say
υ(s) ≤ 1− g (1−δ)
δ
.
If σL/H = 1,
FH/L = σL/H + (1− σL/H)[(1− δ)(−l) + δυH(s)] = 1
GH/L(s) = σL/H [(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυH(s)] + (1− σL/H)δυH(s)
GH/L(s) = (1− δ)(1 + g) + δυH(s)
υH/L(s) = σH/LFH/L(s) + (1− σH/L)GH/L(s) ≤ 1− g (1−δ)δ
υH/L(s) = σH/L + (1− σH/L)[(1− δ)(1 + g) + δυH(s)] ≤ 1− g (1−δ)δ
After re-arranging,
σH/L[δ − g(1− δ)− δυH(s)] ≤ δ − g(1− δ)− δυH(s)− g (1−δ)δ
Recall that V = 1− g (1−δ)
δ
,
then δV = δ − g(1− δ)
Thus,
σH/L[δ][V − υH(s)] ≤ [δ][V − υH(s)]− g (1− δ)
δ
(1.11)
A strategy s is an equilibrium strategy provided that the above equation holds.
Recall that V is the non deviation constraint i.e. the highest attainable pay-off
for any equilibrium strategy. Therefore any player tries to minimize the difference
V −υH(s). However, we know that 0 ≤ σH/L[δ][V −υH(s)] ≤ [δ][V −υH(s)]− g (1−δ)δ
Therefore, [δ][V − υH(s)] lowest level is g (1−δ)δ .
Minimizing [δ][V − υH(s)] is equivalent to replacing the expression by its minimum
g (1−δ)
δ
in the equation (11) :
σH/L[g
(1−δ)
δ
] ≤ 0
Since, by definition, [g (1−δ)
δ
] > 0 and σH/L ≥ 0, the only way for the above equation
to hold is σH/L = 0
The only strategy that maximizes the pay-off while respecting the no deviation
constraint is σH/L = 0 when σL/H = 1. In other words, if a partner cooperates for
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sure, the only strategy that guarantees both an equilibrium and the other partner’s
pay-off maximization is a systematic non-cooperative behavior.
Once σH/L = 0, i.e. the Hs play with certainty D when matched to an L, Ls
maximize their pay-off in such a match by setting their probability to play C to 0
i.e. σL/H = 0.
Indeed, if σH/L = 0
FL/H = (1− δ)(−l) + δυL(s)
GL/H(s) = δυL(s)
υL/H(s) = σL/HFL/H(s) + (1− σL/H)GL/H(s)
υL/H(s) = σL/H(1− δ)(−l) + δυL(s)
Given that σL/H(1− δ)(−l) ≤ 0, υL/H(s) is maximized by setting σL/H = 0.
It is worth noticing that whenever one of the partner plays D with certainty, the
other partner maximizes his pay-off while respecting the no-deviation constraint by
setting his probability to play C at 0.
4.3.1 Equilibrium Stability
The equilibrium obtained here is a segregation equilibrium where members from
two groups systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each other. The
path to the segregation equilibrium is as follows :
- one social group captures more power or economic resources. The other group
(the Ls) perceive additional benefits from entering into long-term relationships with
the previous group (the Hs) through additional opportunities or may not have much
choice but to cooperate to survive. The parameter z is introduced in the matrix.
- the introduction of the parameter z increases the propensity of L group members
to cooperate with Hs, which increases the likelihood of a cooperation from the Hs,
which in turn raises the probability for Ls to play C, and so on. At the end of n∗
periods, Ls cooperate with certainty with Hs. At this time, although the probability
for Hs to play C has reached quite high levels, as soon as σL/H = 1, Hs have no
equilibrium strategy available but to be systematically non-cooperative with Ls, thus
σH/L = 0.
- Whenever σH/L = 0, Ls maximize their pay-offs by choosing never to cooperate
whenever matched to an H, thus σL/H = 0
At the end of the n∗ periods a segregation equilibrium prevails : members of the
two groups will systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each other. As
mentioned above, as soon as one partner sets his probability to play C to 0, the
other partner will reciprocate by setting his probability to play C to 0 and cannot
be better off. Therefore σL/H = 0, σH/L = 0 is a stable equilibrium on the L-H
market.
The path that leads to a segregation equilibrium is rather interesting. Assuming
that one group is deprived of power, it has not much choice but to cooperate with
another. I may conclude that given this systematic cooperation, the latter will refuse
any interaction with the first one. Finally the deprived group’s best response will be
to refuse any relationship too. This result is rather enlightening when thinking about
the ambiguity one may find in the dominated groups attitudes towards dominant
groups. Dominated often wishes to conform to the dominating (translating a will to
cooperate) while depreciating them when they feel rejected by the mighty. As the
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fox in Aesop fable who can not reach grapes hanging high up on a vine, that he eyed
greedily retreats and says : "The grapes are sour anyway !".
5 Main Findings and Illustrative Examples
Two interesting points stand out from the demonstration above. Firstly, segre-
gation is not reduced to psychological and exogenous factors such as prejudice or a
taste for discrimination whose origins are unquestioned. Such a situation is seen as
arising from a socioeconomic context in which one group has taken over much of the
power, be this power economic, political or to some extent symbolic. I have tried to
show that an unequal opportunities distribution triggers social strategies that gene-
rate a stable segregation equilibrium, independently from exogenous preferences.
Secondly, it has been shown that segregation may not originate from a favored
group’s intention to put a deprived group at its mercy, contrary to Roemer (1979).
On the contrary, it is the systematic yearning or necessity by the latter to build long-
term relationship with the mighty that leads to a rejection by the favored group of
any relationship with the powerless. This last point is particularly important as it is
at odds over generally accepted ideas about segregation and discrimination. Indeed
it is striking to see that segregation has always been dressed up with ideologies that
suggest that higher-ups do rightfully despise their subordinates, thereby spreading
the idea that segregation comes from the dominating group. However, I believe that
such an ideology could only entrench where effective segregation is already in place.
In my view, segregation may not be the fact of the mighty, but the product of a
specific situation. These results could be compared to La Boetie’s conclusions in his
Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (de La Boetie (1576)). For La Boetie, tyrants’
power comes from an historical shock that made people surrender their freedom.
This domination is perpetuated by the ideology. In the same spirit, Weber’s account
of the origins of the authority legitimacy suggests that ideology is a way to legitimate
an existing authority.
Power capture is seen as the segregation root. The term power should be taken
in a broad acceptance, that is the ability to give someone opportunities that are
otherwise unreachable. Note that this definition of power enables to account for
various forms of segregation. Indeed, priests may be poor, but as they hold the key
to the gods favors, they do have a spiritual power and therefore may be placed above
the crowd. I have suggested that the process through which segregation occurs starts
with a dependence of one group on another to gain access to additional opportunities.
The deprived group will start looking for long-term relationships with the more
powerful group who in turn will start setting up barriers. The caste system in India
is an enlightening example of the segregation emergence.
As discussed in section 1.2.1 of the Introduction, the "purity of descent" theory
places the origins of caste, or at least endogamy, in the Aryan domination. As they
gained power, either military or culturally or economically, authors argue that they
started establishing separation rules between the conquerors and the conquered.
Even if one des not agree with this theory, whether because of the inconsistencies
pointed out by Klass (2004) or because of the lack of historical records, the fact
that it is the most influential of all and widely accepted still tells that scientists find
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it very tempting to see the origins of a segregationist system such as caste in the
power exerted by one group.
The presentation in section 1.1.2of the textual sources of caste, showed that the
supremacy of the priests in Vedic times was coming from their monopoly over sacri-
fices, which was the only way for others to obtain the benevolence of the deities. The
priests had a spiritual power of influence. Doniger and Smith (1991) argue that when
the Vedic values were reversed, the Laws of Manu was an attempt by the priests to
more firmly establish their supremacy by extolling the virtues of their group.
Moreover, the correlation often observed between caste status, power and wealth
as well as the fission and Sanskritization processes described in section 1.1.4 also
clearly stress that as a group gains influence, it endeavors to restrict relationships
with those they want to depart from. All these examples clearly point in the direction
given by the model. Power exerted by one group over another is tied to restricted
interactions between the two groups.
Another interesting historical example is colonization. It is striking that Portu-
guese colonies contrary to the French and British ones, were not segregated. While
the Portuguese mainly set up trading posts, the French and the British led an active
power and wealth takeover policy. In the French and British empires, natives had to
be cooperative with the new masters to secure social opportunities, while in Portu-
guese colonies trade enabled locals to make social progress on their own. In the first
case, segregationist ideologies appeared while in the second a more integrated situa-
tion prevailed. Amartya Sen recounts in "The Argumentative Indian : Writings on
Indian History, Culture and Identity" an interesting story. At the time when British
trading posts were created in India in the XVIIth and early XVIIIth centuries, some
British actually settled into the sub-continent, married Indian women and somew-
hat managed to mingle with the local society. Then came the time of the proper
colonization process in the XIXth century, when the Honorable East India Company
and later the British government took over power and wealth in the sub-continent.
The locals had then to deal with the new masters to secure social opportunities.
At that time, a new ideology started to appear in the Raj according to which In-
dia and its civilization were backward and needed to be patronized. Indian and
British communities were set aside and any admitted relationship between the two
was to be on a teaching mode. The power takeover by the British led to a segrega-
tion between Europeans and Indians that is well illustrated by novels from that time.
6 Limitations of The Model
This model brings some interesting points to light. First, segregation may arise
even in the absence of prejudice from the decentralized interactions of many indivi-
duals. Power capture may be the origin of segregation by balancing the distribution
of opportunities towards one group. Yet, the framework is unsuccessful at proving
that the segregation equilibrium is one among a limited number. Besides, the inele-
gance of the equilibrium definition, comes from the fact that the path that leads from
a neutral situation to a segregated one, probably has an interest of its own. This
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is the reason why I tried to describe it. A potential way to fix these two problems
would be to rewrite the model in an evolutionary framework. besides it is probably
the most appropriate way to study the path that leads to segregation, that is, as
said, of great interest. This task is left for future research.
The addition of two features would also give the model more depth and allow it
to better catch reality. First, only two groups are modeled and little is said about
what becomes of mixed couples. For instance, what happens to an H who meets an
L ? Does he become an L by his marriage, or does the L becomes an H ? Most likely,
we can think of the L as becoming an H, otherwise there would be little point for him
to cooperate with Hs in the hope to grab the z. Yet, does he have access to power in
the same was as an H ? Wouldn’t the pair be considered as an in between category
between the H and L ? Let’s think about Ancient Regime European aristocrats and
how the pedigree of their ancestors was put forward to assert their status. Marrying
a bourgeoise was often done out of necessity and probably was considered as an ex-
change of status for wealth. Similarly, the South African Apartheid did distinguish
between the whites, the blacks and the "colored" people. Therefore introducing a
mixed category that benefit from a fraction of the power would add much to the
model.
Moreover, the power parameter z is held constant throughout the process, while
it is very likely that the value of power will depend on social composition. Assume
that H that are matched for a long period of time with L, become either an L or
a mixed category. During the phase where such matches are not only possible, but
very likely due to the increase in the Hs and Ls propensity to cooperate, the power
devoted to the H is going to be shared by a reduced number of "true" H and the
worth of each share may increase. Thus, z would increase and each step of the game
may shorten the convergence period to a segregation equilibrium.
Lastly, the main cooperation enforcement mechanism is the need for a defec-
tor to rematch anew. This probably isn’t sufficient to account for some features of
reality. For instance, social norms and obligations are often thought as signals of
potential cooperation. For instance, higher castes were constrained in many ways in
their behavior, such as diet restrictions, ritual education. The renowned sociologist
Srinivas, noted that in order to rise in the caste hierarchy, castes members were going
through a Sanskritization process that mainly consisted of altering their manners,
diets and acquiring religious education. The role of these norms are absent from the
framework, given the assumption that group membership is costlessly observable.
Yet, the introduction of the norms and of a probability that such norms may be
correctly interpreted would also be an interesting adjunction for the model.
All these adds on may largely improve the model and are promising approaches
for future research. I would be particularly keen on translating the model in an
evolutionary framework, since this probably is the most appropriate way to find the
emergence of norms without specifying preferences as in Axtell et al. (2004). The
model proposes an explanation of the emergence of social orders, such as segrega-
tion, as a result of accidents of history whereby a group of individuals receive a
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distinguishing tags (in this model this would be power). As theses accidents become
reinforced over time, "society may self-organize around distinctions that are quite
arbitrary from an a priori standpoint [...] Initially meaningless tags can acquire so-
cially organizing salience : tag-based classes emerge". The starting point of the work
by Axtell et al. (2004) matches the requirements for an initial situation that very
much reassembles to a blank page. However, I would depart from their results by
saying that segregation is not, in my view an accident of history. Although it can be
random, chances are that some initial conditions makes its emergence very likely.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an analytical framework of a phenomenon, namely segre-
gation, that is often considered as exogenous and intricate. It aims at identifying
segregation triggers and breaking up its formation process. In my analysis, segre-
gation stems from specific circumstances in which one group seizes power. Domina-
ted group members are given little choice but to systematically cooperate with the
mighty. A natural response to a potential partner’s ensured cooperation is to reject
the relationship. This is what the powerful group will do. The dominated group will
best reply to this situation by in turn rejecting cooperation. A stable segregation
equilibrium is set.
Three interesting points may be drawn from this analysis. First, segregation is
seen as entirely independent from psychological factors, prejudice or even exogenous
preferences regarding whom to interact with. This supports the belief that discrimi-
nation arises from segregation and not the opposite. Second, the analysis shatters
the generally accepted idea that segregation is deliberately introduced by the mighty
to firm up their domination. Indeed, it is shown that specific circumstances create
segregation through the dominated group’s necessity to establish long term relation-
ships with the powerful. Third, the analysis is detailed enough to account for various
social situations such as the jatis fission process, for example.
Although this demonstration helps at understanding segregation and its conse-
quences, it falls short of explaining why some societies exhibit high levels of se-
gregation, as it is the case in India through the caste system, and other societies
lower levels of segregation. How could a society move from a segregation equilibrium
towards a mixed one is a question that is left for future research. My intuition is
that power distribution within the groups is key. Should members of the deprived
group become powerful, the mighty may find interesting to start collaborating again.
The rise of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe during the XVIIIth century would be
an interesting case study. Besides, the remarkable stability of the segregation equili-
brium, mays suggest that segregation could not be uprooted without special external
intervention. Another related issue that would be exciting looking at is the develop-
ment of ideologies that aim at justifying already existing segregation and how they
become accepted as a social norm.
54 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 2
Social Identity in India : Caste
and Beyond ?
55
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL IDENTITY IN INDIA : CASTE AND BEYOND?
1 Introduction
Social identity is becoming an increasingly popular concept among economists.
How do individuals categorize themselves and what these groups identifications im-
ply are central issues (Akerlof and Kranton (2010)). Although the concept has long
been known to various disciplines such as psychology, history, political science and
anthropology, it had remained for some time outside of the scope of economic analy-
sis until Akerlof and Kranton (2000) plead for its integration in the economic corpus
and showed how powerful it is to explain many puzzling economic issues. It was first
introduced in social psychology by Tajfel et al. (1971) to explore discrimination and
social conflict. Since then the notion has made its way into the economic literature.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) showed how internalizing norms lead individuals
to act in conformity to the stereotype attached to their groups although such actions
may be detrimental. This phenomenon has been the focus of a growing literature
in social psychology and is often referred to as "stereotype threat". Experiments
clearly evidenced that stressing social identity does modify preferences (Benjamin
et al. (2007)), behaviors (Chen and Li (2009); Charness et al. (2007)) or even prices
(Ball et al. (2001))1. An experiment that is of particular interest to my study is the
one conducted by Hoff and Pandey (2006). Children from Northern India were asked
to solve mazes. When caste identity was not revealed, performances across castes
did not significantly differ. Yet, when caste was made salient, performance of the
low caste significantly decreased. Such experiments clearly stress how internalized
norms can lead to "self-discrimination" as individuals obey norms and prejudice
to conform to social identity. This definitely is a breakthrough as discrimination
theories, be they "taste based" or "statistical", tended to view discrimination as a
one way act imposed on the victim. This view is now somewhat moderated by the
concept of implicit discrimination developed by Bertrand et al. (2005)
Another more general justification for the study of social identity can be found in
Sen (1973, 1992) or in Sen (1999c,b). Not only does social identity affects economic
processes as mentioned, but it also alters inequality in income distribution as well
as opportunities offered by such income. In Sen’s words, social identity may under-
mine capabilities and therefore impact social welfare and although Sen particularly
stressed gender bias in Sen (1992), not a great deal of imagination is needed to think
about castes in the same terms. For instance, not only may a low caste individual be
less well endowed with income for instance, but such an income may not bring the
same opportunities in terms of functionings, because of caste membership. Besides,
social identity in the context of secular deprivations and oppression, may engender
"adaptative preferences", that are preferences formed in response to restricted op-
tions. Thus, the absence of dissatisfaction of these individuals with regard to their
condition, that stems from a well anchored social identity, would not from a utilita-
rian perspective lead to account for these inequality, while they must not be ignored
from a social welfare perspective.
Thus, because social identity is the key to solve many unexplained economic
outcomes, such as self discrimination, or lower educational outcomes in certain com-
1For a more detailed review of these experiments please refer to Chen and Li (2009)
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munities, its influence goes much deeper by altering preferences and limiting capa-
bilities. For these reasons, social identity ought to be studied in economics.
Caste has molded Indian society in many respects. A couple of works such as
Borooah (2005), Deshpande (2000b, 2001), Gang et al. (2008) have shown how im-
portant caste is in shaping discrimination, deprivation and inequality. Lawmakers
made no mistake about it, when they outlawed caste-based discrimination in the
15th article of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India and provided for
reservation policies in favor of low castes members in the same text. Laws have been
passed for the last 50 years aiming at protecting what is discreetly referred as "wea-
ker segments of society". Programs have been voted to alleviate the situations of
the former untouchables, now administratively called the Schedules Castes ("SC")
and that of the Scheduled Tribes ("ST"). Yet, caste remains an important ground
for inequality, poverty and discrimination. Inequality comes both from differences
in endowments across castes and differences in treatment linked to discrimination.
However, as the experiment conducted by Hoff and Pandey (2006) showed, interna-
lized norms and stereotype threat are also powerful factors of stark inequality and
a limitation to capabilities.
In India, caste is probably a deep determinant of social identity as many anthro-
pologists and sociologists have shown. Caste considerations may be quite pervasive as
the caste code may govern many aspects of Indians’ everyday life such as marriages,
rituals, social interactions and even food diets. Despite the large heterogeneity in
obedience to the code, caste probably remains a central issue in social identification.
Yet, is caste the beginning and the end of social identity in India ? Are there other
factors, besides castes that could significantly influence the sense of self with respect
to others ? For instance, will a rich outcasts relate in the same way to his fellows and
other castes as a poor one ? These are questions I wish to dispute and try to answer.
I want to identify whether other aspects such as education, occupation or income do
also shape the perceived social status along or instead of caste ? Another hypothesis
I wish to test is whether caste also influence the effect of these endowments with
regard to perceived social status. For instance, education may be efficient at impro-
ving social status, but so only among high castes. In such an event, caste would not
only determine endowments but also the efficiency of such endowments with respect
to social sense of self. To test all these hypothesis and try to provide some answers
to these questions, the study will focus on a question asked in the World Values
Survey : "to which of the following social class do you think you belong to ?".
Despite the heated debate taking place among sociologists and anthropologists
about the origins and the nature of castes, most social scientists have placed caste at
the center of social identification in India and have underlined, probably following
Dumont (1970), caste cleavages and the fact that they are supported by a strong
ideology that reinforces exclusion and inferiority norms. Yet, a pitfall lies in wait for
anyone who addresses the issue of caste in India, that is to consider caste as the only
determinant of social identity that no other factor, such as wealth, could mitigate.
Such a fault has lead many social scientist to consider caste in a rather monolithic
way, when caste is a rather fluid institution. Some sociologists have been aware of
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this issue as some of them such as Beteille (1974), Srinivas (1962), or Bailey (1957)
have tried to untangle the effect of power, wealth and caste in shaping social identity.
Sen (2004) stressed the plurality of identities and I propose to examine wether
caste is the sole determinant of social identity in India. I will try to identify the
relevant factors that influence perceived social status and compare the magnitude
of their effects with that of caste. Results highlight three points : first caste has a
stronger effect on social identity among Tribes than among Scheduled Castes. While
some improvements in earnings or occupational status may be able to cancel the
Scheduled Caste effect, no such variations may counterbalance the tribe effect. Be-
sides, the caste effect manifests itself in both a direct and an indirect ways. Results
show, that the effect of income for instance is diminished by low caste membership.
It could be hypothesized, although this is beyond the scope of this chapter, that
SCs social identity is less dependent upon caste than STs, because they successfully
mobilized politically. Political studies by Jaffrelot (2002) go in that direction.
Before going further in the analysis, some terms need clarification. So far, I have
questioned the relevance of caste in perceived social class. Yet, this study mainly
focuses on three groups : the non scheduled ones, the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes. Yet the identification of the latter as a caste is rather complex
issue as mentioned in section 1.1.3 of the general Introduction to the dissertation.
Given the tricky relationship between castes and tribes, and to be rigorous, what
was earlier described as a caste effect will from now on be referred to as a "group
effect".
The paper is organized as follows : section (2) presents the data as well as the
model used. It provides some compelling summary statistics on the social classes
distribution across castes. Section (3) presents a discriminant analysis of the deter-
minants of social identity. Section (4) presents the empirical strategy, while section
(5) discusses the results. Concluding remarks are found in section (6).
2 Data
2.1 Presentation of The Data
The data are extracted from the Indian section of the World Values Survey
("WVS") conducted in 1995 and 2001 2. Please note that the sampling was based
on voting rolls and the method has consequences that will be discussed in section 2.2.
The survey covers 8,543 households, although caste is informed only for 3,403 of
them. Unfortunately, caste is only informed for individuals of Hindu denomination.
The analysis is therefore restricted to this group. I am particularly interested in one
of the question asked during the face to face interviews : "to which of the five social
classes do you think you belong ?"3. Please note that interviews were conducted in
2Other rounds of the survey are not workable since information about caste is unavailable.
3It is important to bear in mind that questions were translated and that the connotation of the
classes’ labels may be quite different from what is commonly understood in English. Very likely,
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13 local languages and thus the question was translated. Households are grouped
into 8 castes. In order to avoid ranking these groups, whose relative social status
are far from obvious, and as such an attempt would leave room for subjectivity, I
will focus on the lower end of the social scale : the SCs and the STs whose positions
are clear-cut. These two groups will be compared to the rest of the population ,
the non-scheduled groups. Table 2.1 below present the contingency table for the
distribution of castes across classes.
Tab. 2.1 – Contingency tables for castes and classes
SC ST Non-Scheduled Total
Lower class 146 12% 205 21% 151 12% 502
Working class 137 12% 309 32% 225 18% 671
Lower middle class 360 31% 316 33% 565 45% 1 241
Upper middle class 383 33% 132 14% 283 22% 798
Upper Class 143 12% 10 1% 38 3% 191
Total 1 169 100% 972 100% 1 262 100% 3 403
Nearly half of the SCs class themselves in either upper or upper middle classes,
while only 25% of the non-scheduled groups do. This is rather unanticipated given
that SCs are expected to be at the lower bound of society together with the STs.
Yet, STs do perceive that they belong to the lower end of social classes, although
both SCs and STs are, as argued in the introduction to the dissertation, more or less
equally low positioned in the caste hierarchy. It seems that group stigma is not as
strongly felt by SCs compared to STs. Whether this better position is due to higher
income or better education is to be investigated later in the chapter. Pearson’s χ2
tests for the homogeneity of the distribution in classes across caste groups conclude
that the distribution actually differ between SCs and STs, SCs and non scheduled
groups, and STs and non scheduled groups. The results from the test are presented in
table 4.10 in appendix. The figure 2.1 below maps the distribution of the perceived
social class among the scheduled groups that encompass the SCs and STs, and the
rest of the population. Graphically, the distribution of the perceived status looks
more skewed towards higher classes for SCs than for the rest of the population and
more skewed towards lower classes for STs.
Table 2.2 presents the distribution of the assumed main determinants of social
class across castes 4.
the classes are perceived by the interviewees as some sort of ranking on a scale from 1 to 5 and
the labels devoid of the usual sociological meaning, as well as the word "class" although I lack
further information on this particular topic. If I am correct that individuals felt they were asked to
rank themselves, irrespective of the actual meaning of the classes, that leaves room for subjectivity.
This issue is discussed later in section 6.2. Also I insist throughout the chapter that the variable
assessed is perceived social class, this latter word being understood as a rank rather than a class
in a marxist sense
4For more clarity they are graphically represented in figure 4.2 in appendix
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Fig. 2.1 – Distribution of perceived social class by caste
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On average SCs tend to be more educated than STs but slightly less than non-
scheduled groups. Pearson’s χ2 whose results are presented in table 4.11 in appendix
also conclude that the distribution of education differ according to caste, although
only at the 5% level of significance between SCs and non-scheduled groups.
Income is also differently distributed across castes. Non scheduled groups income
is gathered in middle ranges while SCs incomes are more spread over the distribu-
tion. Hence, the proportion of individuals who declared earning more than 20,000
Rupees a month is 16% among the SCs and 3% among the non-scheduled groups.
On average, SCs seem wealthier than other groups, including the non-scheduled one.
As expected STs income is gathered around the lower end of the ranges.
As far as occupations are concerned, it would not be unreasonable to assume
that the impact of an occupation over social status is linked to whether the position
is manual, and whether it implies subordination. The proportion of individuals that
occupy non-manual positions is not different between SCs and non-scheduled groups
(49% and 44% respectively) while the proportion is lower for STs (26%). The pro-
portion of professionals, which seems to be the highest paying position as evidenced
by table 4.12 in appendix is much higher in the SC group than in other groups.
Among white collars, the proportion of managerial positions5 is the highest wi-
5The following occupations are considered as managerial : Employer manager of an establish-
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thin the non-scheduled category although it is close for SCs but much lower for STs
(29%, 23% and 13% respectively).
To put it all in a nutshell, SCs do not seem to be less well positioned than the
non-scheduled group with regard to education, wealth or occupation. They are on
average only slightly less educated, occupy similar types of positions and are on
average wealthier. The picture for STs is more clear-cut. They are on average poorer
and less educated and are overproportioned in manual or subordinate occupations.
Given these raw statistics and leaving aside the potential effect of groups, SCs would
not be expected to rank very differently than non-scheduled groups, while STs are
expected to position at the lower end of the social scale. These conclusions are rather
peculiar given the commonly accepted idea that SCs form a largely deprived group
that is located at the lower end of the social hierarchy together with Scheduled
Tribes. Yet, these expectations may be troubled by caste considerations that have
not been, so far, accounted for. Moreover, these descriptive statistics clearly exhibit
a divide between SCs and STs.
ment, supervisory non manual office worker and foreman / supervisor
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Tab. 2.2 – Distribution of the main variables across castes
Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled Non-scheduled Total
Castes Tribes Groups Groups
Number of observations 1169 972 2141 1262 3403
Income Range(∗)
Nb. missing obs. 205 217 22 13 435
% missing obs. 17.5% 22.3% 19.7% 1.0% 12.8%
Distribution of informed data
< 500 Rupees / month 7.4% 18.9% 12.4% 1.4% 7.8%
501 - 1,000 Rupees / month 12.7% 11.0% 11.9% 15.1% 13.3%
1,001 - 3,000 Rs / month 21.7% 20.3% 21.1% 35.0% 26.9%
3,001 - 5,000 Rs / month 14.5% 19.1% 16.5% 18.3% 17.3%
5,001 - 10,000 Rs / month 18.4% 15.0% 16.9% 19.9% 18.2%
10,001 - 20,000 Rs / month 9.4% 7.9% 8.8% 7.0% 8.1%
20,001 - 30,000 Rs / month 8.2% 3.6% 6.2% 1.2% 4.1%
30,001 - 50,000 Rs /month 4.8% 2.9% 4.0% 0.6% 2.6%
> 50,000 Rs / month 3.0% 1.3% 2.3% 1.4% 1.9%
Educational level(∗∗)
Nb. missing obs. 13 7 20 3 23
% missing obs. 1.1% 0.7% 0.9% 0.2% 0.7%
Distribution of informed data
Primary and below 47.1% 65.0% 55.3% 43.1% 50.7%
Secondary School 23.4% 21.1% 22.4% 28.4% 24.6%
Attended college 29.4% 13.9% 22.3% 28.6% 24.7%
Occupation(∗∗∗)
Nb. missing obs. 471 366 837 615 1452
% missing obs. 40.3% 37.7% 39.1% 48.7% 42.7%
Distribution of informed data
Employer / Manager 8.7% 2.1% 5.7% 18.5% 9.9%
Professional 19.2% 6.4% 13.3% 9.9% 12.1%
Supervisory office 10.3% 6.1% 8.4% 11.3% 9.3%
Non manual office 7.0% 6.4% 6.7% 4.2% 5.9%
Foreman / supervisor 3.7% 4.6% 4.1% 0.0% 2.8%
Total Manual 49.0% 25.7% 38.2% 43.9% 40.1%
Skilled manual 8.5% 12.9% 10.5% 7.7% 9.6%
Semi-skilled manual 5.2% 6.6% 5.8% 1.4% 4.4%
Unskilled manual 3.2% 6.6% 4.8% 1.4% 3.6%
Farmer (own farm) 18.2% 29.4% 23.4% 30.0% 25.6%
Agric. worker 8.0% 15.5% 11.5% 6.6% 9.9%
Army 3.2% 1.0% 2.1% 0.0% 1.4%
Never had a job 4.9% 2.3% 3.7% 9.0% 5.4%
Final nb. of informed obs. 567 455 1022 636 1658
(*) household’s income
(**) interviewee’s educational level
(***) chief wage earner’s occupation
2.2 Sampling Issue
It may seem quite peculiar that SCs’ characteristics apparently do not differ from
those of the non-scheduled groups. It should be recalled that the sampling procedure
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was based on voting rolls as already mentioned. Thus, the sample only include
individuals aged 18 and more. Moreover, the sample does not include any illiterate
individual, which probably is a direct consequence of the sampling procedure. Table
2.3 presents the distribution of individuals across the three educational levels in the
WVS and the 2001 Census of India6. Please bear in mind that the "attended college"
category accounts for all the graduates in the Census while the WVS would recognize
in this category anyone who has attended college even without graduating. Threfore,
there must be a slight discrepancy between the two samples for this category.
Tab. 2.3 – Comparison of educational levels between the World Values Survey and
the Census of India 2001
World Values Survey ("WVS") Census of India 2001 :
individuals aged at leat 19
SC ST Non-scheduled SC ST Non-scheduled
groups groups
Primary and below 47.1% 65.0% 43.1% 73.4% 76.2% 62.1%
Secondary 23.4% 21.1% 28.4% 21.1% 19.9% 28.2%
Attended college 29.4% 13.9% 28.6% 5.6% 4.0% 9.6%
Note : reconciliation of the categories accounted for in the WVS and in the Census
is presented in table 4.13 in appendix
It is noteworthy that individuals are on average more educated in the WVS
sample. This may be due to a bias towards urban individuals given that more than
half of the sampled individuals live in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants. Table
2.4 below presents a comparison between the WVS sample and the Census of India,
for urban individuals aged 19 and more.
Tab. 2.4 – Comparison of educational levels between the World Values Survey and
the Census of India 2001 for urban individuals
World Values Survey ("WVS") Census of India 2001 :
urban individuals aged at leat 19
SC ST Non-scheduled SC ST Non-scheduled
groups groups
Primary and below 47.1% 65.0% 43.1% 59.6% 57.2% 45.8%
Secondary 23.4% 21.1% 28.4% 29.8% 31.9% 35.3%
Attended college 29.4% 13.9% 28.6% 10.6% 10.9% 18.8%
The distribution across educational levels by groups is actually quite close bet-
ween the WVS sample and the Census of India, when the latter is restricted to the
urban category. It should be noted from graph 4.3 in appendix that SCs on average
live in larger towns than non-scheduled groups for the whole sample and this bias
may explain why the SCs characteristics do not seem to differ from that of the non-
scheduled groups. Yet, when the sample is restricted to the 2001 survey only, the
6The estimates for the Census of India were computed on the same districts’s sample as those
contained in the WVS. The list of states and the number of districts accounted for in each state
are presented in table 4.14 in appendix
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distribution between the two groups across town size is probably more balanced7
and the distribution of groups across educational levels is much closer to that of the
Census as shown by table 2.5 below.
Tab. 2.5 – Comparison of educational levels between the 2001 World Values Survey
and the 2001 Census of India
World Values Survey ("WVS") Census of India 2001 :
2001 sample only individuals aged at leat 19
SC ST Non-scheduled SC ST Non-scheduled
groups groups
Primary and below 74.7% 70.2% 43.1% 73.4% 76.2% 62.1%
Secondary 15.7% 23.4% 28.4% 21.1% 19.9% 28.2%
Attended college 9.6% 6.4% 28.6% 5.6% 4.0% 9.6%
This analysis leads to the conclusions that results ought to be assessed for a urban
literate population aged more than 19 at the time of the survey. As mentioned, in
the whole sample, SCs tend to live in larger towns than non-scheduled groups and
this may introduce a sampling bias. Yet, this eventual bias doe not seem to be
so strong in the 2001 sub-sample. Thus I am left with two options. Either I give
priority to the number of observations and proceed with an estimation over the
whole sample, keeping in mind this potential sampling bias, or I halve the number
of observations by keeping only the 2001 sub-sample, and feel greater comfort about
the representativeness of the sample. In what follows, I opted for the first alternative,
especially given that I perform tests that are quite demanding. Nevertheless, results
on the 2001 sub-sample will be discussed later when the effect of the 1995 dummy
is commented on, in section 5.1.1.
2.3 Variables Used
Perceived social status takes on values 1 for lower class through 5 for upper class.
Castes are represented by three dummy variables for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and non-scheduled groups. Main explanatory variables are education, income
range and occupation.
Household’s income was not recorded as a continuous variable but rather as cate-
gorical variable that takes on 9 values according to the income intervals presented in
table 2.2. After performing a test on the homogeneity of the distribution of income
ranges across classes, it has been concluded that the distributions for ranges 8 and
9 were not significantly different, as well as for range 6 and 7. Similar income ranges
were therefore aggregated. Seven income dummies were then constructed to account
for the income ranges and are presented in the table 2.6 below :
The same kind of analysis was performed for the chief wage earners’ occupations
and tests concluded to the homogeneity of the distribution across classes between
7Please refer to graph 4.4 in appendix
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Tab. 2.6 – Income dummies variables
Range Number of observations
1 < 500 Rs / month 231
2 501 - 1,000 Rs / month 394
3 1,001 - 3,000 Rs / month 799
4 3,001 - 5,000 Rs / month 513
5 5,001 - 10,000 Rs / month 539
6 10,001 - 30,000 Rs / month 360
7 > 30,000 Rs / month 132
employer and foreman and between unskilled manual worker and semi-skilled manual
workers. These categories were therefore aggregated. Thus 10 dummies for each
occupation were constructed and the list is provided in the table 2.7 below :
Tab. 2.7 – Occupation dummies variables
Occupation dummies Number of observations
Employer / Manager / Foreman 248
Professional worker 237
Supervisory non-manual office worker 182
Non manual office worker 115
Skilled manual worker 187
Unskilled / semi-skilled manual worker 156
Farmer cultivating his own farm 499
Agricultural worker 193
Member of armed forces 28
Never had a job 106
As we shall see later, the last category labeled "never had a job" in the data set
is rather intriguing. First, the distribution of income within this category, as shown
by table 4.12, is rather spread over the ranges, so this group is unlikely to encompass
only unemployed, students or housewives, especially as "never had a job" is suppo-
sed to describe the occupation of the chief wage earner. Within this category, 100%
of the respondents declared that they were not the chief wage earner, and 94% of
them declared that the chief wage earner was employed at the time of the interview.
Thus this category probably encompasses temporary jobs and/or self-employment
or at least occupations that were not clear to the respondent.
Three education dummies were created in accordance to the ranges informed in
the database that are : primary education and below, secondary school and attended
college. Please bear in mind that the there is no illiterate individual. Other control
variables are the standard determinants of social capital, such as sex, marital status
age and age squared of the respondent. The size of the town is also included under
the assumption that in smaller towns caste identity is more salient and of common
knowledge. Thus its impact would be greater. Given that data were collected in 1995
and 2001, a binary variable equals to 1 for the year 1995 was also included.
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2.4 Benchmark Scenario
Given that I have a large set of binary variables I need to specify a benchmark
scenario. This reference case depicts a situation that is most likely to result in
a high social ranking, i.e. a non scheduled individual earning more than 30,000
Rupees a month, who attended college and who is a professional worker. In order
to select the benchmark occupation I looked at the distribution of income ranges
across occupations, that is presented in table 4.12 in appendix. It appears that being
a professional is the highest paying job, thus this occupation was picked.
3 Discriminant Analysis of The Data
In order to sense which variables are most likely to have an impact on perceived
social status a discriminant analysis of the data is performed. The aim of this tech-
nique is to find a set of functions uz, called discriminant functions that map a set
of predictors xij, (i identifying the individual and j standing for the characteristic’s
type such as income, education and so on) into a latent variable y∗i that is associated
with the actually observed social class yi. The first discriminant function is found
so as to best separate the observed groups. The second discriminant function is the
second best separating function. The merit of discriminant analysis is to graphically
represent the discriminating power of the predictors, that is which characteristic is
most likely to result in a specific classification. Variables that stand close to the
origin of both functions have little discriminating power while those that are the
most far away are likely to be strong indicators of classification8.
Table 2.8 below presents the four discriminant functions obtained. All 4 are highly
significant as testified by the F test. The first dimension u1(x) explain 77% of the
variance in the dependent variable and canonical correlation show a matching score
of 64% between the dependent variable, ie. social classes and the first discriminant
function. Overall the two first functions explain more than 90% of the dependent
variable variance.
Tab. 2.8 – Canonical Linear Discriminant Analysis
Canonical Eigen-value Proportion of the F P>F
correlation variance explained
u1(x) 0.6404 0.695337 0.7741 13.411 0.0000
u2(x) 0.3329 0.124659 0.1388 4.7269 0.0000
u3(x) 0.2178 0.049802 0.0554 2.8885 0.0000
u4(x) 0.1662 0.028423 0.0316 2.2035 0.0000
Figure 2.2 below plots the coefficients associated to the various independent va-
riables given the two first discriminant axis9. Coefficients from the first discriminant
function u1 are plotted horizontally while those from the second function are plotted
vertically. The further away the independent variable is from the origin, the more
8a more formal description of the technique is provided in appendix
9Proper coefficients are presented in table 4.15in appendix
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discriminating the variable is. Given that I have taken as a benchmark the scenario
that most likely induces a high perceived social class, almost none of the independent
variables are located in the two right hand side quadrants.
According to figure 2.2 the two main discriminating dimensions are castes and
income. By and large, the largest constraint on perceived social class is membership
to Scheduled Tribe while the discriminating power of belonging to a Scheduled Caste
is somewhat lower, although it remains quite large. Three points can be made. First,
caste seems to be the strongest determinant of perceived social status. Second, Sche-
duled Castes do not perceive their caste membership as binding on social status as
Scheduled Tribes do. Third, income ranges 3 and 4 display a stronger discriminating
power than membership to Scheduled Castes, while income ranges 2 and 5 have a
similar power thereby suggesting that a decrease in income from the highest level
to middle range income has a negative effect similar in magnitude to that of being
from a Scheduled Caste. However, the income effect can not compete with that of
being from a Scheduled Tribe.
Fig. 2.2 – Coefficients from the first two discriminant functions
labels Plot labels Plot
Income range 1 to 6 (1 = lowest) i1, i2...i6 Agricultural worker oc5
Education level 1 and 2 (1 = primary) e1, e2 Member of armed force oc6
Supervisory non manual office worker oc1 Never had a job oc7
Non manual office worker oc2 Unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker oc8
Skilled Manual worker oc3 Employer / Manager / Foreman oc9
Farmer cultivating his own farm oc4
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Compared to college attendance, other levels of education as a whole have a re-
latively low discriminating power. Out of the two educational levels retained, only
the first one, i.e. primary and below is not located close to the origin and thus may
be thought of as having a negative effect on perceived social status.
Discriminant analysis is particularly helpful to identifying the most relevant occu-
pation with regard to perceived social status. According to the figure 2.2, occupations
are not nearly as discriminant as castes and income. Out of the nine occupations,
three have relatively strong discriminating power : agricultural worker (oc5 in the
graph), unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker(oc8), and farmer cultivating his own
farm (oc4). Next comes skilled manual worker (oc3). It is noteworthy that the most
discriminating occupations are all manual, while office types of occupations are not
so relevant, all of them being compared to being a professional worker. The relevant
divide in occupations seem therefore to be manual versus non-manual jobs, although
occupations in general does not seem to have a strong explaining power.
Nearly irrelevant variables include town size, gender, marital status, age of the re-
spondent as well as secondary school education, or being enrolled in the army.
Three conclusions may be drawn from the analysis :
– Caste strongly binds perceived social identity although the constraint seems
to be harsher on Scheduled Tribes than on Scheduled Castes.
– Income, for intermediate levels, may be almost as powerful in shaping perceived
social identity as being from a Scheduled Caste.
– The above proposition does not hold for Scheduled Tribes. In this instance no
other determinant seem to be as powerful as the caste effect.
– Occupations and education do not seem to be as discriminating as income
and castes are, although manual occupations are generally more binding on
perceived social class.
The discriminant analysis presented above is descriptive, yet helpful at putting forth
hypothesis, that will be checked through the empirical strategy described in the next
section.
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4 Empirical Strategy
Given that the dependent variable is ordinal, the analysis resorts to a pooled
ordered probit model, whose details are given below.
4.1 Base Model
Let y∗i be the latent continuous measure of perceived social class by individual i
defined by the following relationship :
y∗i = θcastei + βIncomei + γOccupationi + δEducationi + ρzi + i (2.1)
where castei is the caste to which individual i belong.
Income, Education and Occupation together with castes are the variables
of interest as earlier described
zi is a vector of control variables usual to the literature on social capital
such as age, sex and marital status of the respondent together with the size of
the town and a dummy for year 1995. ρ is the vector of associated coefficients.
i a random error term assumed to follow a standard normal distribution.
yi is the observed ordinal variable so that for the jth outcome yi = j for j = 1...5
and is determined from the model as follows :
yi =

1 if −∞ ≤ y∗i ≤ µ1
j if µj−1 < y∗i ≤ µj
5 if µ4 < y
∗
i ≤ ∞
where µi are thresholds to be estimated together with the coefficients. The proba-
bilities for each ordinal outcome is therefore
P [yi = 1] = φ(µ1 − xiβ)
....
P [yi = j] = φ(µj − xiβ)− φ(µj−1 − xiβ)
...
P [yi = 5] = 1− φ(µj−1 − xiβ)
for φ the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The ordered probit
model is estimated for the best and worst case scenarios.
4.2 Conditional Effects
Descriptive statistics have shown that the distribution of assumed determinants
of social status such as income, occupation and education significantly differ across
castes 10. In the base specification, I identified the effect of caste controlling for
other variables. However, the effect of determinants of perceived social status may
differ depending on caste. Therefore caste may also have an effect through the diffe-
ring weights carried by other determinants. For instance, education may be effective
at improving the perceived social status among non-scheduled individuals but not
10Please refer to the Pearson’s χ2 test presented in table 4.11 in appendix
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among scheduled groups.
In order to investigate this possibility, I first run a likelihood-ratio Chow test to
check whether the vector of parameters are equal across all three groups : SCs, STs
and non-scheduled groups.
Secondly, I test whether each determinant, income, education and occupation
interacted with alternatively and jointly the SC and ST variables are jointly signi-
ficant. To do so, I proceed with an incremental likelihood ratio χ2 test.
In the event that one of these determinants, say for instance income, has a
differing effect depending on caste, I estimate the base model defined by equation
(1.6) including the income variable interacted with the SC ad ST binary variables.
5 Results
5.1 Base Model
Table 2.9 presented on next page displays the results from the estimation of the
base specification. In specification (1) scheduled groups are compared to non sche-
duled groups, while specifications (2) and (3) compares SCs and STs to the rest of
the population, controls being included in specification (3).
As expected, being from a scheduled group significantly decreases the likelihood
of ranking in high classes. Consistent with the hypothesis brought forward in the
discriminant analysis, being from a Scheduled Tribe has a much larger impact on
perceived social class than that of being from a Scheduled Caste, although this point
will be nuanced in the next section. Group is not the sole determinant of social iden-
tity. Income, education and professions seem all to be relevant variables.
Nevertheless, the significance of the coefficients only show that the effect of the
variables differ from omitted variables. Should I change the benchmark scenarios,
significance may differ. Therefore I need to test whether each parameter differ from
the other. For instance, I need to test whether the impact of earning an income
included in the first range is different from earning a second range income. This will
be performed based on specification (3).
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Tab. 2.9 – Determinants of perceived social class - Base Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caste Scheduled groups -0.592***
(0.000)
Scheduled Caste -0.430*** -0.427*** -0.632***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Scheduled Tribe -1.231*** -1.225*** -0.799***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1995 x SC 0.748***
(0.001)
Income < 500 Rs / month -0.897*** -0.715*** -0.703*** -0.691***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
501-1,000 Rs / month -1.184*** -1.163*** -1.170*** -1.164***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
1,001-3,000 Rs / month -0.949*** -0.928*** -0.938*** -0.933***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
3,001-5,000 Rs / month -0.801*** -0.711*** -0.710*** -0.716***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
5,001-10,000 Rs / month -0.522*** -0.477*** -0.478*** -0.481***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
10,001-30,000 Rs / month -0.384** -0.328** -0.327** -0.324**
(0.017) (0.042) (0.046) (0.050)
Education Primary and below -0.387*** -0.343*** -0.340*** -0.337***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Middle school -0.018 0.012 0.006 0.000
(0.796) (0.867) (0.929) (0.998)
Occupation Employer / Manager/ Foreman -0.202** -0.14 -0.145 -0.13
(0.049) (0.176) (0.167) (0.219)
Supervisory office -0.277*** -0.220** -0.211** -0.197*
(0.007) (0.031) (0.041) (0.058)
Non manual office -0.555*** -0.467*** -0.468*** -0.455***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skilled manual -0.802*** -0.705*** -0.701*** -0.671***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Semi and unskilled manual -1.140*** -0.979*** -0.981*** -0.932***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Farmer : own farm -0.549*** -0.410*** -0.403*** -0.400***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Agricultural worker -1.209*** -1.046*** -1.063*** -1.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Member of armed forces 0.191 0.073 0.06 0.046
(0.422) (0.765) (0.807) (0.853)
Never had a job -0.321** -0.236 -0.223 -0.209
(0.029) (0.117) (0.155) (0.185)
Controls 1995 dummy 0.817*** 1.031*** 1.059*** 0.569***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Female -0.004 0.000
(0.941) (0.999)
Married -0.019 -0.019
(0.775) (0.772)
Age 0.001 0.001
(0.739) (0.702)
town size 2 -0.118 -0.101
(0.243) (0.313)
town size 3 0.028 0.057
(0.815) (0.626)
town size 4 -0.211* -0.169
(0.092) (0.176)
town size 5 0.024 0.046
(0.841) (0.695)
town size 6 -0.146 -0.128
(0.197) (0.254)
town size 7 -0.076 -0.062
(0.515) (0.597)
town size 8 -0.079 -0.067
(0.589) (0.649)
Observations 1658 1658 1653 1653
Robust p values in parentheses ; * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
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5.1.1 The 1995 Issue
Before going any further into the analysis of the results, some comments are
needed on the salience of the effect of the 1995 dummy. The 1995 round is rather
unbalanced as shown by table 4.16 in appendix. During that round, the population
only comprised SCs and STs, the latter representing approximately half of the in-
formed observations. This probably explains, only partly as we shall see, the strong
effect of the 1995 dummy. Moreover, in the whole sample, SCs tend to live in larger
towns which may induce a sampling bias, while the 2001 sub-sample seems to be
more balanced. Thus, the analysis conducted below is also run over the 2001 sub-
sample and the results are presented in appendix11.
It should be noted that although the estimation over the whole sample concludes
that being and ST has a stronger effect than being an SC on perceived social class12,
in accordance with the description given in the discriminant analysis, such a gap
between the two scheduled groups is not found in the 2001 sub-sample (the difference
in the coefficients is not significant anymore at conventional levels). Yet when the
model is estimated over the 1995 sub-sample, the SC group being the benchmark,
such a gap strongly reappears as shown by table 4.17 in appendix.
When the model is estimated over the whole sample but allowing the effect of
being an SC to vary according to survey rounds (specification (4) of table 2.9), the
SC coefficient is significantly different from that of the interacted term. On the other
hand, when the 1995 dummy is interacted with the ST variable instead of the SC
variable, its coefficient is not significantly different from the one associated with
the ST dummy. This, unfortunately, supports the hypothesis that there is a sizable
sampling bias related to SCs, which probably explains why SCs characteristics were
not very different from those of the non-scheduled group. Indeed the Scheduled Caste
effect is much stronger in the 2001 sub-sample. This bias also may partly explain
the large 1995 effect, given that in specification (4) the coefficient associated with
the 1995 dummy is halved, although its impact remains large and significant, which
suggests that only a part of the problem has been removed13. This is the reason why
I proceed with the same kind of analysis as below on the 2001 sub-sample. To save
space and clarity, results are presented in appendix, although some comments on
them will be included in the course of the chapter. 14
11pages 162 to 168
12The difference in the coefficients associated with the SC and ST variables is significant at a
1% threshold (χ2 at 97.62) and is estimated at 0.7976
13Another reason for the potential large effect of the 1995 dummy may be that the two rounds
were badly reconciled
14The differing effect of being an SC between 1995 and 2001 is not devoid of information.
Assuming that sampled SCs had better characteristics in 1995 than in 2001, as it seems to be the
case, and the fact that caste membership has a smaller effect in the 1995 sample concur with the
view that improvements in characteristics may partly cancel the Scheduled Caste effect.
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5.1.2 Tests on Coefficients and Thresholds for Each Variable Type
Education
Results show that the impact of secondary school attendance is not different
from that of the omitted category, that is university attendance. Having only pri-
mary education has a significant negative impact on perceived social status. Thus,
the real divide lies between primary education and above. The test of the equality
of coefficients associated with secondary school and primary do conclude that they
differ (χ2 = 22.02 ; P > χ2 = 0.000). The two upper educational levels may and
will therefore be aggregated into one new variable that will be the omitted one from
now on15. It should be noted that acquiring education beyond primary can only
counterbalance half of the effect of being from an SC or an ST. Out of the four at-
tributes identified as contributing to perceived social class that are groups, income,
occupation and education, the latter has the smallest effect.
Occupation
Being enrolled in the army, an employer and not being occupied are not signifi-
cant, meaning that their impact on perceived social status is not different from that
of being a professional worker (the omitted category). The results from the test of
equality of the parameters associated with each of these variables are provided in
table 2.10 on next page. From this test it can be concluded that parameters do not
differ across these three occupations, namely being a professional, an employer, in
the army or without a job. Therefore, they are aggregated into one variable named
occupation1. This category makes more sense than it appears. As already mentio-
ned, being a professional is probably the most well regarded position, given that all
other compares unfavorably to it as shown by the negative coefficients associated
with occupations. It is also the highest paying occupation16. Second, it can easily be
understood why being in the army or an employer may be valued, besides providing
relatively high incomes. The case of "never had a job" is more peculiar, as mentioned
earlier. The fact that its impact is similar to other supervisory occupations supports
the hypothesis that this category is mainly comprised of self-employed individuals.
The impact of being a supervisory office worker does not significantly differ from
the occupation1 group when the model is reassessed17 and is therefore incorporated
into it. occupation1 becomes the omitted category. The reason that prevented from
doing so in the first step was the significant difference in parameters between this
occupation and being a professional worker. Yet, such a difference does not prove
significant anymore and I feel authorized to combine the variables.
Table 2.10 shows that the coefficients associated with being a non manual office
worker and cultivating one’s own farm do not differ. They are therefore combined to
form a new variable occupation2. Please note that being an office worker does not
have a significantly differing impact compared to cultivating own one’s farm. Yet
15Please note that the analysis over the 2001 sub-sample leads to the same conclusions.
16please refer to table 4.12 in appendix for income distribution across occupations
17please refer to table 4.26 in appendix
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the difference between being a cultivator and a skilled manual is significant. Thus
I did not incorporate this last activity into occupation2. For the sake of clarity the
variable skilled manual is renamed occupation3. Table 2.10 also shows that there is
no difference in the effect of being a low skilled manual worker and an agricultu-
ral laborer. Thus these two occupations are merged to form the variable occupation4.
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The table below summarizes the correspondence between the original variables
and the new aggregates.
Tab. 2.11 – New occupation aggregates
Aggregate Corresponding occupations
Occupation 1 Professional worker
Employer / Manager / Foreman
Supervisory office position
Member of armed force
"Never had a job"
Occupation 2 Non manual office worker
Farmer : own farm
Occupation 3 Skilled Manual
Occupation 4 Semi or unskilled manual worker
Agricultural laborer
These groups can be intuitively ranked. While the first group encompasses mainly
clerical and supervisory position, the second one represents a second tier, while the
last ones are probably the least desirable. Thus, coefficients would be expected to be
negative, given that the omitted category is the first group and decreasing with the
occupational rank. The estimates for the differences between coefficients associated
with the occupation groups is presented in table 2.12 below :
Tab. 2.12 – Estimates of the difference in coefficients - occupation groups
βoccupationj − βoccupationj+1
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
j + 1 0.283*** 0.288** 0.323**
(0.000) (0.012) (0.011)
p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ;
** significant at 5% ;***significant at 1%
Given that the gaps between the coefficients is close to a constant, the variable
occupation is recoded as a categorical variable that tales on value 1 for occupation1,
2 for occupation2 and so on up to 4 for occupation4. It is believed that such a
transformation is not going to greatly alter the estimations but prove very useful to
reading tables and estimating conditional effects.
The above results exhibit where the divides lie in occupations types as far as per-
ceived social status is concerned. Broadly speaking, occupations lying at the bottom
of the scale all relate to unskilled work and do not require any form of capital, be it
physical or human. Acquiring skills or capital spurs a move from the bottom category
to the next, which leads to an improved social image. Next threshold entails obtai-
ning a managing position which has the largest positive impact on perceived social
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status. Even more globally we may speculate that the three factors that determine
social status are in order of importance, capital, either human or physical and power.
Going down to earth and back to a stricter interpretation of the results, it is
important to highlight that acquiring land may be a way to counterbalance the
Scheduled Caste effect. Indeed becoming a farmer from an agricultural laborer has
an effect estimated at 0.61 which is larger than the SC effect assessed at 0.43. Mo-
reover, for a manual worker, acquiring skills has also an effect close in magnitude
to that of being from a Scheduled Caste. More generally, a SC has to shift over two
occupation ranges to offset the caste effect. On the other hand, a Scheduled Tribe
would not manage to clear the group effect by moving even from the least to the
most desirable group.
Unfortunately the above conclusions may be too optimistic with regard to the
estimates over the 2001 sub-sample. Indeed, given that in the whole sub-sample
the SC and ST effects are under- and over-estimated respectively compared to the
2001 estimates, SCs as well as STs have to acquire a managing position to cancel
the scheduled group effect. Moving from the least desirable category, (agricultural
work) to the next (manual and non manual office work) can not fully compensate
for the scheduled group effect, although the magnitudes of the two impacts are quite
close.
Income
A similar analysis is run for income ranges. First, equality of coefficients associa-
ted with the various income ranges is tested. Second, differences in coefficients will
be estimated and commented.
Income ranges all have a significantly differing effect from the omitted category,
which is the 7th range, i.e. earning more than 30,000 Rupees a month as testified by
table 2.9. Equality of coefficients among income variables is tested and the matrix
of the results is presented in table 4.22 below.
Tab. 2.13 – χ2 test of difference in parameters - income
Income 1 Income 2 Income 3 Income 4 Income 5 Income 6
<500Rs. 501-1,000Rs 1,001-3,000Rs 3,001-5,000Rs. 5,001-10,000Rs. 10,001-30,000Rs
Income 1 9.09*** 2.96* 0.00 3.27* 8.52***
(0.003) (0.086) (0.992) (0.071) (0.004)
Income 2 4.39** 14.33*** 32.60*** 41.80***
(0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 3 6.91*** 30.40*** 41.61***
(0.009) (0.000) 0.000
Income 4 8.06*** 18.59***
(0.005) (0.000)
Income 5 3.81*
(0.051)
Robust p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;***significant at 1%
First, all ranges have a differing effect except ranges 1 and 4. Yet, given the gap
5. RESULTS 77
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL IDENTITY IN INDIA : CASTE AND BEYOND?
between the two ranges, it would make little sense to aggregate them. Differences in
parameters are estimated and presented in table 2.14 below. It is noteworthy that
the intervals between the parameters are globally equal to a constant, except for
the lower range. The fact that switching from the lowest income range to the next
induces a negative effect on perceived social status is at odds with common sense
and probably highlights the specificity of the situation. Thus it has to be separately
accounted for. Besides the lowest range, given that the gaps are more or less equal
to constant, it seems sensible to recode the variable as a categorical one in the same
fashion as done for occupations, yet I need to control for the specific category that
is range 1. It is proposed to include in the estimation the categorical variable for
income taking on value 1 for the lowest income range up to 7 for the highest, together
with a dummy that takes on value 1 if the individual earns an income located in the
lowest range to account for the fact that situation is peculiar. Such a transformation
should not greatly alter the results and will again prove helpful in reading tables
and estimating conditional effects.
Tab. 2.14 – Estimates of the difference in coefficients - income ranges
βincomej − βincomej+1
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 6
j + 1 0.461*** -0.24** -0.22*** -0.232*** -0.167* -0.327**
(0.003) (0.036) (0.009) (0.005) (0.051) (0.051)
p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;*** significant at 1%
Going back to the effects of changes in income, they are close in magnitude to
that of switching from an occupation category to the next, which makes sense given
that the two are probably correlated. It is noteworthy that occupation plays a role
of its own in shaping social status, even when I control for its income generating
characteristics. With respect to income, an SC has to increase its earnings by two
ranges to cancel out the Scheduled Caste effect. Although relatively large (about
5,000 Rupees a month), such a move is not out of reach, especially bearing in mind
that the average income in India was about 3,000 Rupees a month in 200818 al-
though, given that this is a national average it may hide strong disparities between
urban and rural areas. As a comparison, the World Bank set the poverty line in
2005 at 648 and 429 Rupees a month for urban and rural areas respectively. The
Indian Planning Commission, using monthly per capita expenditures, set the po-
verty threshold at 356.35 Rupees for rural areas and 538.60 Rupees for urban areas.
Thus going out of poverty to the average level of income could potentially cancel
out the burden on social image of being an untouchable. STs situation is much more
difficult, given that they have to see their income increase thirty fold to cancel out
the effect of coming from a tribe on perceived social status.
There again, results may be too optimistic as far as SCs are concerned and too
pessimistic as far as STs are concerned. Estimates from the 2001 sub-sample show
that both SCs and STs have to switch three income range to reverse the scheduled
18source : Central Statistic Organization, Government of India
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group effect. In practical terms, this means that they have to see their income in-
crease from 1,000Rs or less to more than 5,000Rs per month or to earn more than
10,000Rs. As a comparison, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) assessed, based on tax re-
turns data in 1999-2000, that the top percentile earned approximately 7,300Rs and
more per month19. The top 0.5% of the population, earn more than 12,000Rs a
month, so the jump needed is quite large.
To summarize the findings of this section20, four points can be made. First, caste
seems less a burden on perceived social status for Scheduled Castes than for Sche-
duled Tribes, although this may be driven by a potential sampling bias. Second,
the most effective way to improve perceived social class and to cancel the scheduled
group effect is an improvement in the occupational status, and more particularly the
acquisition of a managing position. Third, relatively large sifts in income are nee-
ded to reverse the scheduled group effect. Fourth, education has a relatively modest
impact on perceived social class and provided it is beyond primary school.
However, by comparing the effects of castes to that of other variables, I made the
implicit assumption that other determinants of social identity have a similar effect
across castes. This assumption may not be tenable. It would be of some interest to
investigate whether caste may modify the impact of income, education or occupa-
tion. In this event, caste would not only have an impact of itself but also through
the alterations of the effects of other variables.
5.1.3 Conditional Effects
In order to address this issue, I will first test whether the set of coefficients from
the base model is the same among the three groups, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and non scheduled groups. A likelihood-ratio Chow test obtained by fitting
the model for each of the three groups and then comparing the results with those
of the base model estimated over the whole sample concluded that the parameters
vectors do significantly differ across castes at the 1% level of significance (likelihood
ratio χ2 = 84.24). The same test also concludes that coefficients differ between sche-
duled and non scheduled group (likelihood ratio χ2 = 36.08 significant at 1%) and
between the sc and st ((likelihood ratio χ2 = 48.15 significant at 1%). Determi-
nants of perceived social class may therefore not have the same effect within every
group. For instance, income may be effective at increasing the perceived social status
of members of the non scheduled group but irrelevant for scheduled groups members.
The same test performed on the 2001 sub-sample yield contrary results. Given
the small sizes of the SCs and STs populations, I was only able to compare scheduled
and non-scheduled groups. The test concludes that the effect of other characteristics,
besides groups’ membership, does not vary across groups. However, we may have
come up against lack of data.
19The exact number is 87,633Rs a year. Four millions individuals fall into the top percentile
20A table comparing the results obtained from the whole sample and the 2001 sub-sample is
presented on page 168
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Going back to the whole sample, the three main determinants of perceived social
status that are education, income and occupation are interacted with the SC and ST
dummies. Results are presented in table 2.15. Specification (1) presents the results
from the basic specification after aggregating the variables. Castes coefficients are
little changed from the estimation presented in table 2.9 and coefficients associated
with the income and occupation variables are in line with the estimates from table
2.14 and 2.12 respectively, all these elements providing some comfort about the in-
nocuousness of the transformations.
Tab. 2.15 – Estimations results - Conditional Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Caste Scheduled Caste -0.437*** -0.439*** -0.017 -0.326* 0.439
(0.000) (0.000) (0.936) (0.069) (0.181)
Scheduled Tribe -1.245*** -1.217*** -1.022*** -1.221*** -0.761**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
Income Income 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.288*** 0.223*** 0.314***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income x SC -0.119** -0.161***
(0.018) (0.004)
Income x ST -0.074 -0.101*
(0.169) (0.085)
Education Education (≤ prim.) -0.346*** -0.330*** -0.339*** -0.346*** -0.271**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Education x SC -0.001 -0.082
(0.994) (0.578)
Education x ST -0.054 -0.135
(0.697) (0.362)
Occupation Occupation -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.277*** -0.241***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation x SC -0.05 -0.122
(0.453) (0.104)
Occupation x ST -0.007 -0.038
(0.923) (0.613)
Lowest Income Dummy 0.671*** 0.672*** 0.613*** 0.672*** 0.607***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1653 1653 1653 1653 1653
Robust p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;*** significant at 1%
Specifications include control variables such as dummy for year 1995, age, gender, marital status and town size
Results prove that the effect of education and occupation does not differ across
groups. All the comments made above about the fact that acquiring land for agricul-
tural workers or skills for craftsmen or obtaining a supervisory position may cancel
the SC effect still hold. On the other hand, the effect of income interacted with the
SC variable and to some extent the ST variable is significant and negative. Two
interpretations can be brought forward. Either high income reinforces the already
negative caste effect, or being from a scheduled group partially softens the income
effect. While none of these hypothesis may be ruled out on econometric grounds,
the first one does not intuitively make much sense. Let’s retain for now the hypothe-
80 5. RESULTS
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL IDENTITY IN INDIA : CASTE AND BEYOND?
sis that being from a scheduled group partially neutralizes the income effect. This
would mean that caste or tribe may have an impact of its own or/and also through
a diminished income effect. This is what seems to be happening. As soon as the
income effect is allowed to vary between groups, the coefficient associated with the
Scheduled Caste variable looses significance. This would imply that, as far as SCs
are concerned, the caste effect mainly runs through a reduced effect of income. The
insignificance of the coefficient associated with the SC variable pleads in favor of the
second explanation. A couple of words need to be said about the insignificance of
the income variable interacted with the ST variable (specification (3)). As already
mentioned, income may be correlated with occupation and to some extent education.
Thus the income variable will probably feel the effects of not allowing education and
occupation to vary across groups. When this last procedure is allowed, (specification
(5)), the interaction of income and ST recovers significance, though only at the 10%
threshold. This last specification is probably the most relevant of the two and will
be focussed on.
One of the reasons for the canceling out of the SC effect and the negative sign of
income interacted is that SC do not declare themselves in the high social positions
their income would induce but rather in lower position due to their caste identity.
In this instance the caste effect does not have an impact of its own but rather ma-
nifests itself through the reduced likelihood for wealthy SCs to perceive themselves
as belonging to high social classes due to their caste membership. This process is
often referred to as cognitive dissonance in social psychology. The concept describes
a situation experienced by an individual that challenges his self-image and as such
generates anxiety. Subjects need to move out of the conflict and they may do so
by repressing the contradictory situation 21. This process may help at explaining
why SCs who are as well endowed with wealth or education as scheduled groups,
as descriptive statistics suggested, still do declare themselves in a relatively low
position, compared to the non-scheduled groups. Fortunately, the picture is not so
dark. Even if income has an additional negative effect among the SCs, the overall
income effect is likely to be positive, although almost half that of non scheduled
groups. Compared to non scheduled groups, SCs will have to increase twice as much
their income to feel that they belong to the same social class as non scheduled groups.
On the contrary, the direct group effect is rather robust for the STs. Coefficients
associated with the ST variable retains its significance, while the effect of income
on improving perceived social status is negative when interacted with ST. This
group suffers from a double effect. Not only does the tribal origin imposes a direct
constraint on the perceived social status, but it also has a indirect one through the
diminished effect of income. ST individuals do declare themselves in a lower position
than their income would suggest because of their tribal origin.
21for more information on this and the related concept of stereotype threat, please refer to
section 2.1.5 of the general introduction
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5.2 Summary of Main Results
Group membership is a strong determinant of perceived social class. Nevertheless,
caste or tribe are not the sole determinants of perceived social class and occupation,
income and to some extent education all exhibit a relevant impact. Being from a
Scheduled Caste or Tribe has a relatively strong effect, especially given the fact that
large increases in income or the acquisition of a managing position can reverse the
groups’ effects, while education can not. The analysis of the whole sample concludes
that income has a reduced impact on perceived social class among scheduled groups,
a result that echoes the findings of the stereotype threat literature. This conclusion
is somewhat tempered by the analysis of the 2001 sub-sample, although it may have
come up against data scarcity.
6 Potential Issues
6.1 Local Environment
One of the dimension that is missing in the analysis is the respondent’s envi-
ronment and most notably the local composition of the villages. Indeed it could be
argued that in villages that are extremely homogenous in terms of castes, say for
instance untouchables villages, social identity rests much more on other economic
variables while caste may be less salient. Unfortunately there is little I can do, given
that the only information about the respondent’s location available is the state. As
a robustness check state fixed effects were included (specification (2) of table 2.16
on next page) and can be compared to the base specification reproduced for conve-
nience in column (1). The percentage of SCs and STs in the state’s population22
was included in the base equation as a control variable (specification (3)) as well as
their quadratic terms to capture potential non linear effects (specification(4)) and
are then interacted with the caste variables (specification (5)).
The inclusion of state fixed effects did not modify the results to a large extent.
The results are robust to the inclusion of the state’s percentage of SCs and STs
as coefficients are hardly modified by this inclusion. Only the percentage of STs
in the population is relevant and has a U-shaped effect as shown by specification
(4). However, the coefficient associated with the SC variable largely decreased after
the inclusion of the interacted terms. This provides some support to the hypothesis
that the caste effect does probably depend on the local social composition. The
coefficient associated to the interacted term is positive although not significant at
conventional levels. The lack of significance probably stems from the crudeness of
the measure which is the state’s population composition, whereas local information
would be more appropriate. It would not be too surprising to see finer measures
becoming significant. Nevertheless, coefficients tend to indicate that the tendency
to rank in high social classes increases with the representation of the individual’s
caste or tribe. The lack of information on the local social composition in terms
of groups is definitely a limitation of this piece of work. Yet, results probably do
not have to be entirely reconsidered since after these robustness checks, signs and
22This information comes from the 2001 Census of India
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significance levels remain23.
Tab. 2.16 – Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scheduled Caste -0.437*** -0.518*** -0.432*** -0.443*** -0.712***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Scheduled Tribe -1.245*** -1.374*** -1.248*** -1.253*** -1.333***
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
% SC in state’s population -0.213 -2.894 -0.742
(0.708) (0.312) (0.288)
% ST in state’s population 0.932* -1.435 0.684
(0.064) (0.314) (0.213)
(% SC in state’s population)2 7.024
(0.399)
(% ST in state’s population)2 10.411*
(0.073)
% SC in state x SC 1.541
(0.151)
% ST in state x SCT 0.885
(0.409)
Income 0.223*** 0.252*** 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.220***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Below primary -0.346*** -0.371*** -0.364*** -0.366*** -0.370***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation -0.296*** -0.290*** -0.294*** -0.296*** -0.293***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lowest Income Dummy 0.671*** 0.659*** 0.707*** 0.699*** 0.721***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State fixed effects No Yes No No No
Observations 1653 1653 1653 1653 1653
Robust p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ;**significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% ;
All specifications include other control variables such as year 1995, age, gender, marital status and town sizes.
6.2 Subjectivity
It could be objected to the analysis that perceived social status is subjective
and that subjective measures induce, as mentioned by Clark and Oswald (2002),
three difficulties : ordinality, scaling and omitted dispositions. The problem of sca-
ling relate to the fact that different individuals may have different mental scales that
prevent from treating their answers as cardinal value. For instance, an individual
may assess the distance between middle lower class and working class differently
from another. The issue of ordinality arises when ranking of the answers is hete-
rogenous and ambiguous. Given that I am only concerned with ordinality and not
cardinality of the dependent variable (indeed the distance between the classes is ir-
relevant to the analysis) and resort to an ordered probit model whose outcomes are
23In a separate exercise, specifications (1) through (5) have been estimated while allowing for the
SC effect to vary depending on survey rounds (similar method as the one presented in specification
(4) of table 2.9). This procedure yields similar results than the one presented above, except for
the size of the groups’ coefficients. Thus the comments made in this section still hold for these
specifications
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easy to rank (it is believed that the ranking of social classes is obvious), the first two
difficulties of ordinality and scaling are overcome.The omitted disposition problem
is somewhat more tricky. If the perceived outcome is assumed to be correlated with
individuals tempers that may in turn affect explanatory variables, I am left with
an omitted variable problem. As Clark and Oswald (2002) puts it "cross-section
equations will be unreliable whenever unobservable characteristics (like a person’s
natural cheerfulness) are correlated with observable characteristics (like education)".
On this particular point I would rely on Clark and Oswald (2002), whose conclusions
are "in happiness research, the biases in cross section patterns may be less dramatic
than has sometimes been supposed".
It could also be objected that the declared social class may not correspond to
reality. Three arguments could be made to tackle this issue. First, I want to insist
that there can not be any sort of objectivity in the definition of social class. Even
when researchers in sociology or statisticians try to match populations with social
classes, they have to make a judgement call about the class segmentation, which
necessarily brings in subjectivity. It is true that some elements allow to assess the
sociological distance between individuals, such as income, lifestyles or education and
according to such distances, clusters may be identified. Yet, the sociological distance
is a continuum and where one class should start and the other end is a subjective de-
cision. Therefore, I would argue that there are no "real" or objective classes. Second,
given that the question about classes was translated, it is very likely that respon-
dents felt they were asked to rank themselves on a scale did not attach too much
importance on the strict definition of the word "class". Third, it should be stressed
that my analysis focuses on perceived social class and the question as to whether
this perception is in conformity with some sort of reality is irrelevant. My interest
lies mainly in analyzing whether a determinant of social class has the same effect
depending on identity. So the processes that are investigated are entirely subjective.
6.3 Peer Control
Another important point that is also missing in the analysis is peer control. De-
clared perceived social rank may differ when it has to be publicly revealed and when
it is confided to the interviewer potentially due to "stereotype threat" mentioned
in introduction. One could easily imagine that an untouchable would depreciate its
social class if he had to announce it in front of higher castes. My results which are
based on data collected during face to face interviews, where the interviewer did
not reveal his identity, should therefore be interpreted with care and I have tried to
insist on the fact that I am concerned with the individual’s perceived status. The
intuition though is that peer control would exaggerate the caste effect.
It would definitely be of great interest to assess potential discrepancies between
the perceived social status and the one publicly declared. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
showed that social identity is highly dependent on the actions undertaken by others.
Thus we may think that such a discrepancy between the self perceived social identity
and the declared one, probably exists and as noted by previous authors are a source
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of anxiety.
Moreover, it would be valuable to investigate the perception others have of ego.
Indeed, I would hypothesize that discrimination is multi faceted and does not uni-
quely stem from a one-way act imposed by a discriminator. We may actually think
of at least three sources of discrimination : (i) an internalized idea about one’s status
that is not necessarily confronted with others’ opinions (and this is what is inves-
tigated in this chapter), (2) an idea an individual may have about himself that is
declared and thus may be approved or contradicted by others and (3) and how others
assess the identity of this individual. Arguably, these are the three main components
of discrimination and disentangling the three would prove an interesting area for fu-
ture research.
6.4 Religion
As mentioned in section 2.1 the analysis is restricted to the Hindu population,
given that information about castes is not available for other denominations. Given
that presumably caste is not so salient among other denominations, the group’s ef-
fect may be overestimated with respect to its effect over the whole population.
The inclusion of religion in the forming of perceived social status poses questions
that are both compelling and fraught with consequences, especially in the context
of rising religious tensions in India. The first one wonders whether religious identity
may supplant caste identity and under what circumstances. There are many possible
factors for identity in India such as religion, caste, language, geography etc. How
come that one becomes more salient than another ? Suppose that religious identity
prevails. In this case, analyzing social fractionalization along the lines of caste to
determine its impact on a lack of cooperation does not seem relevant. Secondly,
if religious denomination has a strong impact on perceived social status, besides
wealth, education, castes or occupations, then claims from religious groups, that
may prompt social tensions, may be better assessed. To sum up, understanding the
rise of a specific identity at the expense of others may prove quite fruitful and is left
for future research.
7 Conclusions
Scheduled Castes do not seem to be less well endowed with education, income
or prestigious occupations than non-scheduled groups as descriptive statistics have
shown. On the other hand, Scheduled Tribes earn less, are less educated and occupy
less prestigious occupations. Logic would command that SCs classify themselves si-
milarly to the non-scheduled groups. This would be without accounting for caste.
Caste is a strong determinant of social status in India, yet it is not the only one. Oc-
cupations, income and to some extent education are all relevant factors of perceived
social class. Nevertheless, the caste effect is quite strong given the fact that large
increases in either income or occupational status are necessary to reverse it. Being a
Scheduled Tribe has a similar effect as being an SC and the same conclusions hold
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for this group as well, except that the way they perceive their social status, not only
is depressed by their tribal origins, but also by reduced endowments.
It has been shown that even when social class is declared privately, castes and
tribes have a strong effect, which suggests that a depreciated self-image has been
internalized. I have argued that if class had been declared publicly, the group’s effect
would have been even stronger,as experiments about stereotype threats have shown.
We may also inquire what would be the judgements made by others about the social
status of the individual be and what would be the impact of castes and tribes on
it. It could be hypothesized that the joint influence of these three elements is what
constitutes discrimination. Discrimination has often been viewed as one-way act
imposed by a discriminator, but this may only be the tip of the iceberg and social
identity ought to be included in the analysis of discrimination. These investigations
are left for future research.
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CHAPTER 3. IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? UNTOUCHABILITY
AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden.
The enforcement of any disability arising out of "Untouchability"
shall be an offence punishable in accordance with the law
Constitution of India ; Fundamental Rights ; Article 17
1 Introduction1
The Constitution of India that came into force in 1950, three years after inde-
pendence outlawed caste based discrimination and abolished untouchability that has
been on for centuries in India. The caste system forbids contacts with lower castes,
and has resulted in practices referred to as untouchability, while the so stigmatized
low castes members are called untouchables that encompass both Scheduled Castes
and schedules tribes (hereafter "SCs" and "STs"). The Constitution, on which the
Indian legal system rests, has placed on the State the responsibility for improving
the welfare of untouchables. For more than 60 years, Indian governments have spared
no effort to design and implement policies dedicated to SCs and STs, such as the
controverted reservation of administrative positions, parliamentary and assembly
seats and access to universities, in accordance with the 46th article of the Directive
Principles of State Policy that enounces that "the State shall promote with special
care the educational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the people and,
in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect
them from social injustice and all form of exploitation". Policies directed at SCs
and STs have mainly focussed, besides reservations, on improving access to educa-
tion and poverty alleviation programs in the forms of grants and credit. Yet, these
domains are not the sole where SCs and STs are at a strong disadvantage because of
their caste membership. They have been often denied access to public infrastructure
on the ground that they are untouchables. Although some efforts have been made to
improve SCs and STs access to common infrastructures such as roads, water sources
or electricity, evidence show that universal and equal access to public goods is far
from being achieved (Anderson (2007), Tiwary (2006)) and that efficient policies in
this area have been too few. This situation does not only arise from unequal wealth
distribution across castes but also from caste based discrimination. For instance,
Shah et al. (2006) presents the results from a survey conducted in 2001-2002, in 565
villages of 11 states and show that, in nearly half of the surveyed villages, untou-
chables were denied access to water facilities. In 28% of them they were denied entry
into police stations and in 18% access to public roads or entry to primary health
centers. Indeed, caste prescriptions prohibit the sharing of some common resources,
the most salient example being the sharing of water. The Constitution of India,
recognized this issue as its 15th article of the Fundamental Rights states that "no
citizen shall, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,
be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) ac-
cess to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment ; or (b)
the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public [...]".
1This chapter was written in collaboration with Mathieu Couttenier, Université Paris 1
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The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, untouchability practices will be eviden-
ced as access to water sources is shown to have an impact on the number of acts
of violence against untouchables. This result highlights the necessity to look into
untouchables’ access to public goods especially given the constitutional objectives
mentioned above. Second, our results, based on a new database on acts of violence
against SCs and STs, collected by the National Crimes Record Bureau show that
(i) common water sources, such as tanks and wells increase the proportion of crimes
committed against the SCs and STs, (ii) while more individualized sources such as
tubewells are effective at reducing the number of violent acts. We shall come back
in a subsequent section to what is defined as common and individualized sources.
All these results are robust to the inclusion of many district and states controls.
These analysis reveals that practices of untouchability are still vigorous and that
governments water improvement programs have the nice side effect of alleviating if
not the causes at least the symptoms of social tensions. This is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first large scale attempt to quantify and evidence the phenomenon
of untouchability and caste based restrictions attached to the use of public goods.
The chapter is structured as follows : section (2) explains why water may be
viewed as a source of caste based conflicts. Section (3) show how this study falls
in line with research on social identity and its relationship with conflicts and the
provision of public goods. Section (4) presents the data and section (5) the empirical
strategy, while results are commented in section (6). Section (7) concludes.
2 Ritual Pollution Through Water
2.1 Castes and Ritual Pollution
As briefly mentioned in introduction to this dissertation, the concept of ritual
pollution governs relations between different castes. It is central to the institution.
As Srinivas (1974) puts it : "every type of inter-caste relation is governed by the
concept of pollution. Contact of any kind, touching, dining, sex and other relations
between castes which are structurally distant results in the higher of the two castes
being polluted [...] Where contact does result in pollution, however, the polluted
member of the higher caste has to undergo a purificatory rite in order to be restored
to normal ritual status. Such a purificatory rite is fairly simple where the structural
distance between the castes is not very great and the type of contact is not serious.
Sometimes, as when a Brahmin eats food cooked by an Untouchable, the resultant
pollution is so great that he or she has to be excommunicated". Given untouchables
very low status, structural distance between untouchables and the rest of the popu-
lation is probably one of the largest.
The ritually polluting nature of Tribes is disputable. As already mentioned, two
cases need to be distinguished. Some tribes actually converted to Hinduism and en-
tered the caste system. Whether their contact is polluting to higher castes members
depends on where they managed to place themselves in the local caste hierarchy.
In some instance, they did not rank higher than the untouchables and are therefore
as untouchable. In a second case, they remained outside the caste system and as
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such, from a higher caste point of view, their contact is polluting. Given that the
tribes we are concerned with are scheduled to benefit from reservations, their social
backwardness was recognized and they are likely to pertain to the second case2.
Although it is important to distinguish between the tribes and the lowest castes, for
they are ethnographically distinct groups, based on the assumption that Scheduled
Tribes are likely to be outcasts, they may also be called untouchables in the sense
that higher castes would avoid their contacts. We therefore refer to "untouchables"
to designate both groups, although this is a simplification, that arguably is not ex-
cessive, of an incredibly complex picture.
As stressed by Srinivas (1974), the degree of pollution does vary depending on the
kind of contact. For instance, entering a higher caste courtyard may be considered
as an offense while touching an higher caste glass or water results in one of the most
extreme degrees of pollution. Food and water are the paramount conveyors of ritual
pollution. The geographical setting of traditional villages in India maps the social
structure and the ban on caste mingling. The heart of the village is the higher caste
district, while untouchables usually live in peripheral hamlets and rarely go through
higher castes neighborhoods Beteille (1965). As a consequence, publicly provided
goods such as water sources are segregated, each hamlet and thus caste groups ha-
ving their own sources. Given the ritual pollution attached to untouchables and the
ban on physical contact with them, they are forbidden access to other castes water
sources. It is common knowledge in India that attempts from untouchables to draw
water from higher caste wells sparks rural violence. Nevertheless, this prohibition
may take different shape depending on the water source.
2.2 Individualized versus Common Sources
Physical contact of an untouchable with water taints the source. Even the contact
of a vessel belonging to an untouchable does alter the ritual purity of the water Du-
mont (1970). Therefore, untouchables are not allowed access to sources where their
jars have to be immersed. Out of the four distribution types identified in our data
(2001 Census of India), that are wells, tanks, tubewells and taps, this prohibition
would pertain to the first two. These two sources are therefore referred to as com-
mon. Of course, we are not able to rule out the possibility for tanks to have taps, in
which case, little pollution would result from an untouchable using it. Nevertheless,
we envisage most tanks as open and water collected with vessels. In villages where
tubewells have been drilled, experience show that untouchables are not banned from
using them, given that such a use would not imply any direct physical contact of
either the individual or his vessel with water, but provided that untouchables stand
last in lines. Therefore, this sort of water access is considered in our study as indi-
vidualized, although it is of common use. Tap distribution is obviously considered
as an individualized source. It may either be of common usage, in which case the
situation resembles that of tubewell or private, in which case it is the utmost indi-
vidualized water source.
2At least this is what is argued in chapter XXIII of Carrin (2006)
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So far, the word individualized, in opposition to common has been used. We
must reckon that the choice of the words is not very fortunate. We tried to give
a description of what is meant by individualized and common in the precedent
paragraph. We could have said that common sources are sensitive to untouchables
pollution, while individualized are less sensitive. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity
and conciseness, we carry on with the words common versus individualized, in the
hope that what is meant by these words is from now on more clear.
3 Related Literature
This article is an extension of the literature about the effect of social fragmen-
tation on the provision of public goods and on conflicts. Previous works have found
that high levels of social fragmentation do impair public goods provision Alesina
et al. (1999); Banerjee and Somanathan (2001); Banerjee et al. (2005); Dayton-
Johnson (2000); Khwaja (2009); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Bardhan (2000) or
induce conflict Collier (2001); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005). These stu-
dies implicitly rest upon the idea that individuals feel a sense of community with
members of their groups and perceive antagonisms with outsiders. These two fea-
tures are more clearly laid out in the design of the polarization measure by Esteban
and Ray (1994). The now popular polarization index includes a sense of group iden-
tification that depends on the population frequency within the group and group
alienation that can be considered as a measure of intergroup antagonisms. Many ex-
periments in social psychology such as, among others, the ones conducted by Tajfel
et al. (1971); Chen and Li (2009) confirm these assumptions : individuals exhibit
strong in-group preferences and reluctance towards members of other groups, even
when groups are formed arbitrarily. These outcomes are strongly related to the pro-
cess of social identification. Individuals easily class themselves and others into groups
and identify with them.
Such an identification process may induce a wide array of economic outcomes as
Akerlof and Kranton (2010, 2005, 2000) have shown, ranging from heterogeneity of
preferences Chen and Li (2009), differences in prices Ball et al. (2001), or conforming
to detrimental stereotypes Hoff and Pandey (2006). One of the most obvious im-
plication of social identity is the setting of social norms. However, the social norms
researchers often refer to govern within groups behaviors. Little stress has been put
on norms ruling interactions between groups. Still they may be salient and of great
consequence, if one thinks about segregation for instance.
Given that public goods give rise to groups interactions, it would seem fair to
assume that norms governing the use of public goods need to exist. Therefore social
fragmentation does not only possibly impair the provision of public goods, it may
also mold the use that is made of these goods. The hypothesis on which our analysis
is built is that if norms govern the use of public goods, violations have to be puni-
shed. This claim may help at understanding why the sharing of water sources is a
ground for conflict in India. Indeed the caste system provides many examples of the
arguments above. Undoubtedly caste shapes social identity. The ideology, tradition
and texts that support the institution make a large way for rules that should be
observed within the caste but also in interactions with other castes. They clearly
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define with whom one is to share his meal, water, street or to marry. Many of these
bans include the sharing of common resources. For instance, each neighborhood is to
be homogenous in terms of caste and has to have its own water facility. This echoes
the result obtained by Banerjee et al. (2005) that caste fragmentation has a positive
effect on the provision of water facilities. The rule governing some inter-caste rela-
tionships is the absolute avoidance of contact and is referred to as untouchability.
Our results show that these norms, as far as water sources are concerned, are still vi-
gorous and that they may be violently enforced. Indeed, it will be shown that shared
water sources do significantly increase the number of crimes against untouchables.
Thereby, the results suggest that social fragmentation may also impact the use of
public goods and that the latter may sharpen social divide.
4 Presentation of The Data
4.1 Acts of Violence
The database used has, to the best of our knowledge, not been analyzed before.
Data on crimes, both against SCs and STs as well as any crime that falls under the
Indian Penal Code ("IPC"), were collected from the National Crime Records Bureau
("NCRB") of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs at the district level for the year
2001. Data cover 31 states and union territories and spread across 581 districts3. The
total number of crimes4 include murders, rape, kidnapping and abduction, dacoity5,
robbery, arson, hurt as well as complaints under the 1955 Protection of Civil Rights
Act and under the 1989 Prevention of Atrocities Act6. Acts of violence were collected
irrespective of the perpetrators. The national average number of crimes against
untouchables is 16 per 100,000 individuals but exhibits strong variations across states
as shown in the figure 3.1 below :
3Missing data are those of the following union territories : Lakshwadeep, Chandigarh, Dadra
and Nagar Haveli, and Puducherry
4Cases registered by districts’ crimes bureaux. This number os not the number of convicted
cases. It is the number of complaints filed.
5Dacoity is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "an act of violent robbery committed
by an armed gang in India and Burma".
6The Protection of Civil Rights Act and the Prevention of Atrocities Act specifically target
discriminatory and humiliating practices, assaults, forced labor and crimes in relationship with
untouchability. However, it seems that very few resort to this legislation as it has not been very
operative for several reasons ranging from low conviction rates, court partiality and the use of SCs
or STs as instruments by crime perpetrators. To be on the safe side, the total number of alleged
crimes against SCs and STs was retained as more representative
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Fig. 3.1 – State-wise number of crimes against SCs and STs per 100,000 SCs and
STs individuals in 2001
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source NCRB, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
Variations are even larger at the district level ranging from 0 to 199 in the Angul
district of Orissa. Although 2001 and 2002 saw an increase in the number of acts
of violence committed against untouchables and Scheduled Tribes, such an increase
is not out of proportions as shown by the following figure 3.2. Indeed, number of
crimes lies 1.5 standard deviations away from the mean over the 1992-2007 period.
Data at the district level were only available for the year 2001 and lack of details
for other years prevented us from using panel data.
Arguably, the variations in the number of acts of violence against SCs may come
from regions or state specificities such as proneness to violence irrespective of the
crimes’ targets. Therefore, we need to control for the total number of crimes. Given
that this variable partly includes the number of crimes against SCs and STs, it can
not be placed as an explanatory variable. An alternative would be to purge the total
number of crimes of those committed against SCs and STs. This procedure would
be very approximate given that the crime heads accounted for in the total number
of crimes may differ from those included in the number of crimes against SCs and
STs as exhibited by the table 4.32 on page 175 in appendix. Moreover, we suspect
that while a differentiation was made for instance between murder and attempt to
commit murder for the total number of crimes, such a difference may not have been
made for the number of murders of SCs and STs, both crime heads being incorpora-
ted under the label "murder". Moreover, the large other categories and the presence
of untouchables specific legislation imply that such a purge may be very approxima-
tive and leads to large inconsistencies. Thus, the only sound way to neutralize the
potential inertia in violence is to use as a dependent variable the percentage of acts
of violence that specifically target SCs and STs over the total number of crimes as
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Fig. 3.2 – Number of acts of violence against SCs 1992-2007 All India
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source NCRB, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
defined by the Indian Penal Code. It is denoted hereafter crime7
The crime variable exhibits large variations at the district level ranging from 0
to 0.51. 99 out of the 581 observations are at zero. For positive values, the variable
exhibits an average of 0.035 and a standard deviation of 0.05. Total population as
well as the percentage of SCs and STs will be introduced as control variables.
Data on crimes against untouchables may underestimate the actual number of
acts of violence for three reasons : first, they only account for untouchables that
file a complaint which is likely to be only a fraction of the victims. Second, police
forces are often thought as being on the side of higher castes. Third, as the survey
conducted by Shah et al. (2006) has shown, untouchables are sometimes denied entry
to police offices. Therefore, our results may underestimate the actual phenomenon.
4.2 Access to Water and Other Public Goods
4.2.1 Main Variables
Data on the availability of different public goods come from the 2001 Census of
India. The Census gives details at the village and town levels about the presence
of taps, tubewells, tanks and wells. Based on this information we have calculated
the percentage of the district population that has access to water through taps,
7Nevertheless, in order to gain some confidence that the transformation is not driving the
relationship, we provide an estimation where the dependent variable is the total number of crimes
against SCs and STs and where the total number of crimes reduced by the latter is introduced as a
control variable. Table 4.28 on page 171 in appendix exhibit the results. Please bear in mind that
these are very crude estimates for the reasons mentioned above.
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tubewells, wells and tanks for 573 districts. Whenever one source was present in a
village, the village population was accounted for as having access to water through
such a source. In some instances, two or more sources were mentioned. In this case,
village population was ascribed to each source. For instance, if a village of, say 5,000
inhabitants, had water distributed through tap and well and tank, the number of
people for that village that have access to tap is 5,000, and the same number is
reported for tanks and wells. The numbers are then aggregated at the district level
and then divided by the total district’s population. Therefore the percentages of
inhabitant that access water through tap, tank, well or tubewell do not sum up to
1. The reason for such a method is to avoid ranking the types of water distribution
modes. Indeed, had we taken the best of the three modes, we would have made a
judgement call that may not be relevant and increased the correlations among the
water distribution modes.
A note of caution is necessary. The Census does not provide information on
whether these sources are private or public. For instance, tanks may be of com-
mon usage or privately maintained. Given that the Census mainly focuses on public
goods, sources have been supposed to be of common usage. Such an assumption
might introduce a downward bias in our results since the influence of truly public
sources might be spread across both private and public sources.
4.2.2 Correlation between water distribution and crimes
The figure 3.5 and 3.6 below show the correlation between the crime variable
and the percentage of common and individualized sources respectively8.
8The common sources are tanks and wells. Please note that given that the two are not mutually
exclusive, this variable varies between 0 and 2, 2 meaning that within a district 100% of the villages
had both a well and a tank. The same goes for the individualized sources
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Fig. 3.3 – Correlation between crime and common water sources
Fig. 3.4 – Correlation between crime and indivudalized water sources
These two graphs show that some observations for the variable crime might be
outliers responsible for the relationship. Therefore, the 4 observations lying more
than four standard deviations away from the mean are removed from the sample.
The correlation in the reduced sample are presented below :
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Fig. 3.5 – Correlation between crime and common water sources : restricted sample
Fig. 3.6 – Correlation between crime and indivudalized water sources : restricted
sample
Please note that the model in the chapter has been estimated over the whole
sample. Nevertheless, results from the estimation over the reduced sample are pre-
sented in appendix (table 4.31 on page 174) and show that these points are not
responsible for the relationship. Furthermore, we also present in appendix estimates
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from a sub-sample where the 15 observations lying more than two standard devia-
tions are removed from the sample. We shall come back to this point later when
results are commented in section 6.
4.2.3 Heterogeneity in water access
Despite governments endeavors to improve water access, especially since it has
been set as a core target of poverty alleviation programs, heterogeneity remains.
Large disparities exist across states as well as between urban and rural regions. For
instance, in 2001, only 23% of the households had access to water through either
taps or tubewell in Kerala, while this number was 98% in Punjab.
On average 56% of a population’s district access water through tap (standard
deviation 0.31), 20% through tanks (standard deviation 0.19), 40% through tube-
well (standard deviation 0.29) and 52% through wells (standard deviations 0.31).
Although large disparities are found between districts, heterogeneity within states
is relatively low as shown by the figures 3.7 displayed on the next page. Standard
deviations associated with the four water variables are rather low at the state level
especially compared to the overall sample.
As already mentioned, for our results to hold, we need to rule out states’ specifi-
cities such as cultural violence or tensed caste relationships. In order to do so, we will
resort to state fixed effects. The trouble is that the lack of heterogeneity of the water
sources variables may weaken the water source effect. If the water source variables
were introduced as such in a fixed effect regression, we request a small variations in
the percentage of people who have access to the various sources to have an effect on
a comparatively large variation in the dependent variable, i.e. the number of crimes.
Besides, the potential multi-collinearity arising from the four water source variables
may also be an issue. Table 4.27 in appendix presents the correlations across the
four variables.
98 4. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA
CHAPTER 3. IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? UNTOUCHABILITY
AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
F
ig
.
3.
7
–
D
is
tr
ic
ts
av
er
ag
e
ac
ce
ss
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
w
it
hi
n
st
at
es
an
d
In
di
a
Ta
p
ac
ce
ss
Tu
be
w
el
la
cc
es
s
0
,4
0
0
,6
0
0
,8
0
1
,0
0
1
,2
0
0
,0
0
0
,2
0
Jammu & Kashmir
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Uttaranchal
Haryana
Delhi
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Manipur
Mizoram
Tripura
Meghalaya
Assam
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Orissa
Chhatisgarh
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Daman & Diu 
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Goa
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Andaman & Nicobar
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 s
ta
te
s
S
ta
te
s 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
0
,4
0
0
,6
0
0
,8
0
1
,0
0
1
,2
0
0
,0
0
0
,2
0
Jammu & Kashmir
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Uttaranchal
Haryana
Delhi
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Manipur
Mizoram
Tripura
Meghalaya
Assam
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Orissa
Chhatisgarh
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Daman & Diu 
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Goa
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Andaman & Nicobar
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 s
ta
te
s
S
ta
te
s 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
Ta
nk
ac
ce
ss
W
el
la
cc
es
s
0
,2
0
0
,3
0
0
,4
0
0
,5
0
0
,6
0
0
,7
0
0
,8
0
0
,0
0
0
,1
0
Jammu & Kashmir
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Uttaranchal
Haryana
Delhi
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Manipur
Mizoram
Tripura
Meghalaya
Assam
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Orissa
Chhatisgarh
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Daman & Diu 
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Goa
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Andaman & Nicobar
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 s
ta
te
s
S
ta
te
s 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 I
n
d
ia
0
,4
0
0
,6
0
0
,8
0
1
,0
0
1
,2
0
0
,0
0
0
,2
0
Jammu & Kashmir
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Uttaranchal
Haryana
Delhi
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Manipur
Mizoram
Tripura
Meghalaya
Assam
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Orissa
Chhatisgarh
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Daman & Diu 
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Goa
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Andaman & Nicobar
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 s
ta
te
s
S
ta
te
s 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
 I
n
d
ia
D
is
tr
ic
ts
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
 I
n
d
ia
4. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 99
CHAPTER 3. IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? UNTOUCHABILITY
AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
4.2.4 Principal Component Analysis
To tackle both the issues of low within states heterogeneity in the water source
variables and of potential multi-collinearity, a principal component analysis ("PCA")
of the water sources variables is performed. Moreover, reducing the four variables to
a single indicator measuring the degree of individualization of the source will prove
useful. Because PCA maximizes the variance of the original variable space, such a
procedure is expected to reintroduce heterogeneity within the variables. The first
component derived from the PCA has an Eigenvalue of 1.66 and accounts for 41% of
the variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy takes on values
between 0 and 1 and assesses whether the overall variables have too little in common
to warrant a PCA. Cutoff point is 0.49. Lower values would indicate that PCA is not
appropriate. This test, in our example is 0.54 which, although low, passes. We chose
to retain the first component although the second component Eigenvalue is 1.06 and
it explains 26% of the variance (the rule of thumb being to retain Eigenvalues whose
values are greater than 1). The decision to retain only the first component rests on
the scoring coefficients, whose ordering makes more sense in our example. Figure
below 3.8 presents the scoring coefficients for the two components :
Fig. 3.8 – Scoring coefficients for the two components
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The ordering of the variables according to the first component is in adequacy
with the concept of common versus individualized sources. The scoring coefficient
decreases with the individualization of the source. They are presented in table 3.1
below.
Tab. 3.1 – Scoring coefficients
Component 1 Component 2
Tap -0.5945 0.2564
Tubewell -0.1789 0.836
Tank 0.4496 0.4624
Well 0.6422 0.1465
Given the scoring coefficients, the first component may be thought of as an
inverse index of source individualization. The ordering of the sources according to
the second component makes the interpretation more difficult. As a consequence
only the first component will be retained. The variables, tap, tubewell, tank and
well are then standardized and scoring coefficients are applied according to create
the variable water according to the following formula :
water = −0.5945× tap standardized
−0.1789× tubewell standardized
+0.4496× tank standardized
+0.6422× well standardized
As mentioned, given that the weight attributed to the variables, the water va-
riable may be thought of as an index of the collectiveness of the variable. The mini-
mum attained by the water variable is -2.74 and occurs when 100% of the population
access water through tap and tubewell. Maximum is 3.4 and occurs when 96% of
the population access water through wells, 77% through tanks and 5% through taps
and tubewells. The variables approximates 0 when access is equally spread between
taps, tubewells and tanks, wells.
4.2.5 Other Public Goods
In order to clearly mark the specific role of water access on crimes against un-
touchables, other measures of access to public goods will be included as control
variables such as the percentage of the district population that live in villages that
are electrified or connected by paved roads as well as the number of schools per dis-
trict inhabitant. On average, 88% of the district population live in electrified areas
(standard deviation 0.18), 75% in villages or towns connected by road (standard
deviation 0.20). On average a district has 9 primary and 3 middle schools per 100
inhabitants (standard deviation are 0.06 and 0.02 respectively).
4.3 Polarization
In order to control for potential antagonisms between castes, a polarization index
has been calculated following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) as :
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P =
∑
i
pi1+αi pij
where pii is the population’s share of the ith group or caste among N . α is a parame-
ter that may be considered as polarization’s sensitivity. It measures the sensitivity
to a shift from a low polarized society to highly polarized one. For α = 0, the polari-
zation index comes down to the standard fractionalization index that measures the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the same group. The
fractionalization index increases with the number of groups and is maximized at the
uniform population distribution over these groups. Yet, this situation is not the one
where the greatest level of antagonisms will be found. A situation where two large
groups face each other is rather more conducive to potential conflicts. Polarization
indices account for a such a situation and departs from the standard fractionalization
index by increasing the weights on population frequencies through the parameter α.
α is to lie in the [0 ;1.6] interval to ensure polarization is maximized when population
is concentrated on two equally sized groups. The larger α, the larger the increase
in the polarization measure when shifting from a low polarized society to a highly
polarized one.
Caste polarization index has been calculated with i={SCs, STs, Others}. We
must admit this is quite a rough measure as Indian society is much more fragmented
along the lines of caste than merely split into three groups. Besides, intergroup social
distance between SCs and STs may be smaller than between SCs and the rest of
the population. However, this indicator has the virtue of accounting for the relative
size of each group and to capture a potential non linear relationship between crimes
against SCs and STs and their relative weights within the population. Summary
statistics for the polarization measures are given in the table below :
Tab. 3.2 – Polarization summary statistics
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Polarization α = 0 0.356 0.13 0.018 0.632
Polarization α = 1.6 0.118 0.028 0.009 0.163
A similar index of religious polarization is included to account for the fact that
caste based antagonisms may vary depending on the relative size of the different
faiths, although castes transcend religions. The index of religious polarization has
been calculated for α = 0 and α = 1.6.
5 Estimation Strategy
5.1 Base Specification
Given that observations are left censored at 0 and that 17% of the observations
are at 0, a Tobit model has been used with left censoring at 0.
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Let y∗i be the latent variable associated with crimei, where crimei is the number
of crimes targeting SCs and STs over the total number of crimes in district i, so that
crimei =
{
0 if y∗i ≤ 0
y∗i if y
∗
i > 0
y∗i is assumed to have a normal, homoscedastic distribution with zero conditional
mean. Let’s note Xik the vector of explanatory variables, i standing for the district
and k serves at identifying the explanatory variable. The intercept has been absorbed
into Xik for notational simplicity. The following equation may be written
y∗i = βkXik + εi
εi/Xik ∼ N(0, σ2)
(3.1)
Since ε/σ is assumed to be normally distributed and independent from Xk it could
be written :
P (crimei = 0|Xik) = 1− Φ(Xikβk
σ
) (3.2)
where Φ is the standard normal density function.
Let’s note
di =
{
0 if crimei = 0
1 if crimei > 0
Hence the likelihood function for each observation i out of a total of N :
L =
N∏
i=1
[
1
σ
φ
(crimei −Xikβk)
σ
]di [1− Φ(Xikβk
σ
)](1−di) (3.3)
where φ is the standard normal cumulative function. The log-likelihood function for
each observation i
ln(L) = `i(β, σ) =
N∑
i=1
{di(−lnσ+ lnφ(crimei −Xikβk
σ
))+(1−di)ln(1−Φ(Xikβk
σ
))}
The vector of explanatory variables Xik encompasses, in addition to the intercept
the following variables for district i :
Wateri is the component obtained from the PCA as described in section 4.2.4
ln(population)i is the log of the district’s population
rurali is the percentage of the districts’ population that is rural
literacyi is the literacy rate
castecompositioni is a measure of the social composition by caste. In a first step,
this measure will be the percentage of SCs and STs in the population together
with their quadratic form. In a second step, it will be represented by polari-
zation indices for α = 0 (i.e. fractionalization) and α = 1.6 (i.e. the highest
possible level of polarization)
religiouscompositioni is the religious polarization index for α = 0 and α = 1.6
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Equation 3.1 may then be written in full as
y∗i =β0 + β1wateri + β2ln(population)i + β3rurali + β4literacyi
+ β5castecompositioni + β6religiouscompositioni + εi
εi ∼ N(0, σ2)
(3.4)
Naturally, water is the variable of interest and the lower the index, the more dis-
tricts inhabitants access water from an individualized source. The higher the index,
the more common is the access to water. β1 is therefore anticipated positive given
our main assumption : the more common the water source the higher the number
of acts of violence against untouchables.
Other control variables mainly come from the 2001 Census of India. As far as
the role of caste composition is concerned, we expect an inverse U shape relation-
ship between the percentage of untouchables and the crime variable in the spirit of
polarization. Indeed, literature on polarization Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002),
Esteban and Ray (1994) show that highest probability of conflicts occurs when two
equally sized group face each other. With respect to the caste polarization index
measure, a positive relationship is expected for a high α while fractionalization is
anticipated to be hardly relevant. Indeed, as already discussed, fractionalization is
maximized by an equal distribution of the population on a large number of groups, a
situation which may not necessarily lead to violence 9. The role of religious composi-
tion is far from obvious. Although caste mainly stems from Hinduism, the institution
does transcend religions and are found among Muslims, Christians and, although in
a much attenuated way, even in religions that originally rejected the system such as
Sikhism or Jainism. Therefore the expected sign is not clear. Nevertheless, inter faith
violence is unfortunately not a rare phenomenon in India and may be exacerbated
in a polarized context. Religious violence may replace caste based violence in highly
religiously polarized environments. This hypothesis would lead us to anticipate a
negative effect of religious polarization on caste based violence.
5.2 Potential Endogeneity Issues
5.2.1 Omitted Variables
It is a well known fact that some states in India, such as Rajasthan, Bihar or
Uttar Pradesh for instance, are more prone to caste based violence than others. A
variety of reason may be invoked such as economic backwardness, local traditions
or political representations. For instance, in areas of the state of Bihar, the Ranvir
Sena private militia largely run by upper castes landlords is known for its exactions
against untouchables. The role of traditions is particularly strong in Rajasthan. All
these reasons are potentially correlated with public goods provision such as water
distribution. This raises the issue of omitted variables. As far as economic back-
wardness is concerned, the states 2001 GDPs are introduced as control variables.
We had to resort to state indicators, since district level GDPs are notoriously un-
reliable or nowhere to be found. We also introduce an human development index
9For an excellent review of why fractionalization is irrelevant to the analysis of conflict, please
refer to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
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as of 1991, which more broadly accounts for economic development at the state’s
level. Unfortunately, we were not able to control for political representation at the
states parliaments. To be on the safe side, state fixed effects are introduced, which,
arguably, would capture all the states specificities.
5.2.2 Reverse Causality
The provision of safe water has been given priority in the Constitution of In-
dia, with article 47 conferring the duty of providing clean drinking water. What
the Census refers to as safe drinking water is water distributed through either taps
or tubewells/handpumps. Many programs have been designed and implemented to
improve water access. We would be faced with reverse causality if these programs
were to take into account the untouchables situation in one way or another. Either
programs specifically target regions where untouchables are particularly at a disad-
vantage or they neglect zones where most caste based conflicts are found. Given
that water improvement programs are often part of poverty alleviation programs,
the first scenario is the most likely. The 2001 National Human Development Report
published by the Indian Planning Commission specifically addresses the SCs and
STs access to safe drinking water and compare them to the rest of the population,
thereby showing government’s concerns for these groups. If water improvement pro-
grams are to take into account SCs and STs situations, this would be in the sense
of favoring them rather than avoiding regions where they are the most at a disad-
vantage. Thus, if a reverse causality exists it is most likely to be unfavorable to our
results and induce a downward bias.
It could be argued that the Indian government policies and programs have put
an increasing emphasis on community participation and that such an emphasis may
prompt reverse causality. Steps were initiated in 1999 to institutionalize community
participation in the implementation of rural drinking water supply schemes10. Ins-
titutional mechanisms have been put in place at the national, state, district, block
and panchayat levels to monitor water access improvement programs. It could be
thought that highly violent environments are less likely to show the local coopera-
tion necessary to implement such programs. In this case, the reverse causality would
favor our results and introduce an upward bias. We have two main reasons to be-
lieve that this is not the case. First, the communities empowerment programs only
started a year before data were collected. This probably isn’t sufficient to change
the patterns of water distribution modes to an extent that would greatly affect our
results. Second, communities are not the sole actors. Authorities at the district and
state levels also have a word to say and as mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that this
word will be in disfavor of violent areas.
10Source : Water aid (NGO) report published by the National Urban Water Awards sponsored
by the Government of India
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6 Results
6.1 Base Specification
We wish to examine whether water access does impact the number of crimes
against untouchables. Table 3.3 presents the results. As expected the index of wa-
ter commonality is positive and significant. Shared water sources are significantly
associated with a larger proportion of violent acts against untouchables. This effect
holds for the various specifications presented.
In specification (1) only the percentage of SCs and STs in the district popu-
lation are entered together with an index of religious fractionalization. While the
percentage of SCs significantly increases the likelihood of caste based violence, the
percentage of STs is not significant. This may be due to a potential non linear rela-
tionship between the percentage of untouchables and the number of acts of violence
as the literature about conflicts and polarization suggest. Indeed, when the qua-
dratic term for the percentage of STs is introduced in specification (3), a U-shaped
relationship is found. STs are in majority in North Eastern States such as Mizoram,
Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh or in the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands. Tribes represent 52% of the population in these states against
8% for all India. When these states are removed from the sample, both the simple
and quadratic form of the percentage of STs lose their significance 11. Indeed, in
states were they are not so numerous, tribes tend to live in isolated villages and
do not mingle much with the rest of the population. This would explain why, when
tribal states are removed from the sample, the percentage of STs is found to be
irrelevant.
On the other hand, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the per-
centage of SCs and the number of acts of violence against them. SCs are more
spread across the country. They represent on average 15% of the district’s popu-
lation ranging from 0 to 50%, although they account for more than 40% in only
29 of the 581 districts sampled. This inverted U-shaped relationship confirms the
results found in the literature that studies the impact of polarization on conflict.
The highest probability of conflict occurs when two equally sized groups face each
other. Thus a caste polarization index is introduced in lieu of the percentages of
SCs and STs in specifications (4) and (5). Not surprisingly the polarization index
for α = 0 (i.e. the fractionalization index) is not found significant while it is and
positive for α = 1.6, which makes sense given that polarization indices are best sui-
ted than the fractionalization index to capture potential antagonisms. The religious
polarization index was introduced for the two values of α (specification (1) versus
(2) and next) and both the religious fractionalization and polarization indices are
found significant. Given the previous discussion on the impact of polarization versus
fractionalization, we chose to retain the religious polarization index for α = 1.6 in
subsequent estimations. The negative sign associated with the religious polarization
index is difficult to interpret. One explanation could be brought forward, although it
is a mere assumption. In religiously polarized contexts, religion based conflicts may
11Results from this estimation are presented in table 4.30 in appendix
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Tab. 3.3 – Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crimes
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water 0.00745*** 0.00713*** 0.00742*** 0.00567*** 0.00605***
(0.000381) (0.000699) (0.000428) (0.00588) (0.00329)
ln(population) -0.00195 -0.000712 -0.000920 0.00154 0.000761
(0.530) (0.819) (0.770) (0.534) (0.762)
% dist. pop. rural -0.0212 -0.0220 -0.0165 -0.0120 -0.0163
(0.177) (0.161) (0.289) (0.446) (0.304)
literacy rate -0.0584*** -0.0630*** -0.0610*** -0.0680*** -0.0624***
(0.00674) (0.00362) (0.00458) (0.00189) (0.00440)
% dist. pop SC 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.445***
(3.27e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.96e-05)
% dist. pop SC2 -0.858***
(0.00173)
% dist. pop ST 0.0212 0.0209 -0.0735**
(0.127) (0.133) (0.0209)
% dist. pop ST2 0.144***
(0.000110)
Religious polarization α = 0 -0.0523***
(0.000326)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.224*** -0.194*** -0.258*** -0.252***
(6.69e-05) (0.000638) (5.95e-06) (8.50e-06)
Caste polarization α = 0 0.00290
(0.873)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.175**
(0.0374)
Observations 573 573 573 573 573
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
overtake caste based conflicts and thus would reduce the number of acts of violence
against untouchables. Nevertheless, the positive impact of the water index is robust
to the introduction of the polarization indices, meaning that even when the various
potentially confrontational contexts are accounted for, water communality remains
associated with caste based violence.
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, 15 observations lie more than two standard de-
viations away from the mean and 4 more than four standard deviations away. Table
4.31 on page 174 in appendix presents the results when the model is estimated over
the restricted samples. Please note that the significance of the coefficients associa-
ted with the water component is not altered while their sizes are somewhat reduced.
Thus, these observations may not be viewed as responsible for the relationship, al-
though they inflate the sizes of the coefficients. This will be taken into account when
the implications of the sizes of the coefficients will be discussed in the following sec-
tion 12.
12Moreover, as it can be seen from table 4.28 on page 4.28 in appendix the transformation of
6. RESULTS 107
CHAPTER 3. IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? UNTOUCHABILITY
AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Please recall that the water commonality index, which is the variable of inter-
est was obtained through PCA in order both to reintroduce heterogeneity in the
data and to reduce potential multi-collinearity. Yet, in order to dispel doubts about
the genuineness of the procedure, estimations with the four variables included in the
PCA are presented in table 4.29 in appendix. Results show that access through tanks
and wells significantly increase the number of acts of violence against untouchables,
while access through tubewells significantly decrease this number. Tap access howe-
ver is not significant. The table shows that increasing by 1 unit the percentage of
people that can access water by tubewell may reduce by 3% the percentage of acts
of violence targeting SCs and STs.
6.2 Magnitude of the effects
The highest value for the water variable is found in the Nayagarh district of
Orissa (3.409084). In this district the most common form of water distribution is
through common sources. Tap water is available to 5% of the district’s population,
water through tubewell to 5%, while wells and tanks are available to 96% and 77%
of the population respectively. The proportion of crime targeting SCs and STs is 83
every 1,000 crimes.
Specification (5) of the model estimated in table 3.3 predicts that the probability
for this district to have a strictly positive number of crimes related to SCs and STs
is 80.5% given the value of the component and all other factors held constant. The
expected proportion of crimes targeting SCs and STs in this district, assuming the
crime rate to be strictly positive, given the value of the component and ceteris pa-
ribus is 61 per thousand crimes. Hence, the expected number of crimes against SCs
and STs is 50 every thousand crimes in this district.
Suppose that in this district the percentage of the population accessing water
through tap increases by one standard deviation. This would imply that 36.5% of
the district’s population has access to tap water instead of the previous 5% . This
induces a change in the component from the maximum of 3.41 to 2.81, which in
turn modifies the expected proportion of crimes targeting SCs and STs from 50 to
47 per thousand crime. Please bear in mind that the average proportion in the whole
sample is 29%. In broad terms, an increase of 30% in tap access induces a decrease
of 10% in the proportion of crimes against SCs and STs.
Following the same procedure, the expected proportion of crimes against SCs
and STs in the Chennai district of Tamil Nadu, where the water component takes
its minimal value of -2.74513 is 24%. Thus the difference in expected proportions
between the two extreme values taken by the component is 23%when the actual
difference is 82%. Table 3.4 summarizes the analysis.
the dependent variable does not seem to be responsible for the relationship. Yet, given all that has
been said about the difficulty in reconciling the two numbers for crimes, these results should be
taken with circumspection.
13100% of the population has access to tap water and tubewell and there is no well or tank
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The effect of the type of water distribution is rather modest. Yet, we need to keep
in mind that the number of crimes committed against SCs and STs were collected
irrespective of the offenders’ castes. They may therefore include crimes committed
against SCs by SCs, in which case, the estimated effect of the type of water distri-
bution may be underestimated.
Tab. 3.4 – Effects of Changes in the Value of the Component on the percentage of
crimes
Pr(crimei > 0) ×E(crimei|crimei > 0) = E(y∗i |crimei > 0) Actual
value
Value of for
component crime
Maximum 3.409 80.5% 61.4% 49.5% 83.3%
1 sd incr. 2.815 78.5% 59.3% 46.6%
in tap
Minimum -2.745 55.2% 43.3% 23.9% 1.0%
6.3 Relevant Crimes
So far the relationship between the water distribution mode and the percentage
of crimes targeting SCs and STs, was estimated irrespective of the crime heads. Yet,
it is likely that some crimes are not related to untouchability practices, such as,
for instance, robbery. In order to identify which type of crimes are likely to be re-
lated to untouchability, specification (5) of table 3.3 is estimated for each crime head.
The difficulty of purging the total number of crimes of those related to SCs
and STs has already been mentioned. Yet, given that in this section we proceed by
crime heads, such a reconciliation may be easier although one caveat is necessary.
We may suspect that classification was not made on the same basis for SCs and
STs and for the whole population. For instance, in the latter case three crime heads
pertain to murder : attempt to commit murder, culpable homicide not amounting
to murder, and plain murder. Yet, as far as SCs and STs are concerned, there is
only the "murder" crime head. So either, attempt to murder an SC or an ST was
classified under the murder head or in the other category. Moreover it is not unlikely
that some crimes are registered as for instance hurt when it is not related to an SC
or an ST and under the Prevention of Atrocities Act when it pertains to a mem-
ber of the weaker segments of society. Thus in the absence of further details about
the classification of crimes, the results presented below should be taken with caution.
Two types of estimations are presented. First, similar to what has been done for
the total number of crimes, the dependent variable is a ratio of, for instance, the
total number of rapes of SCs and STs over the total number of rapes committed as
a whole. In a second step, the total number of, for instance, rapes of SCs and STs
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is introduced as the explained variable, while the number of rapes of non scheduled
individuals is introduced as a independent variable14. For untouchables specific le-
gislation, such as the Prevention of Atrocities Act ("PAA") and the Protection of
Civil Rights ("PCRA"), the control variable is the total number of crimes, based on
the assumption that the latter does not include the formers. These two procedures
should provide some comfort about the innocuousness of the transformation of the
dependent variable.
Results from the two estimations are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
The type of water distribution is shown to significantly impact the following types
of crimes against SCs and STs : rape, arson, hurt and all the crimes that fall under
the Protection of Civil Rights Act. Oddly enough, the latter is negatively influenced
by the "commonality" of the water source, although the significance level of the
coefficient associated with the Water variable is close to the 10% threshold.
14The latter is calculated by subtracting from the total number of cases per crime head, the
number that is related to untouchables victims.
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6.4 State Specificities
As already mentioned other factors may influence the level of public goods supply
such as economic or human development, politics or tradition. Since these factors
may be correlated with caste based violence, we need to control for these possibilities.
Table 3.7 below presents the results when the state GDP is entered (specification
(1), (3) and (4)), when the Human Development Index (hereafter "HDI") is entered
(specification (2), (3) and (4)) and state fixed effects (specification (5)). Again, the
water communality index is positive and significant across all specifications. Both
the log of the state’s GDP and the HDI are significant, although this mainly stems
from the state of Uttar Pradesh, whose GDP is the second largest of all states’15 and
that is the most populated state, but also one where caste relationships are tensed to
put it mildly. When Uttar Pradesh ("UP") is removed from the sample (specification
(4)), both GDP and HDI lose significance. The particularity of this state supports
the necessity to account for state specificities. This is what specification (5) does
by introducing states fixed effects in the equation. Interestingly, caste polarization
loses its significance when states variables are introduced. This probably stems from
the fact that the index does not sufficiently vary within states. Indeed within states
average standard deviation of the index is 0.019 compared to an average of 0.12.
Even when state specificities are taken into account, the more common the water
source, the higher the number of acts of violence against untouchables.
6.5 Other Public Investments
There are three reasons to introduce public investments in other types of in-
frastructure in the equation. First, it will underline the unique position enjoyed by
water supply. As exposed earlier, public investments in water supply plays a specific
role in crimes against untouchables, due to the Indian sociocultural context. Second,
although we have done our best to control for all the usual variables that influence
public goods provision such as polarization, wealth or state specificities, introducing
other types of public goods may help at controlling for potentially omitted factors.
Third, other public investments such as education for instance may be thought of
as having an incidence on crimes against untouchables. Table 3.8 below presents the
results when other kind of public investments are introduced without and with state
fixed effects (specifications (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) respectively).
The first and fifth specifications introduce the percentage of villages that are
electrified in a district. This does not change the sign of coefficients associated with
the variable of interest although it becomes significant only at the 10% level when
state fixed effects are introduced. The coefficient for electricity is barely significant
without fixed effects and loses its significance with fixed effects.
When the percentage of villages accessible by road is introduced, coefficients
associated with the water variable remain significant, although only at the 10%
threshold with fixed effects. The road variable is significant and negative once states
fixed effects are introduced. Presumably, what this variable captures is the district’s
15In 1999 Uttar Pradesh had the second largest GDP behind Maharashtra according to the
Indian Ministry of Statistics
6. RESULTS 113
CHAPTER 3. IS BLOOD THICKER THAN WATER? UNTOUCHABILITY
AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Tab. 3.7 – Water Access Effect - State Controls and Fixed Effects
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water 0.00626*** 0.00809*** 0.00805*** 0.00874*** 0.00590**
(0.00228) (0.000591) (0.000613) (0.000347) (0.0486)
ln(population) -0.00984** -0.000988 -0.0116*** -0.00733* -0.00328
(0.0103) (0.710) (0.00498) (0.0917) (0.390)
% dist. pop. rural -0.0198 -0.0274 -0.0293* -0.0356** -0.000232
(0.211) (0.104) (0.0821) (0.0408) (0.990)
literacy rate -0.0649*** -0.0369 -0.0401 -0.0241 -0.0237
(0.00293) (0.207) (0.169) (0.431) (0.382)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.250*** -0.206*** -0.203*** -0.312*** -0.0892
(9.05e-06) (0.000924) (0.00106) (2.52e-06) (0.166)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.113 0.172* 0.0976 0.163* 0.124
(0.187) (0.0585) (0.295) (0.0929) (0.204)
ln (state GDP) 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.00311
(0.000589) (0.00151) (0.377)
Human Development Index -0.0895** -0.0864* -0.000626
(0.0489) (0.0567) (0.990)
Observations 571 527 525 455 573
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
Sample All All All UP removed All
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
level of isolation and backwardness. Therefore, even controlling for this aspect of the
district, results concerning water still hold. Please note that the diminished coeffi-
cient may stem from a significant correlation of -0.43 between the water index and
the percentage of villages accessible by road.
As mentioned, education could be thought of as having a negative impact on
caste based violence. Presumptive evidence is found with the negative and signi-
ficant coefficient associated with the population’s literacy rate in previous tables.
Indeed, the numbers of primary and middle schools per inhabitant have a negative
significant effect on caste based violence, although the effect looses its significance
for middle school once fixed effect are introduced. This may be due to the fact that
middle schools are less local. They recruit within a larger radius, which dampens the
variable’s variance within states. Nevertheless, a reassuring result is that infrastruc-
ture in primary education are also effective at reducing violence against SCs and STs.
Yet, the results associated with the index of water communality are robust to all
these inclusions, thereby stressing the fact that water distribution plays a role of its
own, even when other public investments are also effective at reducing the number
of acts of violence against SCs and STs and when state specificities are accounted for.
We have seen that the number of crimes against untouchables is affected by the
water distribution mode. This result is robust to various specifications including
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Tab. 3.8 – Water Access Effect - Including other Infrastructures
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Water 0.00738*** 0.00685*** 0.00482** 0.00598***
(0.000776) (0.00138) (0.0275) (0.00572)
% villages electrified 0.0299*
(0.0837)
% villages connect. by road 0.0210 -0.00597 0.0115
(0.169) (0.723) (0.463)
Nbr primary school / inhab. -0.239***
(0.000442)
Nbr middle school / inhab. -0.356**
(0.0214)
Observations 573 573 573 573
Fixed Effects No No No No
Percentage of Crime
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Water 0.00548* 0.00530* 0.00527* 0.00499*
(0.0675) (0.0765) (0.0773) (0.0955)
% villages electrified -0.0360
(0.112)
% villages connect. by road -0.0458** -0.0621*** -0.0502**
(0.0304) (0.00497) (0.0185)
Nbr primary school / inhab. -0.178**
(0.0153)
Nbr middle school / inhab. -0.342
(0.108)
Observations 573 573 573 573
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
All specifications include ln(population), % rural, literacy, caste and religious polarizations
state specificities and other public investments. Therefore, a nice unexpected side
effect of the water improvement programs is the reduction in the number of possible
bones of contention across castes. A note of caution is necessary. We do not claim
that generalizing access to tap water will eradicate caste based violence. This would
be presumptuous and absurd. What is claimed is that the government’s efforts to
provide safe drinking water (i.e. through taps or tubewells) with the intent of impro-
ving public health, have the nice side effect of weakening the role of excuse played
by water for caste based violence. No doubt that caste confrontations will occur
on other grounds. Yet given the salience of water in caste prohibitions, eliminating
such a bone of contention is of great interest. This recommendation may appear
shortsighted and pointless if caste is not to be fought at its base. We fully concur
with this view, yet it would provide some temporary relief to oppressed caste be-
sides improving public sanitation. What are results suggest is a side effect of public
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investments rather than its essential purpose.
6.6 Violence Inertia
The question we now wish to address is : "does the effect of water supply vary
according to different levels of violence ?". It may very well be the case that the same
source of social tensions, water for instance, has a larger impact in an already violent
environment. In order to provide some elements, a simultaneous quantile regression
has been carried out. This methodology considers the error correlation between dif-
ferent quantiles thanks to the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix. It enables
comparison between coefficients in different quantiles (Koenker and Hallock (2001)).
The percentage of crimes is split into four quantiles. Results are presented in table
3.9.
Tab. 3.9 – Quantile Regressions
Percentage of crimes
(1) (2) (3)
q25 q50 q75
Water 0.00110 0.00378*** 0.00671***
(0.146) (0.000555) (7.55e-05)
ln (population) 0.00135*** 0.00117 -0.000428
(0.00157) (0.223) (0.818)
% dist. pop rural -0.00287 -0.00579 -0.00781
(0.301) (0.178) (0.406)
literacy rate -0.0153** -0.0479*** -0.109***
(0.0192) (2.97e-05) (3.45e-10)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.0733*** -0.0918*** -0.112**
(3.09e-06) (0.000809) (0.0363)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.0558*** 0.110*** 0.169**
(0.00211) (0.00257) (0.0269)
Observations 573 573 573
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
These results clearly evidence that water is only an excuse for caste based
confrontations. Indeed, where violence is low, the water distribution mode has no
impact. Yet, in already violent environments, the impact of water increases together
with the level of violence. Conclusions that may be drawn from this analysis are
twofold. First, water really is an excuse for already existing caste based violence and
as mentioned earlier, investments in public infrastructure would not eradicate the
problem, but rather provide some temporary relief. Second, if a choice has to be
made about which zones should be given priority in terms of water access improve-
ments, such a decision would benefit from taking caste based violence as one of the
criteria.
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7 Conclusions
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that violence targeting untouchables is
significantly linked to the water distribution mode. These results induce many conse-
quences. First, they show that untouchability practices are still common in India.
In compliance with caste prescriptions, untouchables are denied access to common
water sources and in accordance with stories of caste based violence recounted in
newspapers, this prohibition is violently enforced. One could think that this study
is India specific. Yet, this Indian example encourages us to question the role of so-
cial norms on public goods usage. So far, the literature has attempted to show the
negative impact of social fragmentation on the provision of public goods, through
diminished collective action. Yet, the collective action problem may arguably be
solved by the creation of intergroup norms, such as the exclusion of a group in our
case. In which case, there is not much ground to think that social fragmentation
impacts public goods provision. Rather, publicly provided goods and their attached
social norms may sharpen social antagonisms and divides.
Another point evoked by the study is the need for policy makers to look into the
usage that is made of public goods. Most development programs focus on the level
of public goods and do not attach the necessary importance to what use is made of
the goods.We shall come back to this point in the next chapter.
Lastly, improving water access does reduce the number of crimes against untou-
chables. Although water improvement programs are mainly designed out of public
health concerns, recognizing that it has a side effect on caste based violence add an
argument for increased efforts in this domain. As already mentioned, it is not clai-
med that water improvement programs will uproot caste violence and there is little
doubt that confrontations between caste will occur on other grounds. Excuses for
caste based violence do not lack. Yet, given the salience of water in caste traditions,
improving water access may provide temporary relief to oppressed castes on top of
improving sanitation.
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1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that caste composition has an impact on the use of
public goods such as water through the introduction of usage norms and rules that
may be violently enforced. As far as castes are concerned, such a norm is segregation
of the public space and public goods appear closer to club goods. If castes do not
share public goods, social fragmentation along the lines of castes would most proba-
bly have an impact on public goods provision. Many theoretical as well as empirical
works brought to light a negative effect of social fragmentation on public goods
provision through hampered collective action. Such a negative impact goes mainly
through three channels. First, heterogenous societies often exhibit strong differences
in preferences regarding public goods characteristics and therefore encounter diffi-
culties in voicing their claims on limited public resources. Second, individuals may
be reluctant to work with other groups’ members. The impact of group heteroge-
neity on group participation has been analyzed by Alesina and Ferrara (2000). The
third issue arises from the fact that different groups may disagree on the sharing of
the private benefits or on the allocation of their effort, due to potential free riding.
Moreover, they fail to implement cooperation enforcement devices across groups.
No matter the channel, this literature rests upon the idea that social fragmen-
tation induces social tensions and such an assumption may be criticized with two
arguments : first, social fragmentation is most of the time assessed though the now
common fractionalization index that does not properly account for potential social
antagonisms. Second, the relationship between social fragmentation and antagonisms
is far from being established. By assuming that the former necessarily leads to the
latter, authors have neglected the arising of social norms ruling intergroup rela-
tionships. Such rules may weaken potential antagonisms, even in very heterogenous
societies. For instance, if the rule is that each group is to promote access to public
goods for its members and refrain from using other groups resources, a norm that
will be called "patronage" in this chapter, social fragmentation may have a positive
effect on public provision of common goods. This point has been made by Alesina
and Ferrara (2005). As they rightly point out "while pure public goods may be lower
in more fragmented communities, the amount of publicly provided "private" goods -
especially those that can be targeted to specific groups - may be larger. We can then
have a positive correlation between fragmentation and ethnically based patronage".
This precisely is the hypothesis that will be tested in this chapter. Many reasons
lead us to believe that caste patronage with respect to public goods is taking place
in India. Relationships between castes are based on avoidance, while caste is suppo-
sed to provide its members with some support, or at least cohesion. As mentioned
in introduction to this dissertation, some sociologists such as Baechler (1988) be-
lieved that the need to solve collective action problem was the raison d’être of castes.
The aim of this chapter is to test the impact of caste fragmentation on public
goods provision. It will be shown in a first step that if fractionalization is to play a
role it is likely to be a positive one. Second, I will try to establish that this impact
is not linked to potential antagonisms, as the impact of polarization indices is not
found significant. Lastly, the occurrence of patronage activities will be looked into
by showing that a households caste does influence public goods access, depending
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on the dominant caste in the village. This study is based on data collected by the
World Bank in the Living Standard and Measurement Survey conducted in 1997
and 1998 in the Northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
2 Related Literature
To date, theories have established that social heterogeneity hampers collective
action through preferences heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 1999), reluctance to work
with members of other groups (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000), or a disagreement on
the sharing of the private benefits or on the allocation of efforts (Banerjee et al.,
2005), due to potential free riding as well as a lack of cooperation enforcement de-
sign. Banerjee et al. (2008) provided a comprehensive summary of these theories
and introduced the effect of specific contexts such as an unequal power distribution
across groups, the presence of influential groups or the degree of group cohesion
while concluding that groups characteristics only account for a small share of the
variations in public goods provision. These authors underline the difficulty expe-
rienced by many authors, as we shall see later, in untangling the effect of social
fragmentation and that of inequality. Social fragmentation is supposed to be detri-
mental to public goods provision while inequality favors collective action according
to Bardhan et al. (2007) among others. This echoes the positive role on collective
action attributed by Olson (1965) to inequality, through the presence of wealthy
individuals.
Empirically, the impact of social fragmentation on public goods provision was
first brought to light by Alesina et al. (1999). Working on US counties, metropoli-
tan areas and cities data, the authors evidenced that the most socially fragmented
zones spend less on schools, roads, trash pickup and more on health and police.
Oddly enough, these last two goods may be thought of in the U.S. context as so-
mewhat related to income, thereby suggesting that social fragmentation may favor
the presence of public goods provided that income comes in the equation.
As Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) rightly pointed out, Alesina et al. (1999)
used data for public goods that are contemporaneous to the fractionalization data,
and given the high mobility environment of US cities, the analysis may be flawed
with reverse causality due to a sorting effect analyzed by Tiebout (1956). Accor-
ding to Tiebout’s model, individuals sort themselves to areas that provide them
with the mostly desired public goods thereby homogenizing the neighborhoods. For
instance, the poor may converge to areas that provide services valued by the poor.
Following Alesina et al. (1999) seminal work, other authors have tried to firmly
establish the link between fractionalization and collective action or public goods.
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) found a negative relationship between ethnic fractiona-
lization and school funding and infrastructure in Kenya. One caveat to their work
is that it may not be immune from Tiebout’s sorting as well, although the authors
use different specifications to address this issue. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)
have tried to tackle the issue of reverse causality by using caste fragmentation data
from the 1931 Census to explain the provision of public goods in the 1970s and the
1980s in India, which makes sense given the low level of mobility in the rural parts
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of the subcontinent. Regressing the proportion of villages in districts having access
to a particular good, they found fractionalization had a negative impact on nearly
half of the selected public goods, while it had a positive significant effect for 10% of
them. Interestingly, Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) admit that the fragmentation
measure may be a proxy for inequality and as the relatively rich can be effective
at getting the goods to their villages. In a similar analysis, Banerjee et al. (2005)
found that caste fragmentation has a significant negative impact on 10 out of 26 pu-
blic goods and a positive significant impact on 3, thus providing more mixed results
about the relationship. Moreover, Somanathan et al. (2006) found that caste hetero-
geneity had no impact on collective action regarding the preservation of a common
forest in the Indian Himalayas. The detrimental role of social fragmentation in the
provision of public goods is not definite, as evidenced by this short literature review.
It is important to note that most of the empirical work cited so far, have been
conducted on a rather aggregate level and has primarily been concerned with the
level of public goods. Micro data may bring out a different story. Four studies are
of particular interest : those of Dayton-Johnson (2000), Bardhan (2000), Khwaja
(2009) and Anderson (2007). Their results however should be handled with care due
to data scarcity. Looking at 48 irrigation systems and maintenance indicators in
Mexico, Dayton-Johnson (2000) found that social heterogeneity has both a direct
negative effect by lowering cooperative efforts and a positive indirect one by making
a group less likely to select the poorly performing allocation rule, so that its indirect
effect on cooperation is positive. Economic inequality is found to lower cooperative
effort, although its impact is U-shaped. Besides, economic inequality has an indirect
effect on cooperation via its effect on the choice of the distributive rule. Bardhan
(2000) found similar results looking at 48 irrigation systems maintenance in South
Indian villages. The social homogeneity variable is hardly found significant, while in-
equality is found to have a significant U-shaped impact although it is twofold. On the
one hand, inequality’s direct effect is negative, while, on the other hand the indirect
effect, working through the cost sharing rule, is positive. Khwaja (2009) also found a
U-shaped effect of land inequality on projects maintenance in rural communities in
Pakistan, although fragmentation’s negative coefficient remained significant. Micro
data analysis do not help at drawing a clearer picture of fragmentation’s detrimental
role to the provision of public goods, although they stress that inequality and social
fragmentation are closely linked, both having direct and indirect effects that may
contradict each other.
A comment made by Bardhan (2000) draws more particularly the attention. He
noticed during his field study that better off farmers tend to violate water allocation
rules crafted by others and respect those defined by the elite. This suggests that
the latter hold public resources in a strong grip. Similarly, Anderson (2007) showed
that high castes control access to water irrigation systems and are unwilling to sell
water to lower castes. As groups appropriate public goods, fractionalization may
have a positive impact on their provision levels. In this chapter, the relationship
between fractionalization and public goods availability will be tested and then I
will try to provide some evidence that some groups do capture access to publicly
provided goods, in the vein of the comment made by Alesina and Ferrara (2005).
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This assumption seems plausible given that caste patronage is commonly found in
other areas of Indian economic life (Platteau, 1995; Srinivas, 1955) as well as in
politics (Chandra, 2004).
3 Data and Main Variables
The analysis is based on data collected during the 1997-1998 Survey of Living
Conditions in the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The data set
covers 2,250 households spread across 120 villages. These two states are part of what
is often referred to as Indian’s poverty belt and caste relationships in this region are
known to be confrontational, to put it mildly. As an example, 29% of acts of vio-
lence against outcasts committed in 1998 in India took place in these two states
alone1. This section is dedicated to the explanation of variables employed and their
constructions.
3.1 Castes and Religions
Indian society has long been divided along two lines : caste and religion. After all
that has been said about castes relationships in previous chapters, it probably seems
straightforward that the institution of castes fosters social fragmentation. Due to po-
sitive discrimination policies, the thousands of jatis have been grouped into three
categories by the Census of India : the Scheduled Castes and Tribes that represent
16% and 8% of the population and the rest. Within the non-scheduled the National
Sample Survey identifies "other backward classes" ("OBCs") that account for 36%
of the overall population2. A similar classification has been used in the data where
castes are either upper, middle, backward agricultural ("BAC"), other backward
castes ("OBC") and Scheduled Castes ("SC"). Tribes are not represented. In the
sample used these group accounted for respectively 15%, 3%, 30%, 22% and 31%
of the Hindu population. Please note that such a classification probably underesti-
mates the actual social fragmentation as the so defined clusters encompass groups
that do not necessarily sense that they belong to the same community. For instance
an upper caste may not feel related to another upper caste.
As already mentioned, while caste is a clear-cut and well established institution
among Hindus, it is also a reality among other religious groups, although not in
the same plain way. Muslims and Christians seem to have inherited from the Hindu
ancestors’ castes. In the sample used, besides Hindus, only Muslims are represented
and they are classified in either upper castes (37% of the Muslims’ population) and
lower castes (63%).
Faith is another factor of social fragmentation. India is reputed for its baﬄing
religious diversity. Hindus represent 80.5% of the population. Muslims come as the
1Source : National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India. To be fair, these two states
are also the most populated accounting for 24% of India’s total population and 19% of the outcasts.
2The exact number of OBCs is still debated. For instance the 1979 Mandal Commission esti-
mated that this group encompassed 52% of the population
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second largest community with 138 million members (13.4%) followed by Christians
(2.3%) and Sikhs (1.9%). In the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on which this
analysis focuses, Hindus account for respectively 80.6% and 83.2% of the population,
while the rest is Muslim. In our sample 90% of the population is Hindu and 10%
Muslim. Religion is an important factor of social division and is becoming increasin-
gly so, as the riots that took place in the state of Gujarat in 2002 and its thousands
of deaths have testified. The choice made in this chapter is to treat Muslim castes as
yet another caste. Thus the religious divide is incorporated into the caste cleavage.
This choice is discussed in section 5.3 later in this chapter.
3.2 Fractionalization and Polarization
Social fractionalization has mainly been approached through the fractionalization
index calculated as follows :
Fractionalization = 1−
n∑
i=1
pi2i (4.1)
where pii is the population’s share of the ith caste, assuming the population is split
into n groups.
This index is largely influenced by the number of groups identified as it mea-
sures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the same ethnic
group. It is a measure of diversity that does poorly at reflecting potential antago-
nisms. According to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) the lack of explanatory
power of ethnic heterogeneity on the incidence of conflict can be attributed to the
inadequacy of the fractionalization index to capture social antagonisms. A richer fra-
mework would be the one designed by Esteban and Ray (1994) where the concept of
polarization is defined as the sum of interpersonal antagonisms that can arise from :
a sense of group identification : individuals feel more closely tied to their groups
when they are relatively large. This is captured by the parameter α ∈ [0; 1.6]
As such, polarization puts the emphasis on the population’s frequency in each
group.
a sense of alienation with respect to other groups materialized by intergroup dis-
tances, noted bij.
The Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index can be written as :
PER = P (α, b) = K
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pijbij (4.2)
where pii is the population’s share of the ith group and K > 0 is used for population
normalization. If intergroup distance represents the difference in groups’ incomes
and for α = 0, the PER index is very close to an intergroup Gini coefficient. The
larger α the further away the polarization measure moves from the Gini coefficient.
The Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index was initially designed as a mea-
sure of wealth or income polarization. As Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) poin-
ted out, the indicator is difficult to implement given that it depends on the iden-
tification and the selection of economic groups which may be arbitrary and by all
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means far from obvious. For computational simplicity, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2002) have derived a special class of polarization index where bij = bi = 1. The
polarization index can therefore be written as :
PMRQ = P (α, 1) =
n∑
i=1
pi1+αi pij (4.3)
Please note that for α = 0, PMRQ = Fractionalization. The larger α, the weaker the
correlation between the fractionalization index and the polarization measure. The
correlation may even turn negative for large values of α. The parameter α may be
viewed as measuring the polarization’s sensitivity. Although the implementation of
PMRQ is much easier, this indicator totally irons out the heterogeneity in intergroup
distances and the fact that such a distance may largely depend on the distribution
of income. This last point is particularly touchy when it comes to Indian castes as
the ritual hierarchy may modulate intergroup distance and where the ascendance
enjoyed by a caste is highly dependent upon its relative wealth. For instance, the
perceived distance between outcasts and backward caste is likely to be larger than
between upper castes and middle castes. A thorough discussion of this point is left
for future research as it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
In order to test the relationship between social fractionalization and public
goods provision, PMRQ will be used as an explanatory variable for three values
of α = 0; 0.8; 1.6. Please bear in mind that the larger α, the more emphasis is put
on potential groups antagonisms. The impact of the polarization index is therefore
expected to increase with α, under the assumption that social heterogeneity under-
mines public goods provision through a sharpened opposition between the groups.
The sample is highly fractionalized. The fractionalization index ranges from 0
to 0.8 with a mean of 0.6 and a standard deviation of 0.18. As a comparison, the
index value reported by Alesina et al. (1999) in the United States ranges from 0.02
to 0.61 with a mean of 0.26 and a standard deviation of 0.14. The index based on
the 1971 Census of India reported by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) at a district
level ranges from 0.2 to nearly 1 and has a mean of 0.9. Fractionalization also seems
to be higher in village where upper castes are dominant a shown in table 4.1 :
Tab. 4.1 – Fractionalization indices in sub-samples
Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
observations Deviation
Villages dominated by upper castes 53 0.64 0.13 0.12 0.80
Villages dominated by BAC 37 0.57 0.15 0.00 0.77
Other villages 30 0.54 0.25 0.00 0.78
Whole Sample 120 0.60 0.18 0.00 0.80
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3.3 Fractionalization and Patronage
Patronage is defined here as providing benefits to members of one’s own group,
such as access to public goods at the expense of others. This is close to the concept
of parochial altruism developed in Bowles and Choi (2007). Should such a pheno-
menon occur, publicly provided goods would resemble more club goods than public
ones and untouchability practices investigated in the previous chapter as well as the
survey by Shah et al. (2006) provide some support to this hypothesis.
If publicly provided goods become "patronage" goods, all the arguments in fa-
vor of the negative role played by social fragmentation in public goods provision do
not hold. Indeed, if goods are not public anymore and their use is restrained to a
particular group, there is no need anymore for intergroup collective action. All the
elements that could undermine cooperation become inoperative. On the other hand,
cooperation within the group becomes central. There are many reasons to believe
that cooperation within a group is more easily achieved. First, potential sanctions
for non cooperative behaviors may be more effective due to repeated interactions.
Second, behavioral experiments have shown that individuals are more altruistic to-
wards in-group members and thus may be more prone to collective actions.3. Third,
social antagonisms may even reinforce cooperation within the group. For instance,
Voors et al. (n.d.) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) found from field experiments that
having experienced war does increase local collective action and shifts social prefe-
rences towards increased altruism. We may push the analysis a notch further. Let’s
suppose that social heterogeneity does indeed leads to strong groups antagonisms4.
As suggested by Bowles and Choi (2007), strong antagonisms may go hand in hand
with the preponderance of "parochial altruist" behaviors, a term coined by the au-
thors which encompasses the definition given to patronage in this chapter. Thus,
this correlation may induce a positive effect of social fragmentation on the provision
of club goods. Whether we posit that social fragmentation induces conflict or not,
arguments can be made to say that collective action within an homogenous group
is more easily achieved.
Should each group succeed in creating a collective action for the demand of a
good, the larger the number of groups, the higher the likelihood that at least one of
them obtains satisfaction. The fractionalization index being directly and positively
related to the number of groups, a positive relationship between the presence of
the goods and the index may be found. On the other hand, the polarization index
would not have any effect. In short, whenever access to publicly provided goods is
restricted, social fragmentation and public goods provision may increase together.
The relative size of the groups is also important. Alesina et al. (2000) designs
a model where public employment is viewed as a redistribution of income in favor
of some groups. The authors theoretically show that in a society composed of two
groups for such a redistribution to take place, the size of the minority must be large
enough, which in turns increases the fractionalization index. In an empirical analysis,
3Examples include Hoffman et al. (1996), Chen and Li (2009)
4this is for the sake of the argument given that, as mentioned earlier this assumption lacks
actual evidence
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the authors find a positive relationship between the fractionalization index and the
extent of public employment. Yet, their reasoning rests on vote-catching strategies
that probably are directly applicable neither to public goods, not to relatively small
villages in northern India.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no theoretical model that clearly associates
patronage and public goods provision. Thus, the above reasoning rests mainly on
intuitions about the relationship that may exist between the two. Nevertheless, the
positive empirical relationship found by Alesina et al. (2000) provides some support.
3.4 Selected Public Goods
The aim of this study is to assess the probability for a village to be connected
by road, bus, to the electric and phone networks or to have an anganwadi center
(i.e. child development centers), a public primary school or a waste disposal system
available in the village depending on village’s characteristics. Figure 4.1 below show
the distribution of these publicly provided goods in the villages considered.
Fig. 4.1 – Share of Villages Having the Following Goods
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It is worth mentioning that our strategy may be thwarted by governments auto-
nomy in implementing public goods. Indeed authorities may decide on an allocation
independently from the social composition of the villages or the districts. Given that
public goods provision is central to many development programs, authorities may
want to increase their efforts in poor regions that may also be the most fragmented
ones. For instance, the Indian state has made an important commitment to pubic
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goods provision. "In 1968, the ruling Congress Party brought out the National Po-
licy on Education, which made a commitment to universal primary education. The
Minimum Needs Program of 1974-75 set down explicit norms about access to public
goods in rural areas [...] Indira Gandhi made the removal of poverty (Garibi Hatao)
the cornerstone of her successful election campaign in 1971" (Banerjee et al., 2008).
Since these campaigns had been on for more than 20 years up to 1997-98 when the
data were collected, governments had time to make those goods available across
the country, irrespective of village characteristics. This may be especially true of
education, as the spread of educational facilities has long been a priority of many
governments. Indeed in our sample, 94 out of the 120 villages had primary public
schools. In villages without a public primary school, more than half households have
access to it within less than 1km.
3.5 Wealth Inequality
Inequality should be inserted in the analysis on two grounds. First, I need to make
sure that the impact of social fractionalization is not proxying that of inequality.
Second, a differing effect of within and between group inequality may provide some
hints that between group relationships are not as important as the ones within the
groups, which in turn may provide some support to the patronage assumption. In-
deed, if access is restricted to members of one group, cooperation between the groups
and its determinants are not relevant any more, as far as public goods provision is
concerned. Only the cooperation within the group matters. Inequality between the
groups would therefore have very little explanatory power. However, it is difficult to
anticipate the impact of within group inequality on the presence of publicly provided
goods. On the one hand, greater inequality may undermine collective action within
the group by increasing its heterogeneity. On the other hand, relatively wealthy in-
dividuals may act as patrons and promote collective action in exchange for social
prestige, as underlined by Olson (1965). In this last case, inequality would favor the
emergence of patrons.
Wealth concentration is quite significant in our sample. On average, the largest
landowner owns 31% of the village’s lands, ranging from 14% to 92%. In villages
where land is most equally distributed land value ranges between 0.4 and 0.9 mil-
lion rupees, while in villages exhibiting the most unequal distribution, it varies from
5,800 rupees to 14 million rupees. The individual Gini coefficient ranges from 0.3
to 0.9 with a mean of 0.54 and a standard deviation of 0.11. Please note that the
largest land owners are the upper castes in 45% villages of the sample, backward
agricultural castes in 31%, Muslims in 13%, other backward castes ("OBC") in 8%,
Scheduled Castes and Tribes in 38%.
Wealth inequality is measured by a Theil index which can be advantageously
broken down into between and within group inequality. The Theil index has been
computed following Deshpande (2000b) and Darity and Deshpande (2000). Suppose
that individuals are arranged into n mutually exclusive groups, g1, ..., gn, each with
mj individuals. Define yj and pij as group’s j average wealth based on land value
and population’s share respectively and y as the population’s average wealth. Let’s
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write Rj =
yj
y
. Then between group inequality can be written as :
bgi =
n∑
j=1
pijRj logRj (4.4)
and within group inequality as :
wgi =
n∑
j=1
pijRjTj (4.5)
with for every individual i belonging to group gj i.e. i ∈ gj
Tj ≡ 1
mj
∑
i∈gj
ri log ri (4.6)
where ri is the ratio of individual wealth to mean wealth for group j. Overall
inequality can then be written
Theil = bgi+ wgi (4.7)
This decomposition of the overall inequality into between and within group in-
equality will prove useful as it allows to identify which sort prevails. In the event of
patronage, within group inequality is expected predominate.
4 Empirical Strategy
The analysis comes in three steps. First, the impact of the fractionalization and
polarization indices on the presence of public goods within the 120 villages will be
tested. A probit model is used and will be detailed in the next paragraph. Second, I
will check that the relationship does not arise from (i) the dominant caste, (ii) the
state in which the village is located, (iii) a proxy for the impact of inequality. This
analysis will be referred to as the fractionalization/polarization models. Lastly, in
order to investigate the possibility of caste based patronage, a probit model will be
used to assess whether a household’s likelihood to access a publicly provided good
is influenced by the household’s membership to the dominant caste, provided the
good is available in the village. This model is labeled patronage model.
4.1 Fractionalization / Polarization Model Specification
The model is a probit that assesses the probability for the village i to have the
good j available as :
P (Yij = 1) = F (αPi + βpii + γσi) (4.8)
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, Pi the polarization
index PMRQ defined in section 3.2 for three levels of α = [0; 0.8; 1.6]. Please recall
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PMRQ is the fractionalization index for α = 0. pii is a set of village population
characteristics such as average income, the number and average size of households
and the percentage of households whose head is illiterate and whose primary source
of living is their own farm. The first three population characteristics are expected
to have a positive impact while the effect of the last one is likely to be negative,
given that it proxies the village’s remoteness. σi represents the number of third
parties interventions such as government or NGO programs in the village in the last
twelve months. The variable is included to account for the institutions’ autonomy
in deciding to provide public goods as discussed in section 3.4. This measure is
approximate given that the it only encompasses programs implemented during the
last twelve months. Please note that neither the number of programs nor the average
or total money allocated are significantly correlated with fractionalization (please
refer to table 4.33 in appendix).
4.2 Patronage Model Specification
The aim of this model is to appraise whether belonging to the village’s dominant
caste significantly and positively influence households’ access to public goods. The
retained definition for dominant caste is the one that owns the largest share of land5.
The sample is restricted to villages where the good considered is available. Let’s note
the main variables as follows :
P (Yhj) the probability that household h has access to good j when this good is
available in the village
Xhk is a vector of observations for household h on k variables such as the value of
the land owned, the size of the household, the age of its head and whether he
is literate.
Ch is a set of dummy variables that account for household h caste.
Dic is a vector of dummies for the dominant caste c in village i in which household
h lives.
The equation to be estimated is therefore :
P (Yhj = 1) = F (βkXhk + δcDic + γ1Ch + γ2(Ch ×Dic)) (4.9)
where F is the standard normal c.d.f. P (Yhj is the probability for household h to have
electricity at home when the village is electrified or to send children to school when
school is existing in the village, for instance. Comparing coefficients γ1 and γ2 should
give an indication of whether belonging to the dominant caste alters the probability
to access public goods. If this turns out to be the case, the assumption that patronage
is taking place would be reinforced. A note of caution is necessary. Assume γ2 is
significant. The only conclusion that may be drawn, based on econometric ground is
that either the effect of caste membership differs depending on the dominant caste,
or the effect of the dominant caste is altered by the household’s caste. While none of
these two explanations may be ruled out, the first one makes intuitively more sense.
5The definition of dominance retained follows that given by Beteille (1965)
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4.3 Identification Issues
4.3.1 Reverse Causality
Many empirical works on the impact of fractionalization on the provision of pu-
blic goods have been disturbed by a reverse causality issue evidenced by Tiebout
(1956). Together with Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and Banerjee and Somanathan
(2007) I believe that this issue is not so manifest in developing countries, given that
geographical mobility often results in losing the critical advantages taken from local
networks. Moreover, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) showed that migrations in India
are mainly due to women for the purpose of marriage as their mobility helps at
mitigating households’ income risks and at smoothing consumption. The 2001 Cen-
sus of India indicates that in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 81% and 89%
of migrants are women out of which 82% and 87% migrate for marriage purposes,
thereby confirming that Tiebout’s sorting may not play a significant role, at least
in this part of India.
4.3.2 Substitution
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007, 2001) brought up the issue of substitution
across public goods. "Neglected populations may not get less of every public good -
they may simply be given less valuable goods. Villages without access to a hospital
may receive some type of less elaborated health facility for reasons of equity or as
part of a political mechanism aimed at pacifying them". Two reasons lead to believe
that substitution is not much of an issue in the analysis : (i) I use the presence of a
particular good in villages rather than budget shares and (ii) selected public goods
do not provide the same kind of services, that are by no mean comparable. It would
make little sense to judge whether electricity is to be preferred to schools. To be on
the safe side, I try to control for the substitution effect by introducing two binary
variables that represent whether the village is dominated by the upper castes or
backward agricultural castes.
5 Results
5.1 Estimation Of The Fractionalization / Polarization Mo-
del
Results from the estimation of 4.8 are presented in table 4.2 on next page. Coeffi-
cients associated with the fractionalization index are significant for 5 of the 7 goods
considered and positive for 4 of them. These results are at odds with the findings
of previous studies that stressed the null or negative impact of fractionalization on
public goods provision. Only the availability of public primary schools is negatively
influenced by social heterogeneity. As will be shown later, the case of public primary
school is special given that this type of infrastructure is widespread and its access
exempt from patronage.
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The effect of a one standard deviation increase from the mean value of the frac-
tionalization index is presented at the bottom of table 4.2. For the average value of
the explanatory variable, including the fractionalization index, the probability for
a village to be connected by road is 53.4%. An increase by one standard deviation
from the average value of the fractionalization index, holding other factors at their
means, yields a probability of 68.2%. The effect of such a change is an increase by
15% in the likelihood to have a road. A similar analysis is run for the presence of
other goods.
As observed in section 3.2, villages that are dominated by upper castes are also
the most fractionalized. In order to make sure that the above results for the frac-
tionalization index does not stem from the effect of the dominant caste, two binary
variables indicating whether upper castes or BAC castes are dominant are introdu-
ced in equation 4.8. Results are presented in table 4.3 below. This does not modify
the significance of the coefficients associated with the fractionalization index. Goods
whose availability was significantly influenced by fractionalization remain the same
between table 4.2 and table 4.3. Nevertheless, the dominant caste has a positive si-
gnificant impact on the presence of electricity, telephone and public primary school
in the village. In subsequent estimations, these two binary variables will therefore
be included.
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Tab. 4.3 – Fractionalization Model - Specification Including Dominant Castes
Road Bus Waste Telephone Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim.
Disposal Centers School
Fractionalization 1.907** 0.739 2.193* 1.991* 0.106 1.251 -2.208**
(0.011) (0.561) (0.068) (0.057) (0.897) (0.103) (0.032)
Upper caste dom. 0.474 0.173 0.21 1.347*** 0.698** 0.366 0.880**
(0.188) (0.687) (0.581) (0.004) (0.047) (0.300) (0.016)
BAC caste dom. 0.337 0.154 -0.227 1.177** 0.713* 0.223 0.213
(0.368) (0.745) (0.583) (0.018) (0.054) (0.560) (0.594)
Nb. of obs. 116 116 116 116 116 111 116
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include control variables such as mean households’ income, the number of households and their
average size, the number of programs, and the percentage of households living from their own farm
The production of some goods require an intervention from the state or the dis-
trict’s administration. As pointed out in section 3.4 these authorities may decide
independently to allocate public goods and such autonomy needs to be controlled
for. Unfortunately, the limited number of data prevents from introducing district
fixed effects. Nevertheless, a binary variable is introduced for Bihar, one of the two
states on which our study focuses. Results are presented in table 4.4 below. This
amendment did not modify the coefficients associated with the fractionalization in-
dex. The previously significant ones remain so and their signs are unchanged. Yet,
given that the Bihar variable has a significant impact on the provision of electricity
and public primary schools it will be included in the following estimations.
Tab. 4.4 – Fractionalization Model - Specification Including Dominant Castes and
State Fixed Effect
Road Bus Waste Telephone Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim.
Disposal Centers School
Fractionalization 1.914** 0.795 2.305* 2.012* 0.026 1.263* -2.300**
(0.011) (0.531) (0.071) (0.054) (0.977) (0.097) (0.049)
Upper caste dom. 0.461 0.255 0.203 1.352*** 0.675** 0.338 0.999***
(0.200) (0.561) (0.598) (0.004) (0.046) (0.335) (0.008)
BAC caste dom. 0.328 0.181 -0.19 1.185** 0.725* 0.185 0.296
(0.379) (0.705) (0.653) (0.017) (0.051) (0.632) (0.466)
Bihar -0.195 0.624 0.714* 0.092 -1.182*** -0.34 1.104***
(0.578) (0.229) (0.093) (0.813) (0.002) (0.367) (0.009)
Nb of obs. 116 116 116 116 116 111 116
Robust p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include the control variables displayed in table 4.2
The literature review emphasized how closely tied is fractionalization to inequa-
lity and how difficult it is to untangle their respective impacts. In order to ensure
that the fractionalization’s effect found is not a proxy for that of inequality, the
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Theil index and its two parts detailed in section 3.5 are introduced in the equation
that is estimated anew. Results are presented in table 4.5 hereafter.
The fractionalization’s coefficients loose their significance for the presence of
waste disposal systems and telephone due to the introduction of the Theil index.
Yet, in the first case, the coefficient is close to the 10% threshold and recovers its
significance when the index components are separately introduced in the equation.
Thus among the 4 goods whose presence was significantly and positively influenced
by fractionalization, three remain so. Please note that inequality has a mere impact
on public goods provision and the coefficients pattern does not allow to draw sound
conclusions about which sort of inequality prevails. Nevertheless, the fractionaliza-
tion’s coefficients seem somewhat robust to controlling for measures of inequality.
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From the 5 specifications tested so far, we may conclude that if fractionalization
is to have an impact on the presence of public goods, which is the case for 4 to 5
of the considered goods, this effect is positive for 3 to 4 of them, which is at odds
with theoretical conclusions. Yet, the latter rested on the assumption that social
fragmentation induces tensions between the groups, that the polarization index is
more likely to capture. Therefore the fractionalization indicator will be replaced by
the polarization index for two values of α = 0.8 and α = 1.6. Please recall that α
measures the polarization sensitivity. Results from this estimation are presented in
table 4.6 below :
Tab. 4.6 – Polarization indices - Base Specification
Road Bus Waste Telephone Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim.
Disposal Centers School
Fractionalization 2.120*** 0.847 2.396* 2.163** 0.467 1.441** -1.602*
(PMRQ for α = 0) (0.003) (0.499) (0.054) (0.012) (0.533) (0.049) (0.089)
Polarization 5.718*** 0.422 2.292 6.702** 0.08 7.745** -4.502
(PMRQ for α = 0.8) (0.007) (0.908) (0.289) (0.017) (0.973) (0.024) (0.108)
Polarization 4.135 -2.961 -4.758 2.959 -2.817 6.987 -4.959
(PMRQ for α = 1.6) (0.299) (0.624) (0.261) (0.500) (0.519) (0.148) (0.276)
Nb. Obs. 116 116 116 116 116 111 116
Robust p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include the control variables displayed in table 4.2
As α increases, more emphasis is put on potential social antagonisms, and coef-
ficients lose their significance. If polarization is to have an impact on the presence
of public goods, it is restricted to intermediate levels of α. Contrary to theoretical
assumptions, groups’ opposition does not impact the provision of public goods. In
order to check the robustness of these results, the Bihar and dominant castes binary
variables are entered in the equation. Results are presented in table 4.7. Coefficients
are hardly modified. Table 4.8 presents the estimations when the Theil coefficient is
introduced in the equation.
Once the inequality measure is included, only the presence of a bus service be-
comes negatively influenced by polarization. Nevertheless fractionalization and po-
larization do, for an intermediate level of α, either have no impact or a positive
one the presence of other public goods, except public primary school, whose case,
according to the series of results, is likely to be apart.
5.2 Summary of The Results from The Fractionalization /Po-
larization Model
By and large, if fractionalization has an impact on the availability of public
goods provision, it is likely to be positive if not null, which contradicts theoretical
reasoning. On the other hand, polarization, which should, according to theoretical
premises, have a stronger explanatory power is not found to have an impact on the
presence of public goods, especially as the stress put on social antagonisms increases.
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Tab. 4.7 – Polarization indices - Introducing caste dominant and Bihar variables
Road Bus Waste Telephone Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim.
Disposal Centers School
Fractionalization 1.914** 0.795 2.305* 2.012* 0.026 1.263* -2.300**
(PMRQ for α = 0) (0.011) (0.531) (0.071) (0.054) (0.977) (0.097) (0.049)
Polarization 5.129** -0.322 2.074 5.580* -1.374 8.583** -6.363**
(PMRQ for α = 0.8) (0.028) (0.929) (0.352) (0.076) (0.636) (0.023) (0.049)
Polarization 3.661 -4.459 -4.763 0.112 -5.122 8.997 -5.327
(PMRQ for α = 1.6) (0.388) (0.444) (0.293) (0.983) (0.307) (0.123) (0.262)
Nb. Obs. 116 116 116 116 116 111 116
Robust p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include the control variables displayed in table 4.2 as well as dominant caste and Bihar dummies
Tab. 4.8 – Polarization indices - Introducing Theil Index
Road Bus Waste Telephone Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim.
Disposal Centers School
Fractionalization 1.656* -0.405 1.977 1.282 -0.204 2.052** -2.894**
(PMRQ for α = 0) (0.072) (0.800) (0.155) (0.303) (0.839) (0.034) (0.030)
Polarization 3.341 -6.281* 0.302 5.457 -1.487 8.211** -6.281*
(PMRQ for α = 0.8) (0.235) (0.067) (0.914) (0.248) (0.645) (0.026) (0.060)
Polarization -0.445 -12.499** -7.945 0.575 -3.125 5.414 -3.232
(PMRQ for α = 1.6) (0.921) (0.028) (0.144) (0.935) (0.555) (0.370) (0.554)
Nb. Obs. 109 110 109 110 109 106 110
Robust p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include the control variables displayed in table 4.2 as well as dominant caste and Bihar dummies
and Theil index
Thus, why would only indices close to fractionalization be significant when other
measures of polarization are not ? Let’s recall that the fractionalization index is
closely and positively linked to the number of groups in the society. The index is
maximized at the uniform distribution of the population across groups. Polarization
on the other hand is decreasing in the number of groups and maximized when the
population is clustered into two equally sized groups. Given the results obtained so
far, the number of groups seems to positively influence public goods provision, while
groups antagonisms do not play any role. A possible explanation might be patronage.
Suppose that each castes tries to appropriate the public goods, thereby turning the
publicly provided goods in club goods. Each caste doing the same might beget the
number of groups, and hence fractionalization, to be positively correlated with public
goods provision. This is an assumption that is worth exploring, although given that
I test for the presence of the public goods rather than the level of provision, the only
inroad I can make in this direction is to test whether membership to the dominant
caste modifies the likelihood for a household to access public goods. This is what
the following section does.
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5.3 Patronage Model
The Patronage model is only tested for the backward agricultural caste ("BAC")
for two reasons. Fist, BAC and upper castes are the only dominant castes for the
bulk of the sample. BAC members own the largest value of land in 31% of the vil-
lages under study. Second, the case of upper castes needs to be set aside given that
membership to this group is a perfect predictor of having electricity at home or of
primary school attendance. Due to this lack of variation, the case of the villages
dominated by upper castes is left apart.
Table 4.9 presents the results from the estimation of equation 4.9. The explained
variable is the probability for a household to have toilets at home when a waste
disposal system is available in the village, to have electricity when the village is
electrified, or to send their children anganwadi or to school when these facilities are
located in the village. Belonging to a BAC caste significantly reduces the likelihood
of anganwadi attendance or to have a toilet facility except when the village is do-
minated by backward agricultural castes. The likelihoods for a BAC household in a
village not dominated by BACs to have toilets or to send their children to an angan-
wadi center are both around 5%. Yet, this same probabilities in a BAC dominated
village are 31% and 15% respectively 6. Similarly the coefficient associated with the
interacted variable is close to the 10% threshold with respect to electricity access,
meaning that a BAC household is more likely to have electricity at home when its
caste is dominant in the village7. On the other hand, primary school attendance
is influenced neither by the household’s caste nor by the village’s dominant caste.
None of the household’s characteristics seems to have a significant impact on primary
school attendance. As observed earlier, primary school education is now relatively
widespread in India. Out of the 841 households with children of primary school age,
792 were actually sending these children to school. Please note that these results are
not driven by the fact that living in a BAC dominated village gives better access
to public primary school as testified by the coefficients associated with the variable
BAC village.
These results provide some support to the hypothesis that there is patronage ta-
king place with respect to access to publicly provided goods. This assumption would
explain why fractionalization is found to have a positive effect on the provision of
public goods while polarization proved irrelevant. Please recall that fractionalization
had a negative impact on the presence of public primary school. According to table
4.9 access to this facility is independent from households’ characteristics. Given what
has been said in chapter 3 of this dissertation and the results found in this study,
provide converging clues that public provided goods in India may be turned into
club goods due to the social structure.
6Holding other factors constant at their mean values
7assuming the interacted term to be significantly different from 0 this would yield an increase
by 9in the likelihood to have electricity from 14% to 23%
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Tab. 4.9 – Patronage Model
Toilets Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim. School
BAC household -0.549** -0.065 -0.561** -0.259
(0.040) (0.680) (0.040) (0.220)
BAC household x BAC dominant 1.162*** 0.347 0.598 0.406
(0.010) (0.120) (0.180) (0.250)
BAC village -0.608** 0.122 -0.301 0.009
(0.020) (0.370) (0.240) (0.970)
Value of land owned 9.04e-07*** 1.80e-07*** -4.45E-08 -6.11E-09
(0.000) (0.010) (0.900) (0.960)
Literacy of household’s head -0.586*** -0.632*** 0.194 -0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.310) (0.940)
Household’s size 0.008 0.030** -0.001 0.043
(0.760) (0.040) (0.990) (0.160)
Age of the household’s head 0.020*** 0.018*** -0.002 -0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.830) (0.260)
Constant -1.986*** -1.907*** -1.001*** 1.631***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nb. of observations 396 895 324 676
Coefficients equality test
Ho : γ1 = γ2
χ2 7.27 1.35 3.19 1.72
P > χ2 0.007 0.2453 0.0743 0.1898
Robust p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
This study is rather exploratory and saying that I prove the existence of patro-
nage would be too enthusiastic. Data scarcity is somewhat of a problem. Yet, the
merit of this study is to show that the relationship between social fractionalization
and public goods provision is far from obvious. As mentioned in introduction to
this chapter, empirical works often found contradictory relationships depending on
the goods and the settings. Moreover, government’s autonomy in its allocation and
poverty alleviation programs blur even more the picture. Nevertheless, these results
coupled with those found in chapter 3 provide clues that publicly provided goods
are not that public but rather club goods in the Indian context. This may bring
on two sorts of problems. First, public goods are often the cornerstone of develop-
ment programs, but if their access is not universal, these programs may miss their
targets. Second, policies focus would benefit from shifting their focus from the level
provision to the use of public goods. Public goods availability is a central issue for
economic development and a key concern of many developing societies. As Banerjee
and Somanathan (2007) recall "The National Election Survey in India, carried out
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by the Center for the study of Developing Societies in 1996, asks 10,000 voters an
open-ended question : "What are the three main problems people like you face to-
day ?" Poverty was the most popular response [...] but public goods came in a close
second. Nearly a fifth of all respondents listed problems associated with different
types of public amenities as their main problem".
A last point needs to be made. It has been assumed in this study and in some
others (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2005; Banerjee and Soma-
nathan, 2007; Bardhan, 2000) that caste is the relevant divide. However, it could
be argued that religion is a much stronger source of antagonisms than castes in In-
dia and that the polarization index should be constructed along religious lines. As
religion was treated as yet another caste, the polarization index may have been un-
derestimated while the fractionalization index was overestimated. I have to reckon
that this argument makes sense especially given the context of growing religious
tensions in India. It would be worth exploring whether religion is a more important
source of potential antagonisms than castes. This is left for future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I found that the relationship between social fragmentation and
the availability of public goods, if any, is likely to be positive, while polarization
is irrelevant. This contradicts theoretical conclusions. Previous empirical works also
produced mixed results about this relationship. One of the reasons for this lack
of assent may be the assumed relationship between social heterogeneity and social
tensions that may not hold as suggested by Esteban and Ray (2008). A finer un-
derstanding of the links between social diversity and conflicts might prove helpful
in refining the relationship between fractionalization, polarization and public goods
provision.
Suppose that as groups are formed, the build up of social identities comes with
the shaping of groups opposition, be it only because individuals perceive themselves
as "we" in opposition to "they". Such opposition does not necessarily translate into
conflict. Social norms, a sort of modus vivendi, may be set up to rule intergroup
relationships, even if they are based on avoidance. Such norms are more likely to
be at work in the public space and hence in the use of public goods. Accounting
for such norms is important and prevents from concluding that social heterogeneity
causes antagonisms and conflicts. Naturally clashes and outbursts of violence may
appear, but they may result from challenging the norms. Castes may be considered
a good example of this line of reasoning. Baechler (1988) developed a theory mentio-
ned in more details in the introduction to this dissertation that caste is the solution
to a collective action problem and that they appeared to ensure social cohesion in
the absence of a strong state. Thus, although caste is prima facie a factor of social
division, they do not necessarily spur antagonisms or conflicts.
The argument is, at the stage of intuition but its formal demonstration would
probably be very instructive. It is left for future research. Our argument does not
mean all is for the best and that caste norms ought not be challenged. Yet, a better
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understanding of how intergroup norms appear would help to find ways of com-
muting the iniquitous ones with fairer ones acceptable. This also is left for future
research.
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The four essays presented in this dissertation are examples of the implications
of social institutions and identities, in this case Indian castes, in various areas of
economic life.
Summary of Main Results
The effect of caste membership on perceived social identity among Hindus was
investigated in Chapter 2. Results show, and this is no surprise, that caste is a
strong determinant of perceived social status for both SCs and STs, although it is
not the only one. Both income and the type of occupation, whether supervisory or
involving human or physical capital do have a significant impact on perceived social
status. Education is also relevant, although to a lesser extent and the divide lies
between primary and secondary or higher education. Moreover, the impact of caste
is much smaller among Scheduled Castes than among Scheduled Tribes, although
their ritual status, is, arguably, quite close. Large, yet plausible shifts in income or
occupation could make up for the caste effect as far as SCs are concerned. For ins-
tance, the acquisition of land or skills can almost cancel the caste effect. On the other
hand, only very unlikely improvements could hardly compensate for belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe. Many reasons could be invoked to explain the differing impact of
caste between SCs and STs, one of them being that SCs better mobilized politically
and managed to somewhat emancipate from their traditional status. This is only a
conjecture that would be worth investigating. The results presented in this chapter
may underestimate the actual effect of caste, as data were not publicly collected. It
seems likely that if individuals had declared publicly their social class, peer pressure
would have reinforced the caste effect. Moreover, the analysis was restricted to Hin-
dus due to a lack of data on castes for individuals of other religious denominations.
Yet, including a religious dimension to the analysis of perceived social status may
yield compelling results, especially in the context of rising denominational tensions
in India.
The indirect caste effect found in Chapter 2 is interpreted as a remainder of
centuries of discrimination, through the internalization of social norms. Chapter 1
questions the origin of these discriminatory norms. It is noteworthy that a large
part of the theoretical literature on discrimination cannot depart from positing that
individuals do have preferences about who they interact with. In these theories, pre-
judice always lurks at the back. In doing so, I would argue that the question of the
origin of discrimination is not properly addressed. Indeed, how come that agents
pick one feature such as skin color for instance, rather than another to form prefe-
rences or prejudice ? Sociological analysis, such as the one conducted by Max Weber,
suggest that social norms and ideologies come as an a posteriori justification of an
already existing situation. As far as castes are concerned, many specialists such as
Ghurye for instance 8, stressed that the founding text of the institution of castes,
Manu’s code, was written at a time when segregation was already in place. Thus,
the following question is addressed : can segregation occur even in the absence of
prejudice ? A theoretical model is constructed to answer this question that links po-
wer capture and segregation. Power is defined as the ability to provide someone else
8As presented by Deliège (2004)
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with opportunities that would be unattainable otherwise. Because one group seizes
power the powerless strive to cooperate with the mighty. In doing so they prompt
rejection by the latter and, in turn, the powerless refuse to cooperate. The ending
situation pictures a systematic refusal to cooperate by both groups and this how
segregation is defined.
This model has several compelling features. First, it addresses an often neglected
fact, namely that an unequal power distribution is frequent in segregated society. Se-
cond, segregation is shown to occur even in the absence of prejudice. Third, the way
both segregation and power are defined allows to account for a variety of situations.
Fourth, the process described has an interest in itself and more particularly that
rejection results from the powerless striving to cooperate. Unfortunately, the model
also has a couple of drawbacks. Ways for improvement are proposed at the end of
the chapter such as the adoption of an evolutionary framework, the inclusion of an
in between group resulting from groups intermediate cooperation and the definition
of power as a function of the number of powerful. Lastly, lifestyles obligations and
customs can serve as signalling devices, based on the observation that they are much
more constraining for some groups than for others.
Finally, Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the role played by caste rules and solidarity
in access to publicly provided goods. The institution of caste strongly defines the
use of common resources mainly through the prohibition put on the sharing of these
resources, particularly with outcasts. This prohibition is what is referred to as un-
touchability, which is grounded on the belief that outcasts are impure and that any
form of contact with them is tainting. Food and water are the paramount conveyor
of ritual pollution. Water is considered tainted if an untouchable or his vessel touch
it. Therefore outcasts are often banned from using higher castes wells. Indian local
newspapers abound with stories of untouchables being beaten up for having used
higher castes wells. The phenomenon is quantitatively investigated in Chapter 3.
The number of acts of violence in a district is shown to be associated with the way
water is predominantly distributed. The more common and shared the source, the
larger the number of acts of violence against SCs and STs. This relationship is ro-
bust to many controls, including castes and religious polarizations, states measures
of wealth or of human development, fixed effects and measures of other public in-
vestments. It is noteworthy that the number of roads and of primary schools are
negatively associated with the number of acts of violence. Finally, quantile regres-
sion show that the impact of water distribution on caste based violence is stronger,
when the latter has already reached a relatively high level. The results presented
in this chapter show that, despite untouchability practices being outlawed, they are
still quite common and violently enforced. This is in accordance with the results
from the survey undertook by Shah et al. (2006) that shows that untouchables are
still denied access to many public goods, including water. This points towards the
idea that some groups may be excluded from using public goods on caste grounds.
Publicly provided goods appear more like club or caste goods. This hypothesis is
investigated in Chapter 4.
Theoretical as well as empirical studies have evidenced, yet with a mild success,
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that social fractionalization has a negative effect on public goods provision, through
a restricted collective action. I argue that this literature exhibit four drawbacks.
First, empirical results are mixed. Second, the relationship seems to rest on the im-
plicit assumption that social fragmentation induces antagonisms or conflicts. Third,
this last assumed relationship has never been firmly established and even if it was,
then polarization indices would be more appropriate to account for the negative im-
pact of social fragmentation on public goods provision than the conventionally used
fractionalization index. Fourth, the intervention of ethnic patronage has hardly been
considered. Yet if publicly provided goods are turned private and intended at a spe-
cific group, a positive relationship between social fragmentation and public goods
provision may come to light.
These four points are addressed in this chapter and more specifically the pa-
tronage assumption. The analysis show that in the northern Indian states of Ut-
tar Pradesh and Bihar, the fractionalization index is positively associated with the
presence of four of the six selected goods. This results is somewhat at odds with
those obtained by previous empirical analysis that displayed a predominantly nega-
tive effect. On the other hand, polarization indices are found to be irrelevant. It is
concluded that the number of groups does positively influence the presence of public
goods, while potential antagonisms between groups play little role. This positive re-
lationship may stem from patronage activities. The last part of this chapter looks
into this assumption by assessing whether the likelihood for a household to access a
particular facility, provided it is available in the village, depends on its membership
to the dominant caste. Results, although not definite, do provide some hint in that
direction. However, data scarcity conduce to taking the results with circumspection.
Nevertheless, results from the last two chapters provide some support to the hypo-
thesis that publicly provided goods may be turned into caste goods.
Discussion
If development can be seen "as a process of expanding the real freedoms that
people enjoy" (Sen, 1999a), these chapters make a case for integrating social insti-
tutions and its effect in the analysis of development. Sen highlighted five types of
freedoms that are necessary to the advancement of individual capabilities. He la-
beled them instrumental freedoms and they are political rights, economic facilities,
social opportunities, transparency, and security, which are all different but inter-
connected. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that the institution of castes violated at least
four of these. Because public goods and facilities may be turned into caste or club
goods, thereby preventing some individuals from using them, social opportunities
are restricted and so are economic facilities. This would not be as much worrying
if it did not bring to light the fact that in modern India, caste rules do sometimes
supplant legal ones. Transparency is not achieved. As untouchability practices may
still be violently enforced, the untouchables demand for security is not satisfied,
which infringes another instrumental freedom.
Arguing that castes impede freedom and hence development is no big news. Law-
makers did recognize it when they crafted the Constitution of India. What is more
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disturbing is that fifty years after the set up of reservation policies and acts aiming at
protecting and promoting the situations of the "weaker segments of society", castes
rules still prevail locally regardless of the law. Poverty alleviation programs, that, for
a good part of them, rest on the provision of public goods, are diverted from their ob-
jectives and caste remain a relevant divide to analyze patterns of inequality in India.
On this topic, we might question the suitability of the current increased devolution
of power to village councils (panchayats) that may appear swift in implementing
caste based rules. An assessment of the reservation and panchayats empowerment
policies is beyond the scope of this work, yet what appears clearly from it, is the
strength of castes and its influence on limiting freedoms.
As worrying such a situation may be, it is not as troublesome as the issue raised
by the influence of caste on social identity. While appropriate policies could argua-
bly deal with law disobedience and the capture of public goods access, the fact that
caste shapes self-perception is fraught with consequences that are less manageable.
Chapter 2 showed how determinative caste is in the perception of social class both
directly, but more insidiously through a reduced capacity for deprived groups to
perceive themselves as socially successful. Results from behavioral experiments sho-
wed that identifying to a group that has suffered from long standing despise may
encourage individuals to act in a detrimental way. They may self discriminate either
to stick to stereotypes or because they expect such a discrimination to occur. Thus,
challenging the institution of caste goes through recasting social identities, which is
tricky, to say the least.
Yet, all is not doom and gloom. Results from Chapter 4 suggest that primary
schools are widely accessible and exempt from the influence of castes. Moreover,
results presented in table 3.8 in Chapter 3 indicate that primary education facilities
are negatively associated with caste based violence and so is road access. The dif-
fering impact of caste on perceived social status between SCs and STs presented in
Chapter 2 indicate that the former were able to detach from their group membership.
The influence of caste in the case of SCs is mainly indirect and nowhere as binding
as for STs. Many reasons for this difference can be invoked, one being that SCs
politically mobilized and asserted their rights and claims (Jaffrelot, 2002). On the
other hand, the political assertion of STs is more feeble and they seem more trapped
in the traditionally low position. Moreover, Chapter 1 showed how an unequal po-
wer distribution may induce segregation. Thus, it could be infered that the political
rise of the long deprived castes might partially lift the yoke of the institution of caste.
Agenda for future research
At the end of every chapter, I have tried to discuss issues raised by the work and
that would be worth exploring. For instance, an extension of the results found in
Chapter 2, would be to investigate potential discrepancies between public and pri-
vate declarations of perceived social status. Hoff and Pandey (2006) observed that
the performance of low caste children decreased when their caste identity was made
public. Such a gap is attributable, the authors argue, to the expectation of discrimi-
nation. Similarly, if we were to find any significant discrepancy between publicly and
privately declared social status, we may be able to estimate the amount of expected
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discrimination on top of that generated by a diminished self image.
Moreover, local social composition may be thought of having an influence on the
salience of caste as a component of social identity and this would be worth testing
with a larger set of data than the one used in Chapter 2. Two questions may arise
from this point. First, does the salience of caste identity depends on local social
composition ? For instance, would it be more relevant if the society is highly po-
larized, fractionalised, etc. Second, when do other identities such as the religious
one supplants caste identity ? This last point is discussed in more details in the last
paragraph of this conclusion.
Let’s suppose that caste identity is stronger when local society is more polarized
along the lines of castes. The trouble with the polarization index defined by Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2002), and that is now commonly used, is that it only
focuses on the distribution of the population irrespective of the income distribu-
tion. It assumes that the distance between all groups is equal to one. However, it is
highly conceivable that inter group distance is not constant and largely depends on
the collective wealth of both groups. As far as castes are concerned, the Sanskritiza-
tion process described by many sociologists show that an increase in wealth is often
accompanied by a attempt to increase social status and thus move closer to higher
groups. It does not require a great deal of imagination to think that a sub-caste who
managed to grow richer will not perceive the social distance to the next higher up
group in the same way than than poorer ones. Thus, there is a need to reincorporate
a flexible intergroup distance, arguably based on wealth, in the polarization index.
The original index designed by Esteban and Ray (1994) did actually focus on
the wealth distribution. Yet, it was criticized on the grounds that groups design ba-
sed on the income criteria is arbitrary and untractable. Both remarks remain valid.
They lead to the interpretation of "groups" as ethnic, religious or caste based, which,
supposedly, are less arbitrary criteria. However, if we could find and incorporate a
metric that accounts for these groups collective wealths, we may be able to modulate
the intergroup distance and better account for the phenomenon. Moreover, I would
argue that a society that is said to be polarized because of the structure of the popu-
lation distribution, is even more so if the pattern of the income distribution follows
that of the ethnic groups and this should be reflected in the index, which is not
the case with the polarization index popularized by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2002). In the case studied in Chapter 4, data show a very strong correlation with
the value of the land owned and caste membership. Thus we could have taken the
difference in the average value of land owned as a measure of intergroup distance.
This was not done as theoretical foundations for such an index lack. Yet, this may
be a way to address the problem.
Section 6 in Chapter 1 proposed improvements for the model, namely to adopt
an evolutionary game framework, the conceptualization of a "mixed" group that
would lie in between the powerful and the powerless and that would lead to endoge-
nizing the power parameter. Moreover, customs or lifestyle such as vegetarianism for
instance, could be included as signals or devices to enforce cooperation within the
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group. As far as the institution of castes is concerned it is noteworthy that lifestyle
prescriptions are more stringent for higher castes than for lower castes. This calls
for an interpretation of these customs as a signal for group membership.
A more general question is posed by these four chapters. Why do agents pick a
trait and define themselves according to this trait ? Let’s take an example. There
are many lines along which one could define himself. In India for instance this may
be nationality, caste, religion, gender, age, language, geography, skin color, lifestyle,
wealth, occupation and the list is probably endless. Under what circumstances will
individuals stress one identity at the expense of others ? What factors make the
religious denomination more relevant than gender, for instance ? This questions has
many implications and let’s discuss only those suggested by the dissertation. First,
what makes a trait relevant to divide the society and to spur segregation ? For ins-
tance, why was segregation in the United States based on skin color, rather than,
say, on height ? Why do we have prejudice against some traits rather than others ?
Second, suppose that the determinants of identity change depending on circum-
stances. Then how can we assess social fragmentation ? Some authors sidestepped the
question by assuming that ethnic groups are relevant, probably having the examples
of African civil wars at the back of their minds. What lurks at the back of the litera-
ture on ethnicity or social fragmentation is that it necessarily induces antagonisms
and conflicts and that the most likely ground for conflict should be taken as the most
salient identity. Then, how can we explain that ethnic identity changed status from
a merely conscious phenomenon up to a reason for civil war ? Arguments have been
brought forward to say that the marked distinction between the Tutsis and Hutus of
Rwanda was a colonialist construction. Nevertheless, such a construction appeared
a couple of years later to be sufficiently relevant to prompt the genocide of nearly
half a million individuals. Thus, the question is not does ethnic fractionalization
or polarization prompt conflict but rather under what circumstances does ethnicity
becomes a relevant argument for conflict ? It has been suggested in Chapters 3 and
4, that caste based fragmentation does not necessarily prompt conflicts, the reason
being that norms govern intergroup relationships. Outbursts of caste based violence
are not seldom, but they mainly arise from norms being challenged and enforced
(the equity of these norms is not discussed here). The fact that conflict arise be-
cause of challenged norms might possibly be a trail worth pursuing. In any event, all
these examples highlight the interest of understanding what makes an identity more
particularly salient than another. Such an investigation may also fuel the debate
about whether ethnicity or identity, in general, is constructed or exogenously given.
These propositions for future research are by and large not exhaustive. They may
seem ambitious, although they probably are incommensurate with the questions
posed by social identity and institutions. Recent economic literature has drawn
attention to them and there is little doubt that it will be a promising area for future
research.
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Section 2 : Data
Section 2.1 : Presentation of the Data
Tab. 4.10 – Pearson’s χ2 test for homogeneity of distribution of classes across castes
SC versus SC versus ST versus Scheduled versus All three
ST Non-scheduled Non-scheduled Non-scheduled groups
Pearson χ2 301.48 139.48 127.56 77.1905 414.63
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tab. 4.11 – Pearson’s χ2 test for homogeneity of distribution of assumed determi-
nants across castes
SCs versus SCs versus STs versus All three
STs non-scheduled non-scheduled groups
Education
Pearson’s Chi2 88.2307 7.9783 114.4352 132.5925
P-value 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000
Income
Pearson’s Chi2 79.9615 206.4024 264.422 379.658
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation
Pearson’s Chi2 133.9157 197.1181 242.1787 410.5238
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manual occupation
Pearson’s Chi2 81.4965 0.7256 100.1947 123.5075
P-value 0.000 0.394 0.000 0.000
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Fig. 4.2 – Distribution of characteristics by caste
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Attended college
Missing information
Distribution of Educational Level
Scheduled  Castes
Primary and below
Middle School
Scheduled  Tribes
Non-scheduled  Groups
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The table below supports our claim that being a professional is the highest
paying occupation, as well as the occupation1 aggregate that encompass professio-
nals, employer / manager / foreman, supervisor office, member of armed force and
unoccupied. This table also provide some support about the fact that unoccupied
individuals should not bee seen as in dire straits.
Tab. 4.12 – Distribution of income ranges across occupations
Income range
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Occupation
Employer / Manager / Foreman 4% 4% 22% 20% 29% 14% 7%
Professional worker 5% 2% 10% 13% 24% 35% 11%
Supervisory non-manual office worker 2% 2% 10% 20% 38% 23% 4%
Non manual office worker 9% 15% 31% 17% 16% 10% 3%
Skilled manual worker 12% 9% 33% 19% 16% 8% 3%
Unskilled / semi-skilled manual worker 13% 23% 23% 15% 20% 3% 3%
Farmer cultivating his own farm 6% 13% 35% 22% 13% 9% 2%
Agricultural worker 21% 32% 29% 7% 6% 4% 1%
Member of armed forces 5% 0% 25% 10% 30% 25% 5%
Never had a job 9% 14% 21% 21% 19% 12% 4%
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Section 2.2 : Sampling Issue
The table below presents the reconciliation of the educational levels recorded in
the World Values Survey and those accounted for in the 2001 Census of India :
Tab. 4.13 – Reconciliation of educational levels between WVS and the 2001 Census
of India
WVS labels Census of India labels
Primary and below Litterate without educationnal level
Below Primary
Primary
Middle
Secondary School Matric. /Secondary
Higher Secondary/ Intermediate/Pre-university/Senior Secondary
Non-technical diploma not equal to degree
Technical diploma not equal to degree
Attended College Graduate and above
Tab. 4.14 – States and their populations’ distributions accounted for in the World
Values Survey sample
State Nb of districts in the sample
1991 Census
Andhra Pradesh 3 7.6% 7.9%
Assam 1 3.0% 2.7%
Bihar 3 7.4% 10.2%
Chhattisgarh 1 2.3% *
Delhi 1 2.2% 1.1%
Gujarat 2 5.0% 4.9%
Haryana 1 2.5% 2.0%
Jharkhand 2 3.0% **
Karnataka 2 5.4% 5.3%
Kerala 2 3.6% 3.4%
Madhya Pradesh 2 5.8% 7.8%
Maharashtra 4 9.7% 9.3%
Orissa 2 3.4% 3.7%
Punjab 1 2.4% 2.4%
Rajasthan 2 5.1% 5.2%
Tamil Nadu 2 6.5% 6.6%
Uttar Pradesh 6 16.5% 16.4%
West Bengal 3 8.6% 8.0%
Others 0 0.0% 3.0%
Source : World Values Survey documentation
* In 1991, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were one state
**In 1991, Bihar and Jarkhand were one state
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The two graphs below presents the distribution of groups across town sizes for
the whole sample and the 2001 round respectively. As mentioned in section 2.2,
SCs tend to live in larger towns than non scheduled groups, which may introduce a
sampling bias.
Fig. 4.3 – Distribution of groups by town size for the whole sample
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Fig. 4.4 – Distribution of groups by town size for the 2001 sub-sample
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Section 3 : Discriminant Analysis of The Data
Description of The Method
Let n be the number of observations that can be classified into k groups or in
this instance social classes. Population within every class is therefore noted nk. Let y
be the class variable that takes on value y1, y2...yk. Let xij be the vector of characte-
ristics for individual i and j the type of individuals’ characteristics such as income,
education, occupation etc... Fisher (1936) suggested using a linear combination of
the observations of the following form
y = u1x1 + u2x2 + ...ujxj + c
where y is a latent variable, xj are independent or discriminating variables, uj are
discriminating coefficients associated with the discriminating variable xj and c a
constant. There exists a function u(x) that maps x and the latent variable y. Such
a function is the discriminant function. The objective of the discriminant analysis is
to find a function that best separates the groups or in this instance the social classes.
Let’s define ηk the center of gravity of the observations in group k, η the center
of gravity of the overall distribution, and Wk the variance-covariance matrix for
the kth group. Wk describes the within group dispersion. The overall within group
dispersion can be calculated as :
W =
1
n
∑
k
nkWk (4.10)
Between group variability can be described as
B =
1
n
∑
k
nk(ηk − η)(ηk − η)T (4.11)
which represents the sample covariance of the groups means. Total sample variability
may be represented by the total covariance matrix V such that :
V = B +W (4.12)
Given that the objective is to find axes that best separate the k groups. Let’s note
u1(x) a vector on which observations will be projected so that
u′1(x)V u1(x) = u
′
1(x)Bu1(x) + u
′
1(x)V u1(x) (4.13)
For more convenience, u1(x) is thereafter noted u1. The axis Z1 that best separates
the group will be defined through the maximization of :
u′1Bu1
u′1Wu1
or u
′
1Bu1
u′1Wu1
which is solved by the following equation :
W−1Bu1 = λu1 (4.14)
The first axis Z1 and the function that best discriminates u1 is obtained for the
largest value of λ. The second axis Z2 and discriminant function u2 comes from the
second largest value of λ and so on.
Table below presents the coefficients found for the fist two discriminant functions.
These coefficients are the coordinates of the points plotted on graph 2.2.
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Tab. 4.15 – Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients
u1(x) u2(x)
Scheduled Castes -0.288 -0.645
Scheduled Tribes -0.759 -0.184
Income Range
1 < 500 Rupees / month -0.261 0.401
2 501 - 1,000 Rs / month -0.450 0.244
3 1,001 - 3,000 Rs / month -0.485 0.819
4 3,001 - 5,000 Rs / month -0.296 0.962
5 5,001 - 10,000 Rs / month -0.151 0.778
6 Income range 6 : 10,000 - 30,000 Rs / month -0.042 0.463
Occupation
Employer / Manager / Formean -0.053 0.232
Supervisory non manual office worker -0.059 0.383
Non manual office worker -0.169 0.193
Skilled Manual worker -0.293 0.158
Unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker -0.357 0.136
Farmer cultivationg his own farm -0.256 0.448
Agricultural worker -0.445 0.008
Member of armed force 0.018 0.042
Never had a job -0.065 0.251
Education
1 Primary and below -0.292 -0.122
2 Middle School -0.036 0.037
Female -0.016 -0.092
Married -0.001 -0.064
Age 0.011 -0.001
Townsize 0.009 -0.187
Year 1995 0.712 0.294
Section 5 : Results
Section 5.1.1 : The 1995 Issue
Comments on the representativeness of the sample
The table below presents the distribution of the observations across sub-samples
and groups that are informed for the 3 main set of characteristics (income, education
and occupation).
Tab. 4.16 – Distributions of informed observations across groups and samples
WVS WVS 1995 WVS 2001 Census of India
whole sample sub-sample sub-sample 2001
SCs 34.2% 52.4% 15.0% 16.2%
STs 27.4% 47.6% 6.2% 8.2%
Non-scheduled 38.4% 0.0% 78.8% 75.6%
Nb of informed observations 1 658 851 807
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Estimates from the 1995 sub-sample
Tab. 4.17 – Determinants of perceived social class - Base specification - 1995 sub-
sample
(1) (2)
Group Scheduled Tribe -0.924*** -0.933***
(0.000) (0.000)
Income < 500 Rs / month -0.648*** -0.749***
(0.001) (0.001)
501-1,000 Rs / month -0.955*** -1.028***
(0.000) (0.000)
1,001-3,000 Rs / month -0.832*** -0.910***
(0.000) (0.000)
3,001-5,000 Rs / month -0.655*** -0.741***
(0.000) (0.000)
5,001-10,000 Rs / month -0.441** -0.540***
(0.012) (0.003)
10,001-30,000 Rs / month -0.494*** -0.570***
(0.003) (0.001)
Education Primary and below -0.281** -0.310***
(0.010) (0.009)
Middle school 0.097 0.093
(0.338) (0.378)
Occupation Employer / Manager/ Foreman -0.23 -0.216
(0.114) (0.143)
Supervisory office -0.286** -0.229
(0.038) (0.108)
Non manual office -0.245 -0.257
(0.147) (0.129)
Skilled manual -0.583*** -0.566***
(0.003) (0.004)
Semi and unskilled manual -1.039*** -1.035***
(0.000) (0.000)
Farmer : own farm -0.497*** -0.611***
(0.001) 0.000
Agricultural worker -1.590*** -1.664***
(0.000) (0.000)
Member of armed forces 0.026 0.001
(0.918) (0.997)
Never had a job 0.103 0.008
(0.805) (0.985)
Controls Female 0.049
(0.560)
Married -0.07
(0.460)
Age -0.002
(0.617)
town size 2 0.632***
(0.001)
town size 3 0.556***
(0.008)
town size 4 0.38
(0.125)
town size 5 0.301
(0.139)
town size 6 0.277
(0.158)
town size 7 0.390**
(0.049)
town size 8 0.044
(0.849)
Observations 851 851
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
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Analysis on the 2001 sub-sample
Estimates from the base model
The table 4.18 presents the results from the estimation of the base model over
the 2001 sub-sample. These results should be compared to the ones presented in
table 2.9 in section 5.1.
Compared to the results obtained over the whole sample, the effect of being
an ST is similar to that of being an SCs. The test of difference in parameters for
these two groups dummies conclude that their effects are not statistically different
(χ2 = 0.41). Yet results from table 4.17 show that the two groups’ effects were sta-
tistically different. As discussed in section 5.1.1, this difference is probably due to a
sampling bias.
Compared to the results obtained over the whole sample and with respect to the
influences of both Scheduled groups, it is noteworthy that the impact of being from
a Scheduled Caste is much higher in the 2001 sample (-0.427 vs -0.625) while that
of being from a Scheduled Tribe is lower (-1.225 vs -0.763). Thus comments related
to the fact that SCs may be able to improve their perceived social status through
likely shifts in other characteristics may not hold anymore, neither those about the
implausible shifts needed to cancel the tribe effect. This impression will be rectified
or confirmed in the following paragraph.
Tests on Coefficients and Thresholds for Each Variable Type
Education
As far as education is concerned, the conclusion that primary education is the real
divide still holds. Indeed, the test of equality of coefficients associated with secon-
dary school and primary do conclude that they differ (χ2 = 6.44 ; P > χ2 = 0.0112).
Results from table 4.18 also show that the impact of secondary education is signi-
ficantly different from that of primary but not from that of university attendance.
Moreover, there is no differing effect between secondary school and college atten-
dance. As before, education plays a relatively little role, given that going beyond
primary education may hardly cancel half of the Scheduled group effect.
Occupation
The table below presents the matrix for the χ2 tests of differences in parameters
for occupations. Please note that no individual is enrolled in the army in this sub-
sample.
162 APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Tab. 4.18 – Determinants of perceived social class - Base Specification - 2001 sub-
sample
(1) (2) (3)
Group Scheduled groups -0.714***
(0.000)
Scheduled Caste -0.679*** -0.625***
(0.000) (0.000)
Scheduled Tribe -0.786*** -0.763***
(0.000) (0.000)
Income < 500 Rs / month -0.906 -0.906 -0.933
(0.123) (0.123) (0.113)
501-1,000 Rs / month -1.375** -1.374** -1.303**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
1,001-3,000 Rs / month -1.118** -1.116** -1.004*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.065)
3,001-5,000 Rs / month -0.914* -0.908* -0.754
(0.084) (0.086) (0.165)
5,001-10,000 Rs / month -0.601 -0.598 -0.46
(0.249) (0.251) (0.388)
10,001-30,000 Rs / month 0.087 0.091 0.262
(0.869) (0.862) (0.619)
Education Primary and below -0.303*** -0.302*** -0.308**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
Middle school -0.01 -0.007 -0.033
(0.925) (0.946) (0.762)
Occupation Employer / Manager/ Foreman 0.041 0.039 0.015
(0.777) (0.787) (0.918)
Supervisory office -0.06 -0.063 -0.042
(0.686) (0.675) (0.788)
Non manual office -0.738*** -0.738*** -0.720***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Skilled manual -0.749*** -0.754*** -0.750***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Semi and unskilled manual -0.891*** -0.901*** -0.906***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Farmer : own farm -0.285* -0.280* -0.21
(0.058) (0.063) (0.195)
Agricultural worker -0.442** -0.451** -0.385*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.078)
Never had a job -0.178 -0.179 -0.103
(0.310) (0.309) (0.601)
Controls Female -0.067
(0.434)
Married -0.035
(0.720)
Age 0.001
(0.845)
town size 2 -0.518***
0.000
town size 3 -0.034
(0.828)
town size 4 -0.371**
(0.010)
town size 5 0.173
(0.263)
town size 6 -0.277*
(0.068)
town size 7 -0.363**
(0.026)
town size 8 0.078
(0.718)
Observations 807 807 802
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
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The tests show that there is no significant difference in the effect of being a pro-
fessional worker, an employer, a supervisory office worker and the intriguing "never
had a job" category. Thus these four categories are combined in a single variable,
labeled Occupation 1. Please note that this group is similar to the one formed over
the whole sample.
Results from table 4.19 show that coefficients associated with being employed as a
non-manual office or as a manual worker, whether skilled or unskilled are not statis-
tically different. Thus these occupations are grouped under the label Occupation 2.
Next, the impact of cultivating one’s own farm and of being employed as an agricul-
tural worker do not seem to differ and these two categories are regrouped under the
term Occupation 3. Table 6 below presents the 3 categories and should be compared
with table 5.1.2.
Tab. 4.20 – New occupation aggregates - 2001 sub-sample
Aggregate Corresponding occupations
Occupation 1 Professional worker
Employer / Manager / Foreman
Supervisory office position
Unoccupied
Occupation 2 Non manual office worker
Skilled Manual
Semi or unskilled manual worker
Occupation 3 Farmer : own farm
Agricultural laborer
The divide between supervisory positions and others remain. Yet, while previous
results underlined a divide between occupations that required capital and those who
do not, this set of results stresses more the divide between rural occupations and
more urban ones. However, the estimates of the difference in coefficients associated
with the three occupational groups presented below in table 4.21, show that the
divide between supervisory positions and the rest is the largest. Moreover, the size
of the difference precludes the creation of a categorical variable for occupations,
contrary to what I was able to do in chapter 2.
It is noteworthy that switching from the second occupational category to a ma-
naging position has a larger effect than that of being from a scheduled group. On
the other hand, going out of the rural occupation category to the next has an effect
not too far in magnitude from the impact of being from a scheduled group (0.714
vs 0.522). Thus, assuming that the effect of occupational categories does not vary
across groups, an improvement in the occupational status may cancel the scheduled
group effect on perceived social class. As we shall later see, acquiring a managing
position is the most effective way of canceling the burden of being from a Scheduled
Group, compared to income or education.
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Tab. 4.21 – Estimates of the difference in coefficients - occupation groups - 2001
sub-sample
βoccupationj − βoccupationj+1
j = 1 j = 2
j + 1 0.738*** 0.522**
(0.000) (0.000)
p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ;
** significant at 5% ;***significant at 1%
Income
As far as incomes are concerned, the table below presents the tests of differences
in parameters.
Tab. 4.22 – χ2 test of difference in parameters - income - 2001 sub sample
Income 2 Income 3 Income 4 Income 5 Income 6
Income 1 1.34 0.00 0.91 4.33** 18.97***
(0.246) (0.985) (0.341) (0.038) (0.000)
Income 2 5.51** 12.67*** 29.52*** 58.79***
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 3 4.56** 22.9*** 55.79***
(0.033) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 4 6.26** 36.21***
(0.012) (0.000)
Income 5 23.42***
(0.000)
Robust p values in parentheses ;
*significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;***significant at 1%
The only categories that may be aggregated are the first and second ranges of
income as well as the sixth and seventh. Thus, we are left with 5 income categories
labeled revenue for more clarity. The categories are detailed below.
Tab. 4.23 – New income categories - 2001 sub-sample
Revenue 1 up to 1,000 Rs / month
Revenue 2 1,001 - 3,000 Rs / month
Revenue 3 3,001 - 5,000 Rs / month
Revenue 4 5,001 - 10,000 Rs / month
Revenue 5 More than 10,000 Rs / month
The difference in coefficients are then estimated and presented in the table 4.24 :
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Tab. 4.24 – Estimates of the difference in coefficients - income ranges
βrevenuej − βrevenuej+1
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4
j+1 0.2687** 0.2586** 0.2920** 0.6726***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.013) (0.000)
p values in parentheses ;
*significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;*** significant at 1%
What stands out from the table is that going from one revenue range to the next
as the same effect across all ranges except for the last one. Thus the revenue variable
may recoded as a categorical variable, while introducing a dummy to control for the
last category.
Can likely shifts in income ranges cancel the SC and ST effects ? Unfortunately,
results from the estimation over the 2001 sub-sample are less optimistic than the
one presented in the chapter. Given that being an SC has a stronger effect in this
sub-sample, an SC has to increase his income by three ranges to cancel the caste
effect. The same holds for the tribes. In concrete terms, an individual belonging to
a Scheduled group must see his income multiplied by five from 1,000Rs per month
to at least 5,000Rs per month, or shift from the 5,000Rs per month range to the
over 10,000Rs range, to counterbalance the effect of his group. This is quite a large
change, especially in comparison to an average monthly income of 3,000Rs in India.
So far, I have assumed that the effect of the characteristics do not vary across
groups, which should be verified. Unfortunately, the sizes of the SC and ST popula-
tions are too small (121 and 50 respectively) to be able to compare the joint effect
of the characteristics across the three groups. Thus I may only be able to test whe-
ther the effect of characteristics, besides groups, differ between the scheduled and
non-scheduled groups. The likelihood ratio χ29 concludes that the parameters vec-
tor do not significantly differ between the two groups, which contradicts the results
obtained over the whole sample.
9the likelihood ratio χ2 test is assessed at 18.42
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Section 5.1.2. Tests on Coefficients and Thresholds for Each
Variable Type
As mentioned in section 5.1.2 the impact of being a supervisory office worker is
not significantly different from belonging to the occupation1 group, when the latter
is omitted, and as testified by the results exhibited in table 4.26 below
Tab. 4.26 – Estimation of the model when the omitted category is Occupation 1
(1)
Caste Scheduled Caste -0.425***
0.000
Scheduled Tribe -1.233***
0.000
Income < 500 Rs / month -0.717***
0.000
501-1,000 Rs / month -1.177***
0.000
1,001-3,000 Rs / month -0.943***
0.000
3,001-5,000 Rs / month -0.721***
0.000
5,001-10,000 Rs / month -0.483***
(0.004)
10,001-30,000 Rs / month -0.319**
(0.050)
Education Primary and below -0.355***
0.000
Occupation Supervisory office -0.116
(0.158)
Non manual office -0.367***
(0.004)
Skilled manual -0.595***
0.000
Semi and unskilled manual -0.873***
0.000
Farmer : own farm -0.290***
0.000
Agricultural worker -0.948***
0.000
Observations 1653
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
Includes control variables such as year 1995 dummy, age, gender, marital status
and town size etc.
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Tab. 4.27 – Correlation coefficients across water sources
Tap Tubewell Tank Well
Tap 1
Tubewell 0.185*** 1
Tank -0.1499*** 0.0236 1
Well -0.4518*** -0.0313 0.3271*** 1
Robust p values in parentheses ; *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ;*** significant at 1% ; include control
variables
Tab. 4.28 – Type of Water Access Effect on the Number of Crimes against SCs and
STs
Total number of crimes against SCs and STs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water 12.49*** 12.27*** 11.26*** 6.513 8.858**
(0.00278) (0.00344) (0.00781) (0.11500) (0.03070)
Tot. nb. crimes 0.00954*** 0.00916*** 0.00865*** 0.00723*** 0.00776***
against non-scheduled. (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00054) (0.00018)
ln (population) 16.11** 19.20*** 17.52** 32.86*** 29.30***
(0.02820) (0.00958) (0.01870) (0.00000) (0.00000)
% dist. Pop. rural -47.17 -50.89 -43.56 -39.1 -49.2
(0.17100) (0.14200) (0.20600) (0.26700) (0.16100)
% dist. pop SC 343.4*** 359.9*** 1118***
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
% dist. pop SC2 -2116***
(0.00014)
% dist. pop ST 13.29 13.69 -39.86
(0.63700) (0.62800) (0.53400)
% dist. pop ST2 132.4*
(0.08210)
literacy rate -163.1*** -168.8*** -152.4*** -153.8*** -141.3***
(0.00020) (0.00013) (0.00056) (0.00057) (0.00140)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -401.5*** -311.2*** -445.6*** -444.1***
(0.00035) (0.00658) (0.00010) (0.00008)
Religious polarization α = 0 -105.6***
(0.00027)
Caste polarization α = 0 88.14**
(0.01640)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 793.0***
(0.00000)
Observations 573 573 573 573 573
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Tab. 4.29 – Type of Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crime - individual
water access modes
Percentage of Crime Marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Effect
% dist. pop water access tanks 0.0231* 0.0198 0.0223* 0.0292** 0.0316** 0.019
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0134)
% dist. pop water access wells 0.0175* 0.0164* 0.0173* 0.0107 0.0252** 0.017
(0.00921) (0.00921) (0.00916) (0.00951) (0.00987)
% dist. pop water access tubewells -0.0319*** -0.0299*** -0.0315*** -0.0339*** -0.0347*** -0.026
(0.00914) (0.00915) (0.00901) (0.00915) (0.00950)
% dist. pop water access tap 0.00378 0.00332 0.00493 -0.000719 0.00805 -
(0.00911) (0.00916) (0.00915) (0.00917) (0.0103)
ln district population 0.00301 0.00372 0.00232 -0.00765** 0.000662 -
(0.00272) (0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00385) (0.00287)
% district pop rural -0.0237 -0.0185 -0.0199 -0.0255 -0.0371** -
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0171)
literacy rate -0.0672*** -0.0712*** -0.0698*** -0.0670*** -0.0395 -0.056
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0299)
Religious polarization alpha=1.6 -0.208*** -0.214*** -0.207*** -0.150** -0.174
(0.0576) (0.0581) (0.0572) (0.0633)
Caste polarization alpha=16 0.211** 0.146* 0.199** -
(0.0844) (0.0857) (0.0909)
Caste polarization alpha=0 0.0113 0.0140 -
(0.0182) (0.0181)
Religious polarization alpha=0 -0.0567*** -
(0.0146)
ln state GDP 0.0113*** -
(0.00312)
Human development index as of 91 -0.121** -
(0.0483)
Observations 573 573 573 571 527
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
172 APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Tab. 4.30 – Type of Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crime
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2)
Water 0.00742*** 0.00874***
(0.000428) (1.49e-07)
ln district population -0.000920 -0.000695
(0.770) (0.791)
% district pop rural -0.0165 -0.0185
(0.289) (0.125)
% dist. pop SC 0.445*** 0.467***
(1.96e-05) (1.60e-08)
% dist. pop SC2 -0.858*** -0.896***
(0.00173) (2.65e-05)
% dist. pop ST -0.0735** -0.0331
(0.0209) (0.249)
% dist. pop ST2 0.144*** 0.0509
(0.000110) (0.233)
literacy rate -0.0610*** -0.0594***
(0.00458) (0.000456)
Religious polarization alpha=1.6 -0.194*** -0.152***
(0.000638) (0.000559)
Observations 573 530
Sample All states Tribal states removed
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tab. 4.32 – Number of cases registered under different crime heads - 2001 - All
India
Total number of cases Total number of cases
against SCs / STs
Murder 35,827 919
Rape 15,921 1,898
Kidnapping 22,304 466
Dacoity 6,032 68
Robbery 19,674 204
Arson 10,456 459
Hurt 268,669 5,286
Preparation for dacoity 1,603
Burglary 100,113
Theft 245,346
Riots 75,578
Breach of trust 14,616
Cheating 44,263
Counterfeiting 1,520
Dowry 6,821
Molestation 33,891
Sexual Harassment 9,595
Family Cruelty 48,886
Import of girls 114
Death by negligence 56,755
Attempt to commit murder 31,298
Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder 3,348
Other crimes classified under IPC 692,576
PCRA 685
PAA 14,799
Other 14,627
Total 1,745,206 39,411
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Tab. 4.33 – Correlation between fractionalization and government’s NGOs programs
Total Money Allocated Number Of Government’s Number Of NGO
To Governments’ Programs Program Programs
Fractionalization 0.0138 0.0424 -0.0344
(0.881) (0.646) (0.709)
P-value in parenthesis
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Résumé
Cette thèse s’inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui vise à réintégrer les institutions
et l’identité sociales en économie et ce pour trois raisons. Premièrement, de nombreuses
expériences comportementales ont mis à mal le modèle conventionnel de l’agent égoïste
maximisateur en raison notamment du rôle joué par les normes sociales. Deuxièmement,
les groupes sociaux, et l’identité qui en découle, peuvent déprécier les attentes des indivi-
dus les plus démunis et limiter leurs "capabilités" selon le terme de A. Sen. Dernièrement,
ces institutions peuvent contrecarrer l’allocation efficiente des ressources. Dans cette thèse,
nous présentons un modèle qui décrit la ségrégation comme un des équilibres provenant
d’une distribution inégale du pouvoir. L’intérêt de ce modèle réside, premièrement, dans
la reconnaissance que les sociétés ségréguées sont aussi celles où le pouvoir est très inéga-
lement réparti, deuxièmement, dans le fait que la ségrégation peut apparaitre en l’absence
de préjugés, troisièmement dans les définitions données du pouvoir et de la ségrégation qui
sont suffisamment amples pour recouvrir un grand nombre de situations, et enfin, dans le
processus qui mène d’une situation neutre à la ségrégation. Dans le second chapitre nous
montrons que la caste détermine considérablement le statut social perçu des intouchables
et des tribus. Néanmoins, d’autres facteurs comme le revenu, la profession et dans une
moindre mesure l’éducation ont aussi une importance. De plus la caste a un effet à la
fois direct et indirect, ce dernier s’exprimant par une influence réduite du revenu sur le
statut social perçu. Nous interprétons ces résultats comme l’internalisation de la discri-
mination subie depuis des siècles, qui abaisse l’image de soi et diminue les attentes. Dans
le troisième chapitre, nous mettons en évidence la persistance des pratiques d’intoucha-
bilité. Nous montrons que le nombre de crimes contre les intouchables est positivement
relié à une distribution communautaire de l’eau. Les règles de castes prohibent le contact
des intouchables avec les sources d’eau des castes supérieures. Bien que ces règles soient
anticonstitutionnelles, elles sont encore largement appliquées et de manière violente. A
priori, ces règles ne concernent pas uniquement l’eau mais aussi une grande partie des
biens publics, ce qui laisse à penser que ces derniers sont en réalité des biens de club ou
de caste. Ce dernier point est étudié dans le chapitre 4. Nous montrons que si l’indice
de fractionalisation a un effet sur la présence dans les villages de biens publics, cet effet
est essentiellement positif. En revanche les indices de polarisation ne semblent pas avoir
d’impact. Nous interprétons ce résultat, contraire à bon nombre de ceux obtenus aupara-
vant, comme le fait qu’il existe du patronage de castes. Cette hypothèse est testée à la
fin du chapitre. Les résultats semblent indiquer que les castes s’approprient l’usage des
biens fournis publiquement. En conclusion, nous proposons des pistes de recherche, visant,
essentiellement, à améliorer la compréhension de la formation des identités sociales et les
raisons de leurs mises en exergue.
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